In the aftermath of World War II, Türkiye made the historic choice of siding with the free world and the Western Bloc. This policy led to Türkiye’s becoming a NATO member on Feb. 18, 1952, at the cost of 721 Turkish soldiers who died in Korea for the interests of the free world whose patron was the United States. Since then, as NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said, Türkiye has become an important NATO ally.
Currently, Türkiye provides a security cushion to NATO such as closing the Bosporus for naval ships, which has reduced Russia’s capabilities to reinforce its presence in the Black Sea and around Crimea, fighting Daesh, supporting Ukraine, and keeping the world’s grain flowing.
Ankara currently has two concrete demands from Stockholm to approve its membership in NATO. One is not to shelter the members, recruiters and fundraisers of groups Ankara describes as terrorists, including the PKK terrorist group, its Syrian presence YPG/PