2024 was a year in which Türkiye managed a turbulent Middle East while endeavoring to widen the scope of its foreign policy by focusing on several regions and actively participating in global platforms ranging from BRICS and the G-20 to the Conference of Asian Political Parties. Having normalized with a good deal of actors in the region, Ankara finds itself with new opportunities for cooperation and peace amid some of its immediate neighbors. Here is a look at its primary focus for 2025.
The most crucial development for Turkish foreign policy has undoubtedly been the fall of Bashar Assad. Ankara had supported and hosted the Syrian opposition since 2011, urging an inclusive administration and a new constitution. For the first time in years, Ankara has seen hope in establishing peace and stability in neighboring Syria, and the international community's stance will be vital in pursuing this goal. However, besides the political consideration, Syria bears two more critical factors for Türkiye in 2025, which have also affected its internal politics. The first is the problem of nearly 4 million Syrian refugees that have resided in the country since the civil war in Syria broke out. The issue has become more urgent as anti-refugee sentiment has been fanned by some political circles, and economic problems have been blamed partially on refugees. Thus, laying the foundations for Syria’s reconstruction and voluntary returns is a priority of the ruling coalition in Türkiye. The second pressing issue linked with the new picture in Syria is the continuing problem of PKK terrorism. Türkiye has long fought to end the presence of the PKK’s Syrian wing, the YPG, despite Western support. The YPG has holed up in Syria’s northeast, controlling oil fields and significant territory, taking advantage of the fragmented country under Assad. Yet things have changed. Türkiye and the new Syrian administration want the YPG to dissolve, in which all non-Syrian fighters would leave the country, and the rest would be integrated into a local security force under the Syrian Defense Ministry. Achieving this goal would also have a noteworthy influence on Türkiye’s Iraq policy.
The Hamas attack on Israel at the end of 2023 already signaled that 2024 would bring together challenges for Türkiye and the region. The ongoing conflict, which left tens of thousands of Palestinian civilian deaths while devastating much of the Gaza Strip, has also boiled over to neighboring countries and has put a stop to Ankara’s normalization with Tel Aviv. Since then, Türkiye has engaged in busy diplomacy to reach a cease-fire, transferred tons of humanitarian aid, led an international Gaza contact group, took part in a genocide case against Israel and even proposed to shoulder the role of guarantor for the conflict. Yet Israel’s attacks have not ceased, while the United States has fallen short of reining in its ally. This might change with Donald Trump. Washington’s support for Israel will continue, yet the new administration is keen on halting the conflict. In the new picture that will emerge, Türkiye will step up as one of the main actors, sharing humanitarian and religious ties with the Palestinian people. Ankara will continue to lobby for a two-state solution and engage in efforts to rebuild Gaza. Moreover, Türkiye will closely follow how the conflict will affect its neighbor Iran. Israel has weakened the main Iranian militia groups in the region, including Hezbollah, and attacked Iran multiple times. Considering that Trump, in his previous term, advocated maximum pressure on Iran strategy, new developments may follow. Ankara will be wary of any instability in the country of 90 million, fearing new migrant waves and voids that could be used by PKK affiliations in Iran.
In 2024, Türkiye turned a new page with Iraq, marked by the visit of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to Baghdad. Signing a dozen agreements, Ankara welcomed Iraq designating the PKK as a “banned organization.” After years of strains caused by Ankara’s military operations against the terrorist organization in Iraq’s north, a positive momentum was achieved with Iraq. The highlight of the new era of cooperation will be the Iraqi Development Road Project, which will benefit Turkish trade and Turkish companies, as well as the welfare and security of Iraq and the wider region. It also proves strategic in providing an alternative to the U.S.-backed India-Middle East route, which is currently inviable due to the conflict in Israel. That route bypasses Türkiye. On the other hand, new developments are expected regarding the fight against the PKK. With friendlier ties in Baghdad, Ankara aims to drive the PKK into a corner. However, the picture is not all rosy. A strong influence of pro-Iran groups over Baghdad might hamper several steps. Moreover, Ankara will follow the elections in Iraq, which might end up with Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al Sudani losing his seat. Again, ties with the Barzani clan in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) will be in focus. Türkiye recently started a new process to end PKK terrorism – which is also viewed as highly important for internal politics. The Barzanis will prove influential figures for the upcoming process. Pressure can be expected to grow on the Talabanis, both for their close ties with the YPG and Iran. With the Gaza war having its implications on Iran, especially potential attacks on Hashd al-Shaabi might leave the Baghdad government in a tight spot, thus drifting Ankara-Baghdad ties into uncertainty. Possible instability in Iraq would both complicate the fight against the PKK, have negative repercussions on Erbil and make significant projects such as the Development Path impossible. For this reason, Ankara seems to be preparing for a period in which it will strengthen its shuttle diplomacy to prevent tensions from escalating or getting out of control.
Mogadishu hosts Türkiye’s most extensive overseas military base and academy. Since 2017, Ankara has been training Somali soldiers, most of whom have acquired Turkish language skills, in various fields, including counterterrorism, considering the threat of al-Shabab. Humanitarian ties are similarly without fault. Yet, new circumstances emerged due to Ethiopia signing a maritime deal to build a port in the breakaway republic of Somaliland. Since then, the two neighbors have been at loggerheads. Enjoying strong relations with both, Türkiye stepped in as a mediator and, last month, negotiated an agreement to end the dispute. The details of how the interests of landlocked Ethiopia and Somalia will be aligned will be shaped in 2025. Moreover, in July, Türkiye and Somalia signed a deal on hydrocarbon exploration and production. The new year is expected to bring growth to the multifaceted cooperation with both Addis Ababa and Mogadishu.
As Russia turned its focus away from Syria after Assad’s fall and amid overstretched military forces, Ukraine will once again top Türkiye’s and the globe’s agenda. The war in Gaza and the resulting geopolitical turmoil in the Middle East had caused Ankara’s attention to turn to the East. Russia recently won the upper hand in Ukraine, advancing at several points using the advantage of Kyiv’s woes of the war economy and slipping morale among soldiers. The election of Trump in the U.S. will have significant implications for the war. Trump has vowed to end the war, forcing the two sides to the negotiation table. Türkiye, the sole actor that managed to bring the two sides together since the start of the war and facilitated the Black Sea Initiative, is expected to play a role in post-war Ukraine after a cease-fire is established. Besides a potential role in peacekeeping, Kyiv expects Turkish firms to participate in the country’s reconstruction.
Although again plagued with challenges, many possibilities await Türkiye, which recalibrated bilateral relations with several previous foes. The fact that Ankara’s clout is also growing in global platforms and alliances will prove vital. Besides these five main agendas that will bear new occasions for Türkiye, the following five should also be watched closely.
Firstly, ties with the European Union are on a new track with less tension in the Eastern Mediterranean and Greece. The issue of Ankara’s bid to purchase Eurofighter jets will still be a priority. Moreover, Türkiye will have an eye on elections in Germany – one of the country’s largest trading partners and where approximately 3 million people of Turkish descent reside.
Second will be developments in Iran as mentioned within the Gaza paragraph. Cyprus is another field for attention as Ankara will continue to press countries and international organizations in 2025 to recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). How the recent deal to upgrade the Greek Cypriot administration’s defensive capabilities with U.S. assistance will affect the delicate balance on the divided island will be watched closely as will be the possibility of the island being dragged into the Gaza conflict due to Western military bases sending Israel military aid.
Growing cooperation with Gulf countries will be another mark of 2025 as Türkiye eyes a free trade deal with the Gulf Cooperation Council and seeks to align the foreign policies of essential Gulf countries to survive rising geopolitical challenges in the Middle East. Lastly, Ankara’s focus on Africa will grow in all fields whether humanitarian, economic or political. With South Africa heading the G-20 presidency this year, Türkiye will reemphasize its ties with the continent. A special focus will continue on the Horn of Africa, Libya as well as Niger, where Türkiye will begin its first gold production.
