Kenneth Waltz opens his book Man, the State and War (1959), originally his doctoral thesis, with the following historical observation, “Asking who won a given war, someone has said, is like asking who won the San Francisco earthquake.” The Russian-Ukrainian war, which began in February 2022, serves as a case that supports this proposition even in the 21st century. To explore this further, it is helpful to briefly examine the trajectory of the war, now nearing its third year, before analyzing the events of 2024.
Although the "Russian-Ukrainian War 1.0," which began with the illegal annexation of Crimea in February 2014, theoretically ended with the Minsk Protocol signed in September 2014, it was widely recognized in Europe that the conflict between the two countries had not truly ceased. Eight years later, the resumption of war in February 2022 was unsurprising. Russia’s announcement on Feb. 21, 2022, officially recognizing the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, signaled the imminent escalation. The "Russia-Ukraine War 2.0," which began the following day with the Kremlin’s declaration of a special military operation, continued unresolved into 2024. On the contrary, the developments in 2024 further delayed hopes for peace. Therefore, an in-depth analysis of the events in the Russian-Ukrainian War during 2024 is essential.
On Jan.1, 2024, as the rest of the world welcomed a new year, the Russia-Ukraine war entered its 677th day. On the same day, Russia retaliated against Ukraine’s Belgorod attack by striking Kharkiv with Iranian-made Shahed drones. During his visit to a military hospital following these mutual attacks, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared, "We will intensify the attacks ... We are doing it today, and we will continue to do it tomorrow," a statement that offered an insight into the likely trajectory of the war in 2024.
Meanwhile, January 2024 was notably marked by a series of meetings between Western leaders (mainly from the United States and the European Union) and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, as well as renewed calls for continued support for Ukraine. By Feb. 1, the call for support had been officially answered, with the 27 EU member states agreeing on an additional €50 billion ($54 billion) aid package for Ukraine.
In February, the Russian-Ukrainian war gained a new dimension with the addition of international law to its military and economic aspects. That month, the war came under the scrutiny of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the highest judicial body of the United Nations. Amid ongoing hostilities, a report published on Feb. 13 by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) revealed that global defense spending had reached a record $2.2 trillion, heightening fears of a potential "World War III." Additionally, as Russian and Ukrainian officials continued to exchange accusations of "genocide," the U.S. and the EU expanded and updated their sanctions against Russia.
In March 2024, as the war raged on, the doors of diplomacy were being cautiously pushed open. Türkiye emerged as a "smart power" in the region, continuing its mediation efforts despite Western calls for actions that risked escalating the conflict. Early in the month, Türkiye hosted the Russian Foreign Minister at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, a brand of Turkish conference diplomacy. The following week, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was received in Istanbul. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s statement, “We will continue our efforts to end the war with a just peace based on negotiations,” exemplified a balanced and constructive approach to the conflict.
March also carried significant political weight. Alongside celebrating Putin’s election victory in Russia, the month marked a notable shift in rhetoric regarding the conflict. On March 22, for the first time, Russia referred to the situation in Ukraine as a "war" rather than a "special military operation." Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov articulated Russia’s renewed stance on the conflict, stating: “We are in a state of war. Yes, it started out as a special military operation, but as soon as this group was formed when the collective West became a participant in this on the side of Ukraine, it became a war for us.”
By April 2024, clashes in the Zaporizhzhia region had intensified, raising fears of a potential "nuclear catastrophe" due to the presence of the nuclear power plant in the area. Additionally, NATO’s series of meetings to rally support for Ukraine and the U.S. supplying the Ukrainian army with Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) missiles with a range of 300 kilometers (186 miles) further dampened hopes for an end to the war. Despite these developments, Russia continued making territorial gains in eastern Ukraine through May. However, the sudden cabinet reshuffle in the Kremlin that month (when Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, after 12 years in office, was replaced by Andrey Belousov, an economist) was widely interpreted as a sign of Russia’s lack of a concrete plan to conclude the war. Indeed, one of the first actions under the new Defense Minister was the staging of "tactical nuclear exercises" near Ukraine’s border, involving Iskander and Kinzhal hypersonic missiles.
