Despite having nearly a thousand years of shared history and culture, Mediterranean neighbors and NATO allies Türkiye and Greece have been standing on opposite ends of the barricade for long years, and 2022 was no different. Bilateral relations hit several snags and saw dead-ends, close calls, and even geographical rapprochement throughout the turbulent year. It was one of reciprocal threats, verbal spats and aerial run-ins that brought the frost between Ankara and Athens no closer to thawing. At least not any more than in previous years.
The rival nations kicked off 2022 on shaky ground, with one-on-one communication already lukewarm due to a longstanding demilitarization issue from two previous summers over the islands of their shared Aegean Sea.
While Athens pondered its age-old plans to expand its maritime boundary claim to 12 nautical miles —something it attempted to accomplish in the 1990s but scuttled after Ankara declared such a move would be a cause of war— Türkiye was lambasting its neighbor for its illegal pushbacks of migrants, as well as human rights abuse.
A number of conflicts stand tall between the two countries, including competing claims over jurisdiction in the Eastern Mediterranean, overlapping claims over their continental shelves, maritime borders, airspace, energy exploration, the Turkish minority in Western Thrace, the ethnically split island of Cyprus, the status of the Aegean islands and migration.
The flow of migrants from Türkiye to Greece, the gateway to western Europe for countless refugees in search of better lives, has been the second most pressing issue Ankara and Athens have clashed over this year, besides the dispute over the islands.
In early January, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis threatened to impose sanctions on Türkiye in case Ankara became “more aggressive” in its criticism of the Greek coast guard’s violent, most often inhumane, treatment of migrants trying to cross into official European territory.
It’s been reported and documented by Türkiye and several international organizations, including the United Nations and the EU, that Greek elements strip and rob asylum-seekers of their belongings and dismantle the engines of inflatable boats before pushing them back into Turkish territorial waters.
A report by the Guardian in June revealed Greek security forces even coerced irregular migrants to turn away their fellow asylum-seekers.
Ankara has repeatedly slammed Greece for its continued mistreatment, argued that it was the primary reason behind the recent surge in migrant deaths in the Mediterranean, and denounced the EU for “turning a blind eye” to the tragedy.
In February, however, the EU country drew the fury of not only Türkiye but also international organizations for causing the deaths of 19 migrants by stripping them of their clothes and pushing them back over the Turkish border.
The continued silence from the EU spurred Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to decry Greece and the EU’s border protection agency, Frontex, for cooperating with Greece. The Turkish leader vowed to bring up the issue during every meeting he would hold with world leaders, stressing Türkiye would “continue to be on the side of the oppressed.”
Greece denied involvement in the incident by dubbing it a “tragedy,” with Migration and Asylum Minister Notis Mitarachi saying on Twitter that any suggestion that Greek forces had pushed the victims back would be "patently false.”
Yet, days later, the Greek coast guard threw a Yemeni family into the sea while trying to cross into the Greek island of Chios. The family was saved in the nick of time from drowning by the Turkish coast guard. However, the incident made no dent in the overall atmosphere, merely adding to the tally of asylum-seekers Greece dispersed.
Months into 2022, the ferocity of their violations finally prompted a warning from the EU’s top migration body, who told Athens protecting the bloc’s borders was “important” but “violent deportations of migrants must stop” if the country did not want to risk losing funds.
Indeed, the surge in migration in recent years led to hundreds dying at sea as many boats carrying refugees sank or capsized. Türkiye’s Ombudsman Institution said in July that Greece had pushed back nearly 42,000 asylum-seekers since 2020.
Between Jan.1 and Dec. 16 of this year, the Turkish coast guard has saved 47,498 irregular migrants in 1,550 separate cases across its areas of responsibility in the Aegean, 18,487 of whom were victims sent back by Greece, the agency said.
Another report by France’s Le Monde newspaper revealed Frontex had indeed been involved in Greece’s illegal pushback of over 900 asylum-seekers between March 2020 and September 2021, despite public denial.
As recently as Dec. 30, Turkish security forces patrolling the region rescued 201 migrants lost on inflatable dinghies, days after two migrant women drowned near the Aydın province after Greek officers forced their group back into Turkish waters.
Despite this international scrutiny and evidence, alongside abundant testimony from the victims, Greek authorities have consistently denied the pushbacks. Mitsotakis’ conservative government has vowed to make the country “less attractive” to migrants since coming into power in 2019.
In November, Greece inked a deal with Egypt involving a term to improve cooperation in migrant search and rescue missions in the Mediterranean, which Ankara said contradicts Athens’ continued pushback policy and aims to “whitewash the pushbacks” as the country continuously refused to do the same with Türkiye in the Aegean.
By the end of the year, Erdoğan was declaring Greece’s attitude towards migrants as having reached “brutal levels” and accusing the west of indifference to “heart-wrenching images from the borderline resembling Nazi camps.”
The Aegean dispute, a seemingly endless snafu for the two neighbors, was at the frontlines of their war of words starting in February. However, the end of the second month saw Ankara and Athens taking tentative steps for reconciliation as the sides reconvened for the third meeting of their exploratory talks, which they had agreed to resume in 2021 after a five-year hiatus. The goal was to unearth a fair, sustainable, inclusive solution for the Eastern Mediterranean conflict from the wreckage of yearslong spats and skirmishes.
Yet, whatever positive impression the exploratory talks inspired on the commercial side did not reflect on the actual dispute, in spite of an initially positive outlook.
With the repercussions of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine reverberating worldwide, Erdoğan extended a rare olive branch to his nemesis Mitsotakis in the form of an invitation to hold talks in Istanbul. Mitsotakis accepted, noting before his trip that as partners in NATO, “we are called upon to try to keep our region away from any additional geopolitical crisis.”
In Istanbul, the two leaders focused on the regional benefits of advancing cooperation, highlighted the notion that Türkiye and Greece had the “special responsibility” in building Europe’s security in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine war, and agreed to take joint steps to address their woes, the minority problems, counterterrorism initiatives, irregular migration and many more.
The meeting was also a push from Ankara as it sought to shore up its credentials as a regional power player by mediating the conflict.
The general air of positivity and hope of moving ties in the right direction quickly dissipated in March when Athens displeased Ankara by bolstering its military with more fighter jets and navy frigates.
By April, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu was saying dialogue channels with Greece were “more open than ever”, and that a positive agenda in commercial relations would “create an environment in which we can sincerely discuss our issues with Greece.”
Athens, in the meantime, supplied arms to Ukraine in a show of European solidarity, a marked indication of taking sides in the conflict in direct contrast to Ankara’s policy of balance and equal distance to Moscow and Kyiv.
The sides also traded another set of accusations by late March, with Türkiye calling on Greece to “stop provocative actions and rhetoric” based on its allegation that Turkish warplanes conducted unauthorized military flights over Greek islands. Ankara said it was the Greek Air Force starting and escalating tension, making provocative flights that violated Turkish airspace.
The 2020 disagreement over Turkish exploration of natural gas in the Aegean had resulted in near-daily air force patrols and interception missions in the region.
The same week, Mitsotakis even complained to NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg about the alleged airspace violations by Türkiye, saying it was “simply unacceptable” for a NATO ally as it “undermined the unity of purpose” of the alliance. The quarrel also attracted Washington’s attention, who urged the sides to respect each other’s territorial integrity.
The U.S.’ compassionate hand behind Greece revealed itself for the nth time in May when it formally extended its bilateral defense cooperation with Greece, granting itself military access to three bases in mainland Greece and its naval presence on the island of Crete.
“Who are they threatening with these bases?” Erdoğan mused following the news.
The show of solidarity was unsettling for Ankara. Still, the real blow came later in May when Mitsotakis, during a visit to Washington, warned a joint session of Congress against supporting the Biden administration’s proposed F-16 fighter jet sales to Türkiye, claiming such a move could create additional instability in the Aegean.
Simply put, Erdoğan was fuming at the betrayal. He criticized the Greek premier’s lobbying and said Mitsotakis “no longer exists” for him.
The weak thread of reconciliation between the neighbors came close to snapping loose.
“We had agreed with him not to include third countries in our dispute, but instead, he visited the U.S. and warned them not to give us F-16s to us,” Erdoğan said.
He then called off a critical strategic council meeting planned to be held between Ankara and Athens in 2022. “I will never agree to meet with him because we only walk on the same path as politicians who keep their promises, who have character, and who is honorable,” he said. “The U.S. will likely make up its mind on selling F-16s to Türkiye without needing to consult the Greek premier.”
Not long after, Greece told the U.N. that Türkiye was “directly challenging” its sovereignty over islands in the eastern Aegean Sea, while Ankara was condemning Athens for arming the demilitarized islands contrary to the Treaties of Lausanne (1923) and Paris (1947).
Çavuşoğlu shut down Athens hours later, saying that “whatever Greece’s justification is, it is not legitimate” since Athens has been arming the islands “since the 1960s notwithstanding numerous objections by Türkiye and its obligations under international agreements”.
As May came to a close on a communicational standstill, Türkiye ended the NATO-brokered joint mechanism with Greece citing “hostile remarks” from Mitsotakis and an “inconsistent stance” on dialogue efforts.
Greece was undeterred, it pressed ahead with militarizing Aegean islands very close to Türkiye’s western coast in another direct violation of international treaties, which was documented by Turkish state media Anadolu Agency (AA). Footage blatantly showed Greek troops and heavy weapons deployed on the Pserimos island, sitting 8 kilometers (5 miles) southwest of southwestern Türkiye’s Bodrum peninsula.
The demilitarization of the eastern islands is an obligation under 20th-century treaties that ceded the sovereignty of the islands to Greece. However, Athens called Ankara’s demand a deliberate misinterpretation and still accuses its fellow NATO member of stepping up hostility in the area.
Türkiye’s response to the Pserimos move was resolute: “We will question the sovereignty of those islands if Greece does not end its violations.”
Erdoğan backed it later in June by saying, “We’re warning Greece to stay away from dreams, statements, and actions that will lead to regret, as it did a century ago, and come to its senses.”
Erdoğan’s marked harshening of rhetoric elicited broad reactions from Greece, the EU, and NATO, who stressed the necessity of dialogue. Defense ministers from both sides came together to smooth out the strain in an apparent attempt to keep communication channels open, but their leaders were still far from shaking hands again soon.
Erdoğan maintained Athens was pushing for maximalism in the Eastern Mediterranean by arming islands and including “third parties” in their dispute, making it appear that the conflict was an issue for broader Europe.
After Athens in late June knocked on Washington’s door for another swathe of combat jets, F-35s to be exact, to combine with its previous purchase of 24 Dassault-made Rafale jets and three navy frigates from France, Mitsotakis attempted to get hold of Erdoğan. “We must meet, we must talk, and deal with our differences in a civilized manner,” he said.
The Turkish leader was as unflinching as ever as he asserted his refusal to meet Mitsotakis until he “pulls himself together.”
He pointed out that Greece was still “obviously militarizing the islands,” and their violations of Türkiye’s airspace reached 147 in 2022.
Moreover, Greek warplanes violated Turkish airspace 256 times and harassed Turkish jets on 158 occasions throughout 2022. Greek coast guard boats also broke Turkish territorial waters 33 times. Despite the escalation, Mitsotakis was quoted as saying he “cannot imagine a war between Greece and Türkiye.”
His repeatedly expressed openness to meeting with Erdoğan was yet to yield results.
By December, after Greek planes tried to intervene in Türkiye’s NATO missions in the Aegean, the Turkish leader said he told his officials to “do whatever is necessary if Greece continues to act out” and repeated his warning: "We may come suddenly one night."
Towards the end of the year, however, a development promising an out from the diplomatic gridlock between the rival nations took place when the senior officials of both sides held a confidential meeting in Brussels with mediator Germany.
Monthslong tensions eased albeit only a little with the high-level talks, which were expected to be repeated sometime soon, as was conveyed by Germany.
“Both the Greek prime minister and the Turkish president responded very positively to the idea of a meeting,” a spokesperson informed in late December.
With few days left in 2022, reports surfaced indicating Greece was once again revising its enduring plans to extend its territorial waters by 12 nautical miles, putting yet another block on the tumultuous road to peace with its neighbor.
Ankara would “never allow” Greece to pull such a move, Çavuşoğlu declared. Citing a 1995 Turkish parliamentary decision stipulating that the government would be authorized to use military powers to defend Türkiye’s interests, he said, “We are warning Greece once again. Don't get into sham heroism by trusting those who might have your back. It won't end well for you.”
As the year ended, it could be said efforts to resolve the Mediterranean dispute were effectively back to square one.
Muslim Turkish minority in the Western Thrace region, home to some 150,000 people near Greece’s northeastern border with Türkiye, is another source of strain in the long list of Türkiye-Greece disagreements.
The rights of this community are guaranteed under Lausanne, too, but since it took effect in 1923, the situation has steadily deteriorated for Western Thracian Turks. Seeing the presence of the community as a “hostage” of its ties with Türkiye, the Greek government has committed numerous breaches of its obligations and European court rulings over the years. For example, it shut down schools and mosques, banned the use of the terms “Turk” or “Turkish” in the names of their schools and foundations, and barred them from electing their religious representatives.
In 2022 alone, Greece closed four schools, blocked the election of a local religious leader, prevented the community from performing Eid prayers in public, and went as far as attempting to build a football field over a demolished Ottoman-era cemetery.
