After the sudden demise of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash in May 2024, Iran went for a snap election in the first week of July. In the runoff phase, Masoud Pezeshkian, a reformist, emerged victorious after defeating his ultra-conservative rival, Saeed Jaleeli. Pezeshkian received more than 17 million votes (53.6%), while Mr. Jaleeli secured around 13 million. It is worth mentioning that in the past presidential elections of 2013 and 2021, Pezeshkian’s presidential candidacies were rejected twice. During the latest parliamentary elections of 2024, his candidacy was dismissed similarly, which was probably due to his criticism of the police brutality against anti-hijab protestors.

Who is the new president?

Pezeshkian was not a well-known political figure in Iran until he emerged as the president. On his maternal side, he has Turkish heritage, while his paternal ancestry is of Azerbaijani descent. During the Iran-Iraq war, he played a forefront role in sending medical teams to the combat zones as a cardiac surgeon. He served as minister as well under President Mohammad Khatami and was elected as the first deputy speaker of the Iranian Parliament (Majlis) in 2016.

His election campaign primarily focused on social and cultural cohesion among different groups. He promised cultural and political rights for minorities in the country. He also promised to address the country’s declining economy. However, to fulfill his promises, he needs full cooperation from other state institutions, which have always overshadowed the office of the president. Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic, the political spheres in the country have been marred by such complexities and contradictions, where the president is bound to operate within the confines set by the office of the supreme leader, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Guardian Council and the Majlis, all of which enjoy significant power.

Government under siege

Though Pezeshkian is the new president of Iran, he needs to overcome many institutional and political obstacles to meet the people’s aspirations. A former president of Iran and almost a mentor of Pezeshkian, Khatami has already said that one should not expect miracles from the new government.

Pezeshkian faced a major political challenge on his very first day in office when Ismail Haniyeh, the political bureau chief of Hamas, was assassinated in Tehran on July 31 in an Israeli clandestine operation after attending the inauguration ceremony of Pezeshkian and meeting with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The assassination of Haniyeh created a tremor in regional and global politics and heightened the probability of an all-out war between Iran and Israel, which always seemed possible but is now more imminent than ever.

Regional and global diplomacy is still in full swing, and every stakeholder is exercising all diplomatic options to prevent the situation from sliding out of control. Both Iran and Israel seem to be preparing for all possibilities as Iranian officials repeatedly state that the assassination of Haniyeh is not merely the elimination of a close comrade but a violation of territorial sovereignty that warrants retaliation. On the other hand, Israel is threatening an all-out war against Iran and its allies in the event of any action taken against it.

The current scenario seems to have put Pezeshkian in a difficult position and created a catch-22 situation for him. If Iran opts for war against Israel, it would result in a strategic victory for Israel, which is desperate for the expansion of the conflict. Conversely, if Iran refrains from war, it would be seen as a declaration of self-defeat and a strategic retreat with long-term implications for the country. On the foreign policy front, another major challenge would be to halt the Palestinian-Israeli war and to contain the Israeli war of attrition against Hezbollah and Syria. Though Pezeshkian has promised to revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran cannot quickly formulate a policy for its revival. This task becomes even more difficult if Donald Trump returns to the White House, as it was he who discarded the JCPOA in 2018.

Pezeshkian’s problems go far beyond addressing Israel, shielding Iran from the growing fear of regional war and reviving the JCPOA; problems at home are no less disturbing. The abrupt resignation of Mohammad Javad Zarif as vice president for strategic affairs within nine days of his appointment was the first significant political blow to Pezeshkian. Zarif, one of the president’s initial appointees, is an eminent reformist figure in Iranian politics and was a key negotiator of the landmark 2015 nuclear deal. There was some speculation that Zarif might be nominated as first vice president, but there was also a counter-narrative claiming that he is not in Khamenei’s good graces.

