Ankara's and Tehran's parallel stances regarding the ongoing war on Gaza are unlikely to spread into other fields of cooperation as the two countries’ geopolitical rivalry lingers and ideological differences constitute barriers.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi on Wednesday agreed on the need to avert the Israel-Hamas war from engulfing the entire Middle East region.
The conflict has already spread across the region. Aside from Gaza, the theater of conflict with the widest international repercussions has been the Red Sea, where the Houthis have repeatedly targeted shipping they say is bound for or linked to Israel. In response, U.S. and British strikes over the past week have targeted Houthi forces in Yemen. Over the past three months, Israel has also repeatedly struck at Iranian targets in Syria, while Iranian-backed groups in Syria and Iraq have fired at U.S. targets in those countries. To everyone’s surprise, Iran also struck Pakistan this month, which drew tit-for-tat airstrikes in each other’s territories.
Both Türkiye and Iran have raised their voice against Israel’s monthslong bombardment on civilians in Gaza since the first phases of the conflict and urged the international community to act. Both have also not shied away from strongly criticizing the West for emboldening Israel in its attacks. Frequent contact and coordination existed on the levels of the president as well as the foreign minister during this process. On Oct. 26, the Iranian foreign minister told an extraordinary meeting of the U.N. General Assembly that Tehran was ready to fulfill a role with Türkiye and Qatar in the release of hostages held by Hamas. In November, again Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian said that Tehran appreciated Ankara’s guarantorship proposal and called for a permanent cease-fire along with Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan.
However, although the two seem to be in concert on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and wider geopolitical issues, significant differences and friction exist in bilateral ties.
Iran has adopted a harsher stance against Israel while Türkiye in the initial days of the conflict spoke with Israel’s president and disapproved of Hamas’ attacks on Israeli civilians, which started the conflict on Oct. 7. Before the Gaza conflict, Türkiye had been normalizing with Israel, even appointing ambassadors while trade relations also continued to flow despite the harsh rhetoric by the Turkish president. In 2022, Ankara also nabbed several cells working for Iranian intelligence that tried to target Israeli citizens in Türkiye. Currently, Türkiye’s stance against Israel and the conflict in general is often criticized by Iranian media, which states that Ankara’s response is insufficient and that it cooperates with Tel Aviv.
Analysts also note widespread anger in Iran's official and semi-official media about Türkiye’s continuing trade and diplomatic relations with Israel. Raisi stressed in his public remarks that it was essential for all nations to "limit their relationship with the Zionist regime." Similarly, during his news conference with Erdoğan, Raisi countered that it was important for all countries to cut off trade with Israel – an apparent reference to Ankara’s steadfast refusal to do so that underscored tensions in Ankara's ties with Tehran.
Seeing this conflict as an opportunity to raise its popularity among Muslim nations, Iran tries to position itself as the greatest and sole advocate of the Palestinian cause through what it calls the "Axis of Resistance," a loose coalition that includes Hamas and armed Shiite Muslim groups around the region, portraying the Arab monarchies as actors that cannot act in the face of the massacre in Gaza due to their ties with the West.
On the other hand, Ankara and Tehran also diverge in their relations with Hamas. Türkiye does not view Hamas as a terrorist group unlike the West but rather as an officially elected structure and liberation force of Palestine. It is hosting Hamas officials and supporting their cause, yet Iran’s ties with the group are stronger with Tehran having provided Hamas training, funding and weapons through the years with the joint aim of containing Israel in the region. Military cooperation also exists between several Iran-backed groups and Hamas.
Testy relations
Türkiye and Iran share a 560-kilometer (348-mile) border that has not been changed for almost 400 years. The Turkish Foreign Ministry describes its relations with Tehran as based on "non-interference in domestic affairs, mutual respect and good neighborliness," which reflects Ankara’s policies toward the country. During the protests for Mahsa Amini's death in 2022, Türkiye did not engage in statements interfering in the country’s affairs. Similarly, during the protests in 2018 against rising commodity prices and perceived government mismanagement, the Turkish Foreign Ministry said violence and provocation along with external interventions should be avoided.
There has been a rapprochement between the two countries in the past few years through separating areas of cooperation and areas where significant differences in points of view exist and containing their rivalry. Türkiye stood with Iran against tightening international sanctions. Vital energy cooperation is also among the common economic interests with Iran being the second-largest supplier of natural gas to Ankara following Russia. Moreover, both have been trying to take advantage of the vacuum left by a lessened U.S. footprint in the Middle East.
Yet, relations are testy in terms of geopolitical cooperation, with both often differing in their stances regarding regional conflicts. In Syria, Türkiye has backed the opposition, which tried to topple Iran’s major ally, the Bashar Assad regime. Iran often targets northwestern Syria, especially Idlib, a sphere of influence of Türkiye. Similarly, to Iraq, Iran sees Ankara’s presence in Syria as an occupying force that works against Assad being able to establish control over his war-ridden country. Organic ties exist between the Alawite Baathist regime and Iran since the founding of the Islamic Republic in 1979. Still, the two engage in dialogue on Syria, having established the Astana format, support Syria’s territorial integrity and oppose the U.S. presence here.
Iraq is another scene of frequent tensions between Ankara and Tehran. Iranian officials do not shy away from accusing Türkiye of breaching Iraq’s sovereignty during Turkish operations against the PKK in the country’s north. Iran-backed militias also retain ties with the terrorist group and rally Baghdad to take action against Türkiye’s airstrikes, angering Ankara. Just last week, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) attacked the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) capital Irbil, killing at least four civilians. Irbil is an essential partner for Türkiye both in the fight against the PKK and in the economic and political fields.
Also in the South Caucasus, both countries’ policies fail to overlap. Türkiye has strengthened its position in the region through its vital support for Azerbaijan in the Karabakh wars while simultaneously engaging in normalization efforts with Armenia. A potential peace deal between Baku and Yerevan would further nourish Ankara’s position. Iran, which has cultural and historical ties with the South Caucasus and hosts a considerable number of Azerbaijani Turks in the country, has seen its influence in the region diminish. The proposed plan of the Zanguzur corridor, which aims to connect Azerbaijan’s Nakchivan enclave and the rest of the country, is also closely followed by Tehran as this corridor would enable a direct route from Türkiye to Azerbaijan, bypassing and economically disadvantaging Iran. Also here, platforms for cooperation exist such as the 3-plus-3 mechanism for the Caucasus and dialogue with Tehran to include it into plans for the corridors. The upcoming period will show whether an agreement can be struck to cooperate on the trade routes in the South Caucasus that would benefit the development of the region.
Türkiye and Iran will try to shift the status quo in the region to their own benefit in the future. The scenes of Iraq, Palestine, Syria and the South Caucasus are worth watching to see the trajectory of balance between contained rivalry and limited cooperation. Although seemingly aligned in the Palestinian cause, time will show whether the spiraling out of control of the conflict toward the wider Middle East will enable both countries to uphold their cooperation.