After the Arab Spring started in Tunisia six years ago and all the turbulence that plagued the country, Tunisia is the only example of a country which has accomplished a successful transition to democracy. Most people believe that Sheikh Rashid Al Ghannushi (R), who is a world-renowned Islamic scholar and also responsible for the political orientation of Ennahda, or the Renaissance Party, is the one behind Tunisia's success. Daily Sabah's Ali Ünal sat down with Rashid Al Ghannushi to talk about various issues, ranging from the failed July 15 coup attempt to the future of the Arab Spring and Daesh.
Sheikh Ghannushi believes that on July 15 history stood still and fortunately history continued to progress after the coup attempt failed. He said that the Turkish people have proven their commitment to democracy while the executives proved they have the merits to lead Turkey. Regarding the future of the Arab Spring, Ghannushi said that the region is transitioning into democracy, noting that it may take five years for a country to complete this transition, for another it may take ten years. Commenting on why first Turkey and then Tunisia is now being demonstrated as a model country in the Islamic world, Ghannushi underlined that Turkey has the capacity to impact the entire world and that it is for that reason the Western world hesitates to use Turkey as a model country. Ghannushi also said that if a Sunni state had supported the Sunni population, as Iran does to the Shiite population in the region, Daesh would never have emerged.
Ali Ünal: How was the July 15 coup attempt perceived in Tunisia? What are the implications of the coup attempt in regards to regional politics?
Rashid Ghannushi: We congratulate the Turkish people and the executives. The elimination of the terror organization that attempted the said coup is vital. In our opinion, the night of the coup attempt is when history was rewritten. The failure of the coup attempt in Turkey is a development that balances the successful coup in Egypt and what transpired after it. History stood still on the night of the coup attempt; it would either progress or regress. Fortunately, history continued to progress as the coup attempt failed. The Turkish people proved their commitment to democracy on that night, while the executives proved that they have the merits to lead Turkey.
The difference between Egypt and Turkey was clearly revealed on that night. In Egypt, people were divided as proponents and opponents of the coup; however, the Turkish people stood united against the coup. Moreover, the Egyptian army supported the coup as a whole, while in Turkey the majority of the army was against it. In this sense, the people of Egypt were divided, but not their army; in Turkey, the people were united, but the military was divided.
AÜ: What is your opinion on the proposed presidential system in Turkey?
RG: We are going in different directions compared to Turkey when it comes to the presidential system; in Tunisia, we are trying to transition into a parliamentary system from the existing presidential system, while the transition in Turkey is in the opposite direction. Nonetheless, I cannot say one is more Islamic than the other.
As a result of the long-lasting dictatorship in Tunisia, all issues are attributed to the presidential system. To eliminate the possibility of a dictatorship, we believe it is essential to abolish the Tunisian presidential system. As you know, parliamentary systems are more widespread than presidential systems in the world; however, we know there are many countries that have a presidential system and are democratic. In Tunisia, we are also trying to eliminate the possible shortcomings of the parliamentary system. To eliminate the said shortcomings, it is essential to divide the rule between numerous partners, as foreseen by the principle of separation of powers.
The opponents of the revolution in Tunisia are praising the presidential system, while decrying the parliamentary system. Moreover, they are indicating that historically Tunisia has always gathered around a central figure, a leader, and this has become the political culture of the country.
There is a direct link between a president's merits and the authority they have. A powerful president can utilize authority in a more powerful way, even if there are limitations to their power. On the other hand, if the president does not want to use their authority to the fullest extent, their responsibilities are narrowed. In Turkey, the existence of two top executives may cause a disparity in the sharing of power. Therefore, it is unthinkable that a popularly elected president does not have any authority.
The current authority and position of the Turkish president may fit a system in which the president was not elected by the people. However, as the president is popularly elected, it is quite understandable that the president cannot utilize the expected authority within this system. More authority is necessary for a popularly elected president.
AÜ: What are your expectations six years after the Arab Spring? How did the leadership and structural elements contribute to the success of Tunisia and the failure of the other countries?