Erdoğan called for the Islamic world to “no longer be a spectator” to the persecutions of the Turkish minority and Muslim population in the country, it seems, to no avail.
In the heart of Turkish-Greek relations lies the issue of another disputed island: Cyprus. It has been entangled in a web of problems that only feed each other the more they are left unresolved, and 2022 witnessed very little progress.
The island’s conflict erupted in the late 1950s when Greek Cypriots launched a campaign of oppression and fear against Turkish Cypriots, forcing the latter to withdraw into enclaves for safety and a 1974 coup aiming at Greece’s annexation led to Türkiye’s military intervention, dubbed Cyprus Peace Operation, that eventually led to the foundation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in 1983. Multiple international efforts were made for a remedy, with the U.N. working for years to achieve a comprehensive solution, proposing a reunification plan for a federation, and sponsoring peace talks that eventually broke down.
While Greece and the Greek Cypriot administration support the U.N.’s suggestion of a federal Greek Cypriot administration, the TRNC and its guarantor Türkiye have been resolutely calling for a two-state solution, stressing that “the sovereign equality and the equal international status of the Turkish Cypriots are non-negotiable.”
On Nov. 15, the TRNC celebrated its 39th foundational anniversary, i.e. its independence from the Greek Cypriot administration, with Türkiye reassuring it would “determinedly continue working” for the welfare and safety of Turkish Cypriots.
As its relations further strained with Athens, Ankara kept its promise. It deployed more forces to the island to “protect” Turkish Cypriots a week after the U.S. lifted its arms embargo on the Greek side of the island.
The most notable occasion was a week before the anniversary when the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) welcomed the nation as its third non-member observer country. It marked the first time the TRNC is being represented in an international organization with its constitutional name. It was hailed as an essential step in bringing Turkic states closer and TRNC nearer to its ultimate goal of gaining international recognition.
One more discernible escalation in the Mediterranean basin was the simmering hostility between Libya and Egypt, two southern neighbors with whom Greece and Türkiye are involved, over several issues, most notably energy exploration and maritime borders.
Libya and Türkiye struck a pact in 2019 against any attempts from Greece to appropriate huge parts of Libya’s continental shelf and confirmed their maritime borders. In response, Egypt and Greece signed an agreement in August 2020, designating an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Eastern Mediterranean whose legitimacy Ankara questioned and subsequently dismissed.
2022 saw Türkiye and the Government of National Unity in Libya expand their cooperation in the field of hydrocarbons, which is abundant in the region, and shut down criticism from the EU and Greece that the deal could “potentially undermine regional stability.” The October deal enabled Libyan-Turkish companies to dig for oil and gas in Libyan waters.
Athens permitted international companies, namely Exxon Mobil, to start a gas-prospecting project off its southwestern coast in early November, prompting Tripoli and Ankara to decry it as “irresponsible behavior.”
Greece’s announcement that it would extend its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles to the south also became helpful in its standoff with Libya by the end of the year.
As of December, the sides were all biding their time to make the first move forward — or backward.
Tense politics aside, Turkish-Greek commercial ties have, in the meantime, remained buoyant, with trade volume tripling since 2005. In the first month of the year, the nations revived a joint economic committee and signed a protocol to enhance energy and tourism cooperation. In addition, a newly built pipeline from Türkiye to Greece currently transports natural gas from Azerbaijan to Western Europe. It’s a part of Europe's effort to reduce dependence on Russian energy.
The sheltering of PKK, YPG and Gülenist Terrorist Group (FETÖ) terrorists by its western allies and neighboring Greece was a significant source of concern for Türkiye in 2022.
Greece has long been accused of being a favorite hideout for terrorists from the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP-C) and PKK. Those fleeing Türkiye have taken shelter in refugee camps in Lavrion near Athens under the guise of being asylum-seekers, especially in the 1980s. Despite the closure of Lavrion in 2013 amid pressure from Türkiye, Greece continues to be the primary destination for DHKP-C terrorists.
In November, Erdoğan named several EU members alongside Greece as he blamed them for protecting and enabling terrorists.
“The aim is that these groups could be used one day against Türkiye,” another government official was quoted as saying earlier in the year. “Athens is not a transit country for terrorists anymore, but the direct target country.”
In a way that explains the constant up-and-down in tensions throughout the year, Greece’s anti-Türkiye sentiments were never-ending, mirroring similarly justified rancor from the Turkish side.
While 2022 bowes out on a chilly note, December’s diplomatic contacts indicate there is yet hope to be had about the future of the Türkiye-Greece relationship in the new year.
