"I think Türkiye is going to hold the key to Syria," were the words of the United States’ incoming president on the new realities faced by the two allies and the beginning of a new chapter.

In 10 days, Donald Trump will take office, launching what many call "Trump 2.0." Bearing repercussions for every continent, countries have for some time now recalibrated their policies to prepare for Trump’s return. What is expected are new approaches as well as a continuation of the trade wars and maximum pressure policies that we saw in his first term.

Trump’s incoming has undoubtedly also significant implications for Ankara and this article will take a brief look at the main points of agenda that will dominate ties in the upcoming four years.

Syria

As already obvious, Trump’s words concerning Türkiye move around mainly on the topic of Syria. Ankara, too, had been calculating even before Trump’s victory the possibility of lessened or completely withdrawn U.S. forces from Syria, which would change the balance of power in the country – referring to the fact that one of Trump’s main acts in Syria previously was to decrease the number of American boots in the war-torn country. Being against Bashar Assad, the U.S. is content with the new picture of Syria after the dictator’s fall. Again, both the U.S. and Israel favored a weakened Iran, where the new situation in Syria cuts the country’s axis of influence across the Middle East. Coordination is planned with Türkiye to rebuild institutions in Syria, reorganize its army, establish an inclusive government and handle the future of the YPG. Türkiye is also expected to pressure the U.S. and the West to lift sanctions against Syria put into force during the term of Assad. The country faces severe economic problems, insufficient infrastructure and energy shortages, among other challenges. Although Washington on Jan. 6 issued a license permitting specific transactions in Syria for six months to facilitate public services and humanitarian assistance, more is needed. A formula to integrate non-terrorist forces within the YPG into a local force is also being worked on. Solving the YPG/PKK issue in Syria would lift one of the main straining points of Ankara-Washington relations.

Defense and security

The defense relationship between Türkiye and the U.S. remains a cornerstone of bilateral ties, yet it is marred by unresolved disputes. At the heart of this tension is Türkiye’s 2019 acquisition of the Russian S-400 missile defense system, which led to its removal from the F-35 stealth fighter program and the imposition of CAATSA sanctions by Washington. While Trump had previously downplayed the significance of these sanctions, a second-term Trump administration would likely face renewed pressure from Congress to address the issue.

Türkiye, as a NATO ally, faces the dual challenge of maintaining its strategic autonomy while reconciling its actions with alliance obligations. As the F-35 issue bears continued significance for Türkiye, the two allies are expected to work on solutions to address the problem. Compromises can be agreed on the S-400s, possibly including their non-operational storage.

Balancing act: Ukraine

Another topic that will once again gain the focus of the international community will be the continuing Russian invasion of Ukraine – especially after the fall of Assad in Syria and expectations that Moscow’s focus will shift further to the conflict. Trump emphasized a shift toward negotiations and a reduction of U.S. involvement. A shared interest exists between Washington and Ankara in resolving the war. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has a close dialogue with Russian President Vladimir Putin, has facilitated meetings and a deal between the warring countries, and the U.S. values its balancing act in general and makes Türkiye an indispensable ally for the issue.

Eastern Mediterranean dilemmas

The Eastern Mediterranean remains a volatile theater for Turkish-U.S. relations, driven by competing interests over energy resources and maritime claims between Ankara and Athens. As underlying problems between Türkiye and Greece have not been solved despite the current warm atmosphere, tensions may spark at any time. Ankara has also recently voiced disturbance by the U.S. using the island of Cyprus as a port to transfer military equipment to Israel in its attacks against Palestinians, fearing the island might be drawn into the conflict.

Trump’s transactional approach to diplomacy could manifest in efforts to mediate between Türkiye and its regional rivals, aiming to secure U.S. energy investments and prevent an escalation into open conflict. However, the administration would also likely weigh Türkiye’s strategic location in its calculus, recognizing its pivotal role as a transit hub for energy pipelines, including those bypassing Russia.

$100 billion vision

Economic cooperation between Türkiye and the U.S. has long been overshadowed by political disagreements, yet trade remains one of the most promising avenues for resetting ties. During Trump’s first term, both sides expressed ambitions to increase bilateral trade volume from $20 billion to $100 billion annually. Türkiye’s growing defense exports, including its drones that have gained global recognition, could serve as a bright spot in bilateral trade. However, the U.S. remains critical of Türkiye’s deepening economic ties with China and Russia, particularly in sectors like telecommunications and finance. These concerns might spur Washington to offer trade incentives aimed at drawing Türkiye closer to Western markets.

Iran and the Middle East

Türkiye’s nuanced relationship with Iran has long tested its ties with the U.S. While Ankara cooperates with Washington on some regional security issues, it often diverges on Iran-related policies. Türkiye’s refusal to fully comply with U.S. sanctions on Iran, particularly in the energy sector, has been a recurring irritant in bilateral relations.

During Trump’s previous term, the U.S. withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal and reinstated sweeping sanctions, which put Türkiye in a precarious position as a major importer of Iranian natural gas and a key trading partner. Iran and its proxies being weakened in the region due to its conflict with Israel is a reason to watch how Türkiye will position itself with expected renewed "maximum pressure" on Iran by Trump 2.0. It should not be forgotten that Trump’s main priority in the Middle East is to guarantee the security of Israel – a point that has repercussions for internal U.S. politics. Trump, in his first term, moved its embassy to Jerusalem and facilitated the Abraham Accords to foster ties between Arab countries and Israel, thereby adding to its security. The war on Gaza has irritated several Arab countries, and Trump thus is expected to refocus on Israel’s position in the region. Otherwise, the administration has previously voiced that it wants to turn its focus to Asia to counter growing Chinese influence.

In all these areas, the Trump administration’s transactional approach, coupled with Türkiye’s insistence on strategic autonomy, is likely to produce both friction and opportunities for collaboration. The success of bilateral ties will hinge on whether both sides can navigate these challenges while preserving their shared strategic interests. "Leaders diplomacy," a term often used for the close dialogue between Erdoğan and Trump in his first term, might again be decisive in the near future.