In my opinion, the Arab world entered a new age with the Arab Spring in 2011, and this age is characterized by freedom. It started with people putting their will at the core of the system. It is a spirit of emancipation. This spirit was carried out differently, thus experienced differently, in each and every Arab country. For instance, the current situation in Egypt after el-Sissi's coup is worse than Hosni Mubarak's rule. State violence started to be utilized more with Sissi's administration. On the other hand, the Egyptian people are resisting more fiercely against this despotic administration. Moreover, the region is in a new process; people are more hopeful, and there are reciprocal interactions and transformations between the people and the society.
We are in a transitional period in which the old order is collapsing more by the day, while the new order is yet to emerge. The struggle for this transformation is experienced differently by each country due to their unique conditions.
For instance, as Tunisian society is monolithic, this transformation was relatively less painful in comparison with Egypt, Syria and Yemen. In this sense, it is all about the variations of transformations. If Nusayris had not supported al-Assad in Syria, and the military had not supported Sissi in Egypt, they would not be able to maintain their rules. On the other hand, the geopolitical positions of Syria and Egypt are more crucial than Tunisia; as both of them are crucial geopolitical locations, the foreign interventions were forceful.
In my opinion, the region is on the brink of a major transformation; however, it will take time to have democratic political systems within the region. The region is transitioning into democracy; while it may take five years for a country to complete this transition, for another it may take 10 years. As you know, it took almost a century for France to transition into democracy from monarchy. Even though more than 90 years have passed since the creation of the Republic of Turkey, we recently witnessed a coup attempt, which indicates that the democratization process in Turkey is yet to be concluded. In a full-fledged democratic system, a military coup is impossible. This signifies that there are people in the Turkish army and among the elite who have yet to internalize democracy. I am hopeful about the future of democracy in the Arab world. The Arab peoples paid too much for democratization and, seemingly, will continue to do so.
AÜ: At the very beginning of the Arab Spring, Turkey was being portrayed as a model country for the Arab world by the Western media. However, after the process of al-Nahda winning and losing the government, Tunisia is now being demonstrated as a model country. What is your take on this subject?
I am not sure why Turkey is no longer considered as a model. It may be because of the domestic processes of Turkey or the negative sentiments of international forces toward Turkey. I believe the international community no longer wants to show Turkey as a model and prefer Tunisia, as they do not consider us as a threat to them. However, Turkey has the capacity to have an impact on the world. This is why they are hesitant about Turkey being shown as a model, I believe. The Westerners are looking for an Islamic model, as they are not able to completely reject Islam as a reality.
AÜ: In the past months, you have indicated that you were not interested in political Islam. Could you please elaborate?
I said this at the most recent congress of al-Nahda. We previously had a comprehensive Islamic ideology, which encompassed politics and Islamic and social research. However, we were the opposition when we created this ideology, while the government was forcing its lifestyle upon the people. As these regimes fell, the comprehensive ideology of the opposition became irrelevant. I now believe that political parties should only focus on politics; civilian initiatives should take part in the remaining spheres of life. What I am saying is not a new interpretation of Islam. In our belief, the principles of Islam are clear. The issue is how an Islamic organization or movement should be. For instance, we said that the mosques should not turn into a mouthpiece of a political party. The imams are allowed to talk about politics, but they should not be endorsing a political party.
As politics was restricted during the dictatorship, we were making politics in unions and civilian movements. Today, there are not any restrictions on politi
cs; therefore, anyone can enter politics or form NGOs to be active in it.
AÜ: During his visit in 2011, then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan suggested the Arab world employ laicite. Could your statement about political Islam be considered as being in the same vein as Erdoğan's statement?
While the wording is different, I can say that we are basically saying the same thing. The word Erdoğan used, laicite, was not very popular among religious and conservative crowds. We express the same content with different words.
I believe Erdoğan was referring to a civilian and democratic state. Laicite is a much-disputed concept in the Arab world. In France, Turkey and Tunisia, the word laicite connotes the state waging war against religion. However, in many other instances around the world, it is understood as the state being impartial with regard to any religion, while showing respect to all faiths. This is why we use the concepts of democracy and civilian state instead of laicite.
AÜ: As an Islamic thinker, what is your take on Daesh?
