Recent statements from Turkish authorities and increasing PKK attacks on Turkish soldiers in Iraq point to fresh tensions between Ankara and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), one of the dominant parties in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).
Türkiye has intensified its airstrikes in Syria and the Metina, Gara, Hakurk and Qandil regions of northern Iraq after nine Turkish soldiers were killed in clashes with the PKK last week and another 12 died in a similar attack last month. The incidents have once again turned Ankara's attention toward the heightened activity of the PKK in the country, using Iraq's weak government and internal divides.
"We will not hesitate to take further measures if the PUK does not change its supportive attitude toward the PKK despite our sanctions against Sulaymaniyah in Iraq," Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said Tuesday, pointing at continued frictions with the Suleymaniyah-based PUK.
Türkiye's airstrikes in northern Iraq are not new but have been continuing for decades to prevent the PKK from using the country as a launching pad for attacks against Türkiye. Especially since 2019, Ankara has set up a 15- to 30-kilometer-deep buffer zone along its border with Iraq as part of cross-border operations dubbed "Claw." Türkiye has built 620 kilometers (385 miles) of roads in "Claw" operation zones and Turkish troops have eliminated 1,689 PKK terrorists in the operation zone since then. Within this frame, Ankara has been cooperating and coordinating its operations with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the ruling party of the KRG. Besides security, Türkiye and the KDP also boast significant cooperation in politics and trade. Yet Türkiye's expectations of a similar partnership with the PUK against the PKK have not been met.
"The PUK allows the PKK to walk around Suleymaniyah freely. These terrorist elements even operate under the helm of legal structures," security sources told Daily Sabah regarding the latest tensions. "This stance of the PUK toward the PKK has developed in the past few years."
When asked why PUK maintains its ties with the PKK at the expense of relations with Türkiye, the sources said: "Both the U.S. and Iran are putting pressure on PUK in this regard. However, this is not sustainable and is self-defeating." They added that amid the recent tensions, PUK officials demanded a meeting with Turkish authorities. Whether such a meeting will take place is to be seen and might not be made public, as Ankara does not prefer to give pictures of the party in the current conjuncture.
What the sources described as U.S. pressure is Washington's desire for cooperation between PUK forces and the PKK/YPG mainly "to fight Daesh." Iran, on the other hand, has more complex goals.
Relations between Ankara and the PUK have had their ups and downs in the past decade but rarely witnessed a period that could be called positive. Having enjoyed relatively positive ties during the Jalal Talabani period, relations became more tricky when a co-chairmanship was established in the PUK leadership in 2020 between Jalal Talabani's son, Bafal Talabani, and his cousin Lahur Sheikh Jangi. Bafal Talabani's ousting of his cousin, who was known for his anti-Türkiye stance, was a welcome development for Ankara. Yet Türkiye's ongoing operations on KRG territory continued to cause tensions with Bafal Talabani, leading the latter to criticize Ankara openly and frequently.
In April, a suspected Turkish strike targeted the ringleader of the PKK's Syrian branch YPG, Ferhat Abdi Şahin, also known as "Mazloum Kobani," and three U.S. military personnel, who were reportedly near Suleymaniyah airport. The Iraqi government called on Ankara to apologize.
Furthermore, on Sept. 18, an airstrike on Suleymaniyah's Arbat airport, which left three members of the PUK's Counter-Terrorism Group (CTG) dead and three others wounded, was blamed on Ankara by Iraqi officials. While not claiming the attack, the Turkish Foreign Ministry said the next day that, "It is understood that the members of the PUK's 'Anti-Terrorist Group' were conducting a training exercise together with PKK/YPG terrorists at the time of the explosion. This development is quite disturbing as it has clearly revealed the cooperation between the PUK's security apparatus and members of the terrorist organization."
The CTG is known to have ties with the YPG. Following the attack, PUK leader Bafal Talabani labeled the strike as a "terrorist attack" and said, "Our problem with Türkiye is hard to resolve."
Suleymaniyah airport often serves as a hub for YPG/PKK terrorists and is vital for entry into PUK-governed territories. The attacked airport is eating away at the economy and benefitting airports in Irbil and Kirkuk.
The PUK has been forging close ties with the PKK, especially since the Syrian civil war and openly voicing support. In December 2022, Bafal visited Syria's Afrin publicly and met with Şahin and other officials of the YPG. He then stated that, "The PUK will always support its brother and sisters in Rojava to achieve their rights and demands through peaceful means."
Ties may be salvaged
Despite the aggressive exchange of words between Ankara and the PUK, Türkiye does not aim to completely rupture ties as relations have the potential to be salvaged and both might benefit from enhanced ties. The PUK is still a vital actor in the KRG and the KDP, with which it partakes in a power-sharing agreement forged following the bloody civil war between the Barzani and Talabani clans between 1994 and 1998. The PUK's strategic significance can also be seen in the party receiving the most votes in last month's local elections in Iraq's Kirkuk, a resource-rich province with which Türkiye has cultural ties. In the case of increased consonance between the KDP and the PUK, the two Kurdish parties could form a counterweight against Baghdad and attain a greater role in decision-making and terms of bargaining power, benefitting the Kurdish region.
Another reason why Türkiye is not shutting the door on the PUK is that Ankara does not want to push the party further toward Iran's axis. Through keeping close ties with the PUK and entrenching the Baghdad government, Iran aims to further its regional ambitions while trying to resist Turkish influence in Iraq. Iran took advantage of divisions between the two Kurdish parties as well as of the diminishing U.S. footprint in the country. Tehran was also influential in launching a case ruling that oil exports from the KRG through Türkiye were illegal. Iran killed two birds with one stone as the ruling weakened the economy of the KRG and caused disruptions in the cooperation with Türkiye.
Currently, the relations between the PUK and Iran are not of mutual benefit but mirror the dependency and dominance of one over the other. The party drifting out of Tehran's orbit and focusing on balanced ties with its neighbors, as with the KDP, would be a better strategy for the future. Türkiye will continue to voice criticism of the PUK for allowing Suleymaniyah, its administrative capital, to be a refuge for PKK terrorists. A lack of cooperation with Türkiye in the KRG will only lead Ankara to extend its presence and operations in the region, whereas coordination and intelligence exchanges with the PUK could aid in pinpointing and targeting PKK elements in a manner that would cause less damage to the reputation and stability of Suleymaniyah.