After monthslong surveillance, Türkiye’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT) has exposed a "ghost" cell of 56 operatives spying on non-Turkish nationals in the country on behalf of the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad.

In a collaborative operation with the Anti-Terrorism Branch of the Istanbul Police Department, the agency’s counterintelligence unit apprehended seven people who all confessed to working for Mossad in their testimonies, according to information gathered by the Sabah newspaper.

According to MIT, the seven suspects are among the 56 operatives linked to a total of nine networks, which are each overseen by nine Mossad agents based in Tel Aviv and have the ability to operate on an international scale.

Documents from MIT revealed that the spies were gathering biographical intelligence on foreign nationals through an online routing method, tracking vehicle movements via GPS, hacking into password-protected networks based on Wi-Fi devices and finding private locations.

The operatives also physically followed certain targets determined by Mossad to surveil and photograph one-on-one meetings.

The cell, consisting of citizens from various Middle Eastern countries, used several fake websites in multiple languages, chiefly Arabic, to obtain technical locations and real IP addresses, MIT discovered.

All communication between Mossad agents in Türkiye and abroad was done through single-use mobile phone lines owned by fake persons in Spain, England, Germany, Sweden, Malaysia, Indonesia and Belgium.

One of the group’s leaders, a Mossad spy codenamed "Shirin Alayan" whose real identity MIT was unable to determine, used a German phone line to instruct a Palestinian named "Khaled Nijim" to set up bogus news platforms like "najarland.com, almeshar.com, nasrin-news.com and hresource.co.uk." These websites featured exclusively pinpoint articles to attract targets who would then click on virus links, enabling the network to infiltrate their phones.

The Istanbul unit of the network was provided cyber training and technical support remotely by a Priyanshi Patel Kulhari, the 24-year-old owner of Tel Aviv-based spy software firm Cyberintelligence International Private Ltd, MIT said.

Kulhari, who was in constant contact with the Mossad spies, determined how to infiltrate targeted phones and which news articles would be pushed for the target to click.

Far-reaching branches

MIT further found that Mossad sent its spies of Arab origin in Istanbul to especially Lebanon and Syria to gather intelligence and mark locations to be struck by armed drones.

Some Syrian and Lebanese agents working in the city were also deployed to Beirut to explore the Haret Hreik municipality and gather information. The agents discovered the exact coordinates for a building occupied by Lebanese Hezbollah, as well as the identities of the group’s high-level military and political figures residing on the third floor of the building.

Another network leader codenamed "Abdulla Qassem," whose real identity also remains unknown as he currently resides in Israel, introduced himself as a Jordanian Arab living in Sweden and instructed remotely a man called Zeyd Saadeddin to take pictures and analyze the security level of a strategically significant building in the Qudsiyeh district of Damascus.

Moreover, Mossad sent dozens of spies, including Turkish nationals, on secret three-stop touristic trips to first Serbia, then Dubai, and finally, Thailand’s capital Bangkok, three places that don’t require a visa for Turkish citizens. In Bangkok, the operatives would be taken to a Mossad center to learn espionage.

There, one Turkish man named Okan Albayrak, a fugitive Mossad agent, was taught to compose reports, surveil targets, evade and escape intelligence services like MIT, document photographs, observe and analyze intelligence, and put satellite tracking devices on vehicles.

MIT also learned that Mossad developed overcomplicated methods and conducted various operations in Istanbul to evade Turkish intelligence.

Mohammed Filli and Abdullah Fellaha, Mossad spies from Aleppo, discovered the office of Hisham Younis Yahya Qafisheh, the Syrian CEO of a real estate investment company in Istanbul’s Kağıthane district and planned a mugging to seize his phone and a burglary at Qafisheh’s apartment in the Başakşehir district to steal his computers and documents.

Filli and Fellaha were also involved in surveilling a foundation and several Egyptian nationals in Istanbul, including a dissident journalist, a doctor and a clerk at a foreign exchange office.

Furthermore, another Mossad spy codenamed "Ilya", whose real identity remains unknown, was tasked with following Soliman Agbaria, an Israeli of Arab origin.

Operating logic

While Mossad held so-called bureaus in various business fields in Malaysia, Indonesia and Sweden, all operations were managed from the Israeli capital.

Israeli intelligence tests the loyalty and abilities of its field agents by having them watch fake targets dubbed "whites" like mosques, churches the Grand Bazaar and the Egyptian Bazaar, Istanbul’s best-known tourist spots. Then the field agents are promoted.

Activities of a spy include five levels during which the operative is put through remote operational training. Once they complete the fifth level, the spy is deployed in an overseas post to be trained as a professional intelligence officer.

Turkish media also reported in May that MIT busted another cell of 15 Mossad agents based in Istanbul and made six arrests.

The agents were also found to be trained in Europe by Mossad executives and tasked with watching a company and 23 individuals with trade ties to Iran and targeted by Israel.

Last December, Türkiye exposed another group of seven people spying on Palestinians for Mossad, which used their intelligence to launch online defamation campaigns and threats against Palestinians.

The MIT, in cooperation with Turkish police, has uncovered a string of espionage networks in recent years, including one working for Russia, and thwarted a plot by Iran to assassinate Israeli citizens in Türkiye. Operations have also led to the discovery of a story by Iranian intelligence operatives to kidnap Iranian dissidents who took shelter in Türkiye.