Türkiye’s rise as an influential actor in the international community continued in 2024. Throughout the year, Ankara sought to normalize ties with countries it fell out with, further severed relations with some and played a key role in conflicts far away and in its region.
A power broker pursuing a delicate balance between sides of various conflicts, Türkiye occasionally achieved its ambitious diplomatic goals. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, a veteran politician in power for over two decades as prime minister and president and Hakan Fidan, former intelligence chief turned foreign minister, led this diplomatic blitz.
The year began with the completion of an unfinished task from 2023: Sweden’s NATO membership. As the Nordic country, along with Finland, sought to join the bloc, NATO’s major member Türkiye stalled the bid on the grounds of a lack of counterterrorism cooperation and rampant Islamophobia in Sweden. Eager to join a military alliance under the shadow of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Sweden bowed to Türkiye’s demands and amended laws for a more effective fight against terrorism, particularly activities of the terrorist group PKK, which killed thousands in Türkiye. After intense talks in 2023, the Turkish Parliament finally ratified approval of Sweden’s admission in January and soon after, Erdoğan issued a decree to greenlight the approval.
The highlight of February for Turkish diplomacy was a landmark visit by Erdoğan to Egypt. It was the first visit by the Turkish leader to Egypt under the leadership of Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi and the first in 11 years. Türkiye had downgraded diplomatic relations with Egypt after el-Sissi took over in 2013, although commercial ties have remained largely unharmed. Erdoğan’s visit crowned the normalization process that began in 2022 when the two leaders briefly met on the sidelines of the World Cup in Qatar and continued with the appointment of ambassadors in 2023. The process accelerated after Israel began its vicious attacks in Palestine, pushing the two countries to find a common ground to counter this threat and pursue a solution to the conflict while coordinating humanitarian aid delivery through Egypt’s Rafah crossing with the Palestinian enclave. The February 2023 earthquakes in Türkiye’s southeast that claimed thousands of lives paved the way for further normalization as Egypt sent aid and its foreign minister to Türkiye, offering assistance in the aftermath of the disaster. The president received a warm welcome in Egypt with el-Sissi scrapping diplomatic protocols and hugging Erdoğan as soon as he disembarked his plane. This was the first sign of a new era between two countries that shared an intertwined history for centuries. Erdoğan visited Egypt again in December, this time to attend a D-8 summit and el-Sissi demonstrated his admiration of the Turkish president again by rushing from his chair at the venue to welcome Erdoğan. El-Sissi received a similar welcome when he reciprocated Erdoğan’s visit in September. Turkish-Egyptian normalization also paved the way to a breakthrough in the Eastern Mediterranean, where the region's countries have overlapping claims on maritime borders and natural gas resources, notably with Greece and Libya.
Speaking of Greece, 2024 was also the year of further rapprochement with Türkiye’s western neighbor. After decades of hostilities, the two countries took fresh steps to improve their ties. Erdoğan’s visit to Athens in 2023, the first in six years by a Turkish head of state, was reciprocated by Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis in May 2024. The two countries signed a series of deals and memoranda of understanding to further the thaw, though long-standing issues remain a thorn in relations, such as the exact delimitation of maritime borders of the two countries on both sides of the Aegean Sea and the stance on Cyprus, the Mediterranean island divided between Greek and Turkish entities.
Another attempt at normalization was with the Assad regime of neighboring Syria. Though the two countries took baby steps to that extent in 2023 with the meeting of high-ranking officials in Moscow, the process gained momentum in 2024 with Ankara and the Damascus-based regime expressing willingness to fully restore ties broken after the beginning of unrest in Syria more than a decade ago. In June, Bashar Assad voiced openness to normalization while Erdoğan responded with remarks that there was no reason not to establish diplomatic relations with the regime. At one point, Assad even consented to the presence of Turkish troops in the country’s north as a measure against terror threats. Yet, Türkiye’s call to the regime for a political solution to the civil war was ignored by Assad. Ankara has always adhered to the call since the unrest began, but it gained more importance as Israel escalated its expansionist policies in the region, targeting places beyond Gaza in the process of the ongoing Palestine-Israel conflict. Türkiye believed a stable Syria would thwart Israel’s ambitions. Despite normalization efforts, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan acknowledged in November that Damascus was apparently not ready to take action to that extent. One month later, Syria entered a new era with Assad fleeing the country in the face of advances of anti-regime forces, which crowned what Türkiye called the Syrian revolution by capturing Damascus.
