Inherent to its nature, Türkiye’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT) is shrouded in secrecy and its workings have remained under wraps for decades; but since 2010, the agency has been undergoing what has been broadly described as a “revolution” through which it launched headline-making cross-border anti-terrorism operations, busted spy networks at home, and developed a complementary mechanism for Turkish diplomacy.
Tracking the agency’s profile has thus become a lot easier in the past decade, as opposed to a “darker,” that is, unknown era in Türkiye’s intelligence past. The MIT has become more visible through various reforms that now tell the tale of an increasingly self-reliant institution, according to two security experts.
For Merve Seren Yeşiltaş, author, security and intelligence expert, and assistant professor of International Relations at Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, the agency’s growing prominence is tied to its former chief – and current foreign minister – Hakan Fidan’s efforts to build an authentic institution by fortifying it with Western references, namely operational capabilities and technological improvements.
Beneath this revolution lie certain motivations triggered by a surge in the variety of regional and international threats, like post-Cold War polarizations and a search for proxy elements across the Middle East, pointed out another expert Cenker Korhan Demir, associate professor of International Relations at Hasan Kalyoncu University.
“These threats kicked off a search for what is called strategic autonomy in foreign policy and pushed Türkiye into action,” Demir told Daily Sabah in an exclusive interview.
“Türkiye was forced to rely on its own skills and build on these in the face of security issues in its near region and concentrated its efforts, especially from the 2010s onwards, on obtaining its strategic interests via these skills,” Demir said.
He conceded that the roots of transformation were laid in the early 2000s when the MIT functioned as a kind of support mechanism. “That has now changed. The MIT has become an operational element in mostly three primary steps,” Demir argued.
Several legislative addendums, most notably in 2014, expanded MIT’s field of authorization, enabling it to conduct operations abroad.
In 2012 and 2013, incorporating the Electronic Systems Command from the General Staff, establishing directorates for foreign operations, signal and cyber intelligence, as well as infrastructural changes, have facilitated organizational development while coordinated action with the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) ensured operational expansion, according to Demir.
“In addition to armed drones, intelligence ships and reconnaissance planes, the MIT adopted human intelligence intertwined with technicalities, demonstrating its effectiveness,” he explained, pointing to support provided by local security units in cross-border operations like Euphrates Shield (2015), Olive Branch and Peace Spring in Syria, Iraq and even Libya.
What shows initiative, especially to the international community, however, Demir said, has been leadership "decapitation" operations, a central pillar in intelligence policy in which capturing or killing a terrorist group's leader is effective.
The Aug. 15, 2018 killing of the PKK’s so-called administrative council member Ismail Özden in an air-backed strike in northern Iraq was the MIT’s first overseas decapitation operation. The following year, the agency went on to eliminate many of the group’s spokespersons and foreign affairs representatives.
In 2020, it dealt a major blow to the group’s Syrian branch by eliminating Sofi Nurettin, the highest-ranking member of its armed wing ever killed.
In 2021, it took out Ali Haydar Kaptan, one of the founding members, in a joint operation with TSK.
Earlier in April this year, Daesh leader Abu Hussein al-Qurashi was killed by the MIT’s special operations team in Syria.
The agency has also been striving to consider civilian lives in counterterrorism operations, an issue that has been promoted in domestic and international venues, Demir noted.
As for intelligence diplomacy, such a phenomenon has always existed, according to Yeşiltaş “but beyond corporate competition between the MIT and the Foreign Ministry, a corporate cooperation has emerged especially from 2010 onwards.”
The agency has coordinated joint initiatives with counterparts from several other countries in a bid to bolster Türkiye’s foreign policy in recent years, Demir said.
Advancing bilateral ties with neighboring Iraq in 2009, which was both a regional and central administrative move, the surprisingly swift solving of the 2018 murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi and sharing the case with Washington were all a “clear message” to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and even the UAE and the U.S., he argued.
“It was a kind of warning that Türkiye now has an independent initiative in its region and initiating any action in Türkiye was not so possible anymore,” he said. “It also worked to highlight the MIT’s power and effectiveness.”
This is how the MIT’s increased visibility is interpreted worldwide, Demir said, within the context of its serious enterprising over the past decade, from overseeing the Black Sea grain deal and prisoner swaps between Russia and Ukraine to hosting the chiefs of CIA and Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation (SVR RF) in Ankara for clandestine talks.
This visibility has only worked to highlight Ankara’s mediator role in international conflicts but has also been effective in blending Turkish foreign policy with mature intelligence data, Demir said.
According to Yeşiltaş, this popularity comes with both advantages and disadvantages, including the position it puts the MIT in where it can come under more intense scrutiny from not just politicians and the bureaucracy but local and international public, as well.
“There is a herd salivating to prey on your smallest mistake and use it against you when you’re in the spotlight,” she said and added, “Undoubtedly, transparency and accountability are noble terms for intelligence ethics, but the first rule of intelligence is ‘caution.’”
The MIT, in the meantime, has attained a status allowing it to prevent its international counterparts from taking initiative in its region of domain, which provides leverage to Turkish diplomats in political talks, Demir said.
Yeşiltaş believes as a NATO state, Türkiye has the biggest and riskiest gallery of threats than any other member.
“Despite it, Türkiye continues to put up a commendable fight against domestic or external threats. In that regard, it should be noted that even if its technology isn’t at the same level as some Western nations and most of the time it’s blocked by its allies, Turkish intelligence constitutes a reference point for many countries,” she said.
The improvement in the intelligence mechanism was also in part helped by Fidan’s military notion and continental experience, Yeşiltaş added.
In contrast, Ibrahim Kalın, previously President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s chief adviser until he was named the MIT’s new director after the May elections, does not have a military past, but he is more familiar with the intelligence discipline than most believe, she said.
Citing Kalın’s tenure as the first head of the Public Diplomacy Coordination and “unique ability” to analyze Türkiye’s operational field through historical, political, sociological, religious and cultural aspects, she argued his think-tank and bureaucracy experience would make major contributions to MIT.
Dismissing the recent idea that MIT has “taken over” the military’s role with its leap, Yeşiltaş said, “I believe Kalın can reinforce the agency by transforming into a hub that can produce and implement long-term strategic plans in civilian fields that concern national security and interests.”
Whether this transformation can be sustained depends on investments in education, coordination mechanisms and human talents, Demir added. “If technical capacity and capability are improved and the MIT is further institutionalized, then there is nothing standing in the way of advancement and expansion.”