Efforts to end the war gained momentum in June 2024 with the "Ukraine Peace Summit," hosted by Switzerland on June 15-16. However, Russia’s absence from the summit and the participants’ inability to present a unified commitment to ending the conflict hindered the summit’s success. Meanwhile, in its final declaration, the NATO Summit held in Washington in July reinforced ‘commitments to military alliance and long-term support’ for Ukraine. Following the summit, the first batch of U.S.-made F-16 fighter jets was delivered to Ukraine, marking a significant escalation in military aid.
By August 2024, the realization of a major prisoner swap, pivotal for Russian-Western relations, raised hopes that this climate of detente might also influence the war in Ukraine. On Aug. 1, 2024, Moscow and the West, with Türkiye’s mediation, completed the most comprehensive prisoner exchange since the Cold War. Türkiye’s mediation skillfully combined effectiveness on the ground with diplomatic finesse and was widely praised by the international community. However, this "hostage diplomacy" did not translate into a significant impact on the Ukrainian war. Approximately 15 days after the historic exchange, Ukraine launched a counter-offensive in Russia’s Kursk region, dashing hopes for a sustained de-escalation.
By September 2024, the escalation of the war had entered a new phase. On Sept. 1, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov indicated that Russia’s "Nuclear Doctrine" would be amended. Another significant development in September was U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres openly acknowledging the U.N. Security Council’s ineffectiveness in ending the war in Ukraine. In October, Zelenskyy proposed a plan to end the war, which included Ukraine’s NATO membership. However, the plan received no response from the Russian side.
The re-election of Donald Trump in the U.S. this past November is seen as a pivotal moment for those hoping to end the Russian-Ukrainian war. Trump’s notable claim, “I can end the war in 24 hours,” resonates with many. However, the Biden administration’s decision (despite not yet officially transferring power) to authorize Ukraine’s deployment of ATACMS missiles in November raises ongoing questions about the prospects for peace. In response, Putin’s signing of the “Nuclear Doctrine” is a significant development that merits careful assessment in this context.
As of December 2024, numerous developments in the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war indicate that Russia maintains a dominant position. Notably, Zelenskyy, who previously stated that the war’s conclusion depended on Ukraine reclaiming all its territories, revised this stance on Dec.1, declaring that Kyiv’s NATO membership is now the primary condition for peace. Adding to the tension, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov remarked in a Dec. 5 interview that Russia’s use of hypersonic missiles in the conflict was intended as a signal that Moscow is prepared to use all available means to avoid defeat.
Furthermore, the war has increasingly devolved into a series of “missile reprisals,” particularly in recent weeks, diminishing the likelihood of a definitive victor in a potential missile-driven escalation. This assessment is underscored by the Dec. 17 killing of Igor Kirillov, commander of Russia’s Nuclear Protection Forces, in a Ukrainian bombing in Moscow, followed by Moscow’s retaliatory missile strikes on Kyiv.
As 2024 draws to a close, the Russian-Ukrainian war still holds the prospects for both a significant conflict and peace. As we enter 2025, the realization of either outcome depends on several key factors. As reflected in his recent statements, one critical element is Putin’s apparent willingness to engage in negotiations to end the war. Another decisive factor will be how effectively Trump, set to assume the U.S. presidency on Jan. 20, 2025, can assert his commitment to ending the war and influence the Pentagon’s stance. Without meaningful progress, the continuation of the conflict into the new year risks dragging both Russia and Ukraine into a devastating stalemate with no clear winners.
While it is not yet possible to calculate the precise net cost of the Russian-Ukrainian war, estimates suggest that the total loss of life on both sides is approximately 500,000 at best. In contrast, the conflict's direct and indirect financial costs have exceeded $1 trillion. This stark reality underscores the accuracy of the assessment presented in the introduction. Thus, beginning with Waltz’s monologue, this analysis of the Russian-Ukrainian War of 2024 can be effectively concluded with his poignant observation, “In wars, there is no victory but only varying degrees of defeat.”