The victory of anti-regime forces changed the fate of the war-torn country and gave Türkiye a chance to reestablish bonds with its southern neighbor. Erdoğan enthusiastically lauded the end of the oppressive Baathist regime while Hakan Fidan became the first Turkish top diplomat to meet the new rulers of Syria in December, days after Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalın realized the dream of Erdoğan of praying in the iconic Umayyad Mosque in the Syrian capital.
Türkiye was one of the most affected by the civil war in Syria that gave birth to the YPG, the Syrian wing of the terrorist group PKK. The YPG/PKK expanded its clout in northeastern Syria and received assistance from Türkiye’s ally, the United States, under the guise of fighting against Daesh despite the protests of Ankara. The terrorist group targeted Turkish border towns and dispatched members into Türkiye to carry out attacks, including the latest in the capital, Ankara, that targeted an aerospace company. Türkiye also hosted more than 3 million refugees from Syria fleeing the war.
After the fall of the Baathist regime, Türkiye engaged in diplomatic efforts for a smooth transition and pledged to help the new rulers rebuild the war-weary country. Erdoğan and Fidan held phone calls with their counterparts and rallied to mobilize the international community to aid recovery. Türkiye pushed for rule by the people of Syria after more than six decades of Baathist domination, which propped up the Assad family. It is expected to continue these efforts in 2025, along with a drive for the elimination of the YPG/PKK. Erdoğan repeatedly called the terrorist group to lay down arms or be prepared for elimination. Syria’s new administration agrees with Ankara on the matter.
Türkiye’s role as a key mediator manifested itself in the biggest prisoner exchange since World War II. On Aug. 26, prisoners imprisoned in seven countries were exchanged at Esenboğa Airport in the capital, Ankara.
Many names languishing in prisons while efforts to free them appeared to be futile walked free, from a prominent journalist to major dissidents of the Kremlin. The swap was important not only for the large number of exchanged individuals but also for the prominence of those involved. Each swapped individual has a unique story and holds particular significance for their respective countries. One notable figure is Evan Gershkovich, a Wall Street Journal reporter frequently mentioned in global media. Gershkovich was arrested in Russia in March 2023 on espionage charges while working as a reporter there. Russian authorities accused him of collecting secret information about a defense company involved in military equipment production and repair in the Sverdlovsk region. Gershkovich became the first foreign media worker in Russian history to be arrested on espionage charges. At the time of the swap negotiations, he had been sentenced to 19 years in prison by Russia.
Another individual who returned to the U.S. in the swap was Paul Whelan, a former Marine. Whelan, who served for eight years in the U.S. Marine Corps, was arrested in Moscow in 2018 on espionage charges. Canada-born Whelan had citizenship in the U.S., Britain and Ireland. When he was arrested in a Moscow hotel, he was in possession of a hard disk allegedly containing confidential information. He claimed a Russian friend gave it to him. In 2022, there were discussions about swapping Whelan for Viktor Bout, who was serving a 10-year sentence in the U.S. for illegal arms trafficking and terrorism financing. However, Whelan was not on the swap list, leading to significant public backlash against the Biden administration.
Also, Alsu Kurmasheva, a journalist with both U.S. and Russian citizenship, was another person who returned to the U.S. Kurmasheva was detained at an airport in May 2023 while attempting to return to Czechia from Russia due to family reasons. She was convicted on charges of "failing to report as a foreign worker" and "disinformation."
Rico Krieger, who worked for the Red Cross, was detained in Belarus during the Russia-Ukraine war. Krieger claimed he was visiting Belarus as a tourist, but Russia alleged this was a cover for espionage. According to Russia, Krieger was involved with the Ukrainian security services. Convicted on six separate charges, Krieger was sentenced to death in Belarus on June 24, 2024, for "terrorism and mercenary activities." Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko later granted clemency. Krieger returned to Germany two days after his pardon through the swap operation in Türkiye.
Ilya Yashin, a Russian citizen and former mayor of Krasnoselsky, was another significant figure who returned to Germany in the historic swap. A close ally of the late opposition leader Alexei Navalny, Yashin was convicted in December 2022 for spreading "false information" about the Russian military.
Vladimir Kara-Murza, a prominent opponent of Russian President Vladimir Putin, was another key individual who returned to Germany in the swap. Kara-Murza, sentenced to 25 years in prison, was arrested in April 2022 on charges of spreading "false information" about the Russian military, collaborating with an "undesirable organization," and treason. His conviction was widely condemned internationally.
Vadim Krasikov, a significant figure for Russia, was the only individual brought back from Germany in the swap operation. Krasikov was sent to Berlin by the FSB, receiving special training to assassinate Chechen opposition fighter Zelimkhan Khangoshvili, whom Russian President Putin had labeled a terrorist. In 2019, Krasikov was sentenced to life in prison for killing Khangoshvili in Germany. Initially denying any connection to Russia, Krasikov was later praised by Putin as a "patriot."
