Kirkuk is an ideal and small-scale mosaic of Iraq itself, representing the complex social and political landscape of the federal state. The latest provincial elections as well as the appointment of a new Kurdish governor once again threaten to risk renewed ethnical tensions.

Iraq’s provincial council elections, conducted in December, had not been held for around a decade due to the struggle against Daesh and internal problems. Kirkuk itself has not witnessed elections for 18 years. This has led the December elections to become a ruthless race of high importance in which Kirkuk’s groups endeavored to come forth in the political future of the province.

In the province of Kirkuk, which has a mixed population of Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen and has long been disputed territory between the central governments in Baghdad and the administration of the semi-autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in the country’s north, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) took the most votes, followed by a Sunni Arab list and a Turkmen list. The PUK emerging as the first party in Kirkuk was not a welcome development for either the Turkmen population or Türkiye.

The balance of power that emerged after the election results revealed the fact that no ethnic group can establish a local government in Kirkuk alone since none achieved the necessary eight-plus-one majority of the 16-seat council.

The next task was to appoint the necessary officials and distribution of tasks by finding a formula for the coalition of different groups.

However, the fractured election outcome caused a series of discussions and resulted in a failure to appoint a governor up until recently. Obligated to intervene, Iraq’s Prime Minister Mohammed S. Al Sudani pressured the provincial council to meet and decide on the duties. At last, five PUK members, three Arabs and one Christian member of the council came together in the capital Baghdad on Aug.10 and voted for the governorship and parliament chair. Rebwar Taha of the PUK was chosen governor and Arab member Mohammed Hafiz was chosen as the chairperson of the provincial council.

Yet, the rest of the council – the Turkmens, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and three other Arab members – did not attend the meeting. Although the reason for their absence at the meeting is not clear, the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITC) applied to the federal court to boycott the decisions – but to no avail.

Ankara’s perspective

Kirkuk was once a predominantly Turkmen province, sharing significant historical and cultural ties with Türkiye. It currently hosts a vast Kurdish population and has in recent years undergone what we can call "Arabization," through a growing population and political influence of Arabs coming to the city. Besides the cultural and ethnic ties, however, the oil-rich province bears strategic importance, putting it also into the focus of regional players such as Türkiye and Iran.

Politically supporting the Turkmen Front, Ankara envisaged a formula without the PUK for Kirkuk’s provincial council. The reason is that the PUK is known for its closeness to the PKK as well as Iran. Ideally, the 10 Turkmen, Arab and KDP members would form a coalition and become the majority. Yet fractions among the Arab council members have caused three to partner with the PUK, and the result is what we face today.

"The local government in Kirkuk has been formed through complex maneuvers on the local, national and regional scale," said Mehmet Alaca, an academic researcher focusing on Iraq. "Here, Türkiye and Iran, two regional rivals, came forth. The PUK receiving the post of governor is seen as a victory for Iran and a loss for Türkiye."

Alaca elaborated that pro-Iran groups, which have increased their influence in Kirkuk since the referendum of 2017, have won the game, now also strengthening their political presence besides their military ones. "In crisis areas, whoever is strong on the ground can set the table or overturn it, and Iran is skilled at doing this."

He added that Iran not only managed to win over the Kurds but also strong Sunni leaders that are pro-Mohammed al-Halbousi, a former parliament speaker and head of a Sunni coalition. The increasing weight of the PUK in Kirkuk is to be explained due to its connections to Iran, Alaca explained.

"Türkiye has tried to establish its Kirkuk policy through the Turkmens and the KDP. However, the KDP and Ankara pursue different goals in the province. While Ankara defends a common administration of Kirkuk by the Iraqi central government and the KRG, Irbil views the province as part of the KRG. Thus, despite adopting a compatible policy on the governorship, both actors would eventually seek their own agenda," the analyst said.

"Kirkuk is a strategic area for Iran’s military presence in Iraq, the transfer of military equipment to Syria as well as an illegal economy," Alaca pointed out, indicating that this aspect is more important than the PKK issue.

"Türkiye has concerns that a PUK governorship could open the doors for a PKK presence just as in Suleymaniyah – the headquarters of the PUK," he continued, yet highlighting that Ankara and Baghdad’s increasing cooperation against the PKK may influence the issue.

The Turkmen Front

The provincial elections and the following process of choosing a governor have been a defeat for Turkmens and their ambitions.

"The Turkmens of Kirkuk are not only fragmented into Sunni-Shiite camps or pro-Ankara-pro-Iran camps, but a long-standing rivalry also exists between the current and previous leaders of the ITC," Alaca underlined.

He said that the Turkmen have to adopt a local and national policy that distances itself from sectarian or outside influences.

"Since the Turkmens lack a military element in contrast to the Kurds or Arabs, they are left to the mercy of the other groups due to their failure in the political arena. In Iraq, military power decides on political power. Therefore, Turkmens both in Kirkuk and other areas, have to focus on achieving the optimum advantage from local politics," Alaca added.

The recent developments in Kirkuk present a complex picture in which both local and outside actors vie for clout. Ethnic and sectarian identities have become increasingly political in the city. And the race for the majority in the provincial council and the governorship has turned into a matter of identity, which also influences Kirkuk. Yet, the outcome shows that instead of laws, political bargaining and deals have become the norm in overcoming crises. It seems that Iran, for now, has gained the upper hand, exploiting the fractured groups and thus cementing its political and military sway. The current political position and the election results are here to stay. What is important is to prevent ethnic tensions from rising further and avert any scenario that could once again benefit terrorist organizations such as Deash or the PKK.