Zarif was also named the chairperson of the Strategic Council for Transition by Pezeshkian. The council was tasked with shortlisting candidates for ministerial and vice presidential posts for the government. Zarif stepped down, accusing Pezeshkian of not keeping his promises to change the outlook of the country by forming a reformist Cabinet. He expressed his displeasure with the list of Cabinet members provided by the president, stating that the list lacked youth, did not include ethnic minorities and had only one woman, which he found quite troubling. There were no Sunni names despite the fact that they number around 5 million in a nation of 100 million. The 19-member Cabinet nominees included several conservative figures, leading reformist allies to accuse the president of deviating from his electoral promises. Zarif claimed that a majority of members belong to the conservative faction, which is contrary to the promises Pezeshkian made during the campaign.

Abbas Araghchi, 63, a former IRGC member, has been nominated for the post of foreign minister, while Eskandar Momeni, a former IRGC commander, is facing a lot of criticism for his nomination for the position of home minister. Similarly, the nomination of Esmail Khatib for the post of intelligence minister is seen as a continuation of the previous regime, as Khatib held the same portfolio under the late President Raisi and was responsible for large-scale arrests. There are reports that the nomination of Momeni as home minister was inducted at the behest of IRGC and the office of the supreme leader.

The composition of the new Cabinet introduced by the president has provoked severe criticism among reformists, who claim to have played a major role in Pezeshkian’s victory but have been ignored in terms of Cabinet positions.

There was so much criticism on social media that Pezeshkian had to tweet: "Your opinions and concerns about choosing Cabinet members are valuable to us." While reformists, sympathetic to the new president pleaded for patience, suggesting that the new Cabinet should be allowed to start working before passing judgment, the current situation suggests that Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guard do not want to share power with the liberals. This, of course, will prevent the president from implementing the reforms he promised and will also disappoint voters and the reformist faction in Iranian politics.

On the domestic front, Pezeshkian has promised to improve the flagging national economy and create jobs for millions of youths but there is no magic wand to fulfill these big promises. Currently, the Iranian economy is suffering from stagnation, inflation and a decline in currency value. The current inflation rate is 40%, unemployment is at an all-time high and all public service sectors are constrained due to the decades-old economic siege against Iran. Pezeshkian also promised during the campaign to ease social media and internet restrictions but it remains to be seen if he can secure the necessary autonomy to achieve these goals because his victory does not necessarily mean a complete retreat of conservatives in Iranian politics.

Can Pezeshkian challenge Khamenei?

Does the victory of a moderate or reformist president make any difference in Iranian politics given the limitation of the president’s power? In Iran, the president is only responsible for implementing the broad lines of policy set by the supreme leader, the highest official in the Islamic Republic. Khamenei himself, having served as the president of Iran between 1981 and 1989, knows the limitations of the presidency and has a deeper insight, having been at the helm of Iranian politics as supreme leader for more than three decades.

The president has authority over economic affairs but no control over the IRGC or armed services, who are the real decision-makers. Pezeshkian can be a moderate but he cannot evade the constitutional and ideological commitments to the fundamental political legacy of the regime. Loyalty and devotion to the supreme leader are indispensable, as he is the embodiment of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Pezeshkian promised to open up to the West for economic reasons, but he will need the cooperation and consent of the IRGC and Khamenei in his engagement with the outside world, particularly the West.

Pezeshkian cannot go against the wishes of the supreme leader despite his bold promises. The reflection of the president’s liberal political outlook can only be seen in his policies related to health and education. Otherwise, the execution of his liberal political vision will be allowed only as long as it does not transcend the mandate of the Islamic Republic.

In a victory speech, Pezeshkian said that he could not have imagined his name coming out of the ballot box as a victor without the supreme leader’s blessing, which is evidence of his loyalty to Khamenei. Many challenges are awaiting Pezeshkian and among them, the biggest one is likely to be navigating a political terrain marred by decades-old hostility between conservatives and moderates, improving the national economic indicators and deterring Iran from being dragged into regional war without being seen as a submissive and fatigued power in the face of an aggressive and hawkish Israel.