In the historic swap, a couple with two children working for the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) was included. Artem Dultsev and Anna Dultseva were caught in Slovenia with false Argentine passports. Anna Dultseva, using the alias Maria Rosa Mayer Munoz, was pretending to be an art gallery owner in Slovenia. The family, along with their two children, was handed over to Russian officials through the swap operation.
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken praised the support from U.S. allies and said Washington appreciates the Turkish government providing a location for the safe return of prisoners to the U.S. and Germany.
As Israel’s brutal attacks targeting Palestinians marked the first year, Türkiye sought to raise the voice of Palestinians and stop the Netanyahu administration. Ankara led an initiative that included 52 countries, an international body, and a national body to stop arms exports to Israel through the United Nations Security Council. Türkiye also continued its diplomatic efforts for a prisoner exchange between Israel and Palestine and a cease-fire, although those efforts ultimately failed due to Israel’s aggression.
In May, Türkiye suspended all trade with Israel in the face of Tel Aviv’s genocidal attacks. The same month, it announced a bid to join a genocide trial against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
Under the leadership of Erdoğan, Türkiye became a staunch defender of the Palestinian cause and criticized Israel at every platform and occasion, from the U.N. assemblies to other international summits. Türkiye also continued delivery of humanitarian aid to Gaza, though Israel’s refusal to open a crossing into the enclave for delivery dealt a blow to the efforts.
As part of its mediation efforts, Türkiye reached out to Somalia and Ethiopia and managed to bring the leaders of the two countries to Ankara in December to end a feud between the two countries.
Erdoğan announced the sides had agreed on a joint declaration and that a process had been launched for a fresh start between the two countries. According to the Ethiopia-Somalia Ankara Declaration, the two parties decided to launch technical negotiations facilitated by Türkiye by the end of February 2025 and conclude them within four months. They also agreed to abandon differences of opinion and contentious issues and to move decisively toward shared prosperity. The two countries affirmed respect for Somalia's territorial integrity while recognizing potential benefits Ethiopia may gain from secure access to the sea.
Ties between Ethiopia and Somalia have worsened since Ethiopia struck a deal with the breakaway region of Somaliland on Jan. 1 to use its Red Sea port of Berbera. Türkiye has been working to end tensions between the two Horn of Africa countries. Ethiopia lost its Red Sea ports in the early 1990s after the Eritrean War of Independence, which lasted from 1961 to 1991. In 1991, Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia, leading to the establishment of two separate nations. The separation resulted in Ethiopia losing direct access to the Red Sea and key ports. Ethiopia has since been landlocked, affecting its ability to conduct efficient maritime trade. Ethiopia made an accord in January with Somaliland that unilaterally broke away from Somalia. Ethiopia gained access to the sea but recognized the territory's independence, setting off a new crisis with its neighbor. The two countries, which have fought two wars in the past century, agreed in March to resolve their quarrel.
Shortly after the historic Ankara Declaration, Türkiye announced in December the intent to broker a deal between Sudan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In a phone call with the head of Sudan’s Transitional Sovereignty Council, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Erdoğan said Türkiye was ready to mediate the tensions. “We are hoping the recent initiatives, including Erdoğan’s suggestion, who offered to mediate after his successful brokering between Ethiopia and Somalia, will succeed,” Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Yusuf said in an interview in December.
The Sudanese government accuses the UAE of providing weapons to its rival paramilitary force and prolonging the war. The UAE called the allegations “utterly false” and “baseless” and accused the government of refusing to negotiate peace with its enemy.
The United Arab Emirates, on Dec. 28, welcomed Türkiye's diplomatic efforts to find a solution to the ongoing crisis in Sudan and expressed its readiness to cooperate and coordinate with Ankara in this regard. An Emirati Foreign Ministry statement said it "welcomed the diplomatic efforts of the brotherly Republic of Türkiye to resolve the ongoing crisis in Sudan, which also represents a priority" for the UAE. The statement emphasized that these efforts "reflect Türkiye's steadfast commitment to promoting regional peace and stability and contributing to the strengthening of international relations." The UAE affirmed its full readiness to cooperate and coordinate with Turkish efforts and all diplomatic initiatives to end the conflict in Sudan and find a comprehensive solution to the crisis. The oil-rich country reiterated its "steadfast position" in relation to the crisis, stressing that the primary focus remains on "reaching an immediate cease-fire and an urgent cessation of hostilities in the internal fighting in Sudan between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces."