I have previously defined them as "furious Islam." When I used this definition, there were many who criticized me for not asserting that they are unbelievers. If you were to ask me whether Daesh members understand Islam correctly, I would say definitely not. However, if you ask me if this requires "excommunicating" them, I would say I am not sure.The ideal Muslim is not defined in the Holy Quran; to the contrary, it is a person who sins and makes mistakes. We can say that Daesh members are cruel; they do not understand Islam correctly and such. It is easy to define them; however, the real issue is how they have emerged. Why did such a reality that did not have any precedents emerge today; this is the question.
On the other hand, we should not forget that Daesh conceptualizes itself by taking Islamic precedents as its basis. For instance, there are many interpretations of Islam by a splinter group named as Khawarij (the Outsiders), which are usually disregarded by the majority. However, Daesh is adopting these disregarded interpretations and creating an ideology out of it.
Why would anyone try to revive an unusual and disregarded interpretation? The answer is that numerous sociopolitical and economic issues have satisfied the prerequisites of radical action. People who look at what the U.S. did in Iraq and what Iran did to the Sunni population in Iraq after the U.S. withdrawal can understand how and why Daesh emerged. Many cities in Iraq and Syria are facing demographic cleansing; the locals are being forcibly replaced with outsiders. These processes and this spiral of violence cause people to act in an irrational manner.
For instance, in the past years, tribes in Iraq fought against al-Qaeda and pushed the terrorist organization out of their territories. Then, these tribes were subjected to pressure and violence by the Iraqi state instead of being allowed into the Iraqi army. During the Maliki government, these people tried to explain their conditions to the state by holding peaceful demonstrations, only to find tanks standing against them. All of these pushed the Sunni tribes towards Daesh.
In my opinion, if a Sunni state had supported the Sunni population, as Iran does to the Shiite population in the region, Daesh would have never emerged. Moreover, I believe if a Sunni country does not protect the Sunnis of the region, the conflicts in the region will continue.
AÜ: There are a significant number of Tunisian foreign fighters in Daesh. How would you explain this phenomenon from a sociological point of view?
As you know, the countries in Northern Africa got rid of imperialism after grueling struggles. For this reason, the people living in the region have a concrete anti-imperialist consciousness. In 1948, 12,000 Tunisians went to Palestine to aid their efforts. With the formation of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the 1960s, hundreds of leftist Tunisian youth joined the organization. Again, in the 1990s, hundreds of Tunisians joined the Bosnian War. In this sense, there is a consciousness against foreign invasions.
I believe most of these people who are among the ranks of Daesh were against the dictatorship in Tunisia during Ben Ali's reign and did not find the opportunity for armed struggle against it. For this reason, youths aiming to liberate their country went to other countries where they could both learn how to use weapons and join a resistance. I should say that these youths understand Islam in a very superficial way. Daesh was able to influence these youths with their ideology, as they had a superficial understanding of Islam. For instance, you would not see many Palestinians among Daesh members because Hamas allows youths to participate in a movement in which they can realize their goals. In this sense, Palestinians who jihad with a moderate interpretation of Islam do not need radical ideologies.
AÜ: The Muslim Brotherhood is one of the movements that came to mind while talking about moderate Islam. However, when the Arab Spring turned into Arab Fall, the idea of moderate Islam was put aside and the Muslim Brotherhood is now in crisis. As the leader of al-Nahda, which is an extension of the Muslim Brotherhood, what is your thought on the future of the organization?
As you said, the Muslim Brotherhood is a moderate movement and always seeks the possibility of being active within legal boundaries. In my opinion, the oncoming conflicts will be between seculars and Muslims. All ideologies, except for Islam, are bankrupt. I believe radicals will continue to be just a minority faction within Islam, as it has always been the case. Mainstream Islam will stay moderate.
Regarding the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, I can say that Egypt is a unique instance. While the Egyptian army confiscated the government, the Muslim Brotherhood influenced the people. In this context, both the army and the Muslim Brotherhood are a part of the reality in Egypt, and they cannot disregard this fact. The organization has to address the Copts and seculars in society, while planning for the future without disregarding the fact that the state is being run by the army.
The Egyptian army is trying to envision an Egypt without the Muslim Brotherhood; however, this is not a realistic aim, and it is wasting Egypt's precious time. On the other hand, the Muslim Brotherhood's policies towards the army are also not realistic, as the army will continue to have an influence on the state. Every state has an army; however, in Egypt, the army has a state and, seemingly, this will not change in the near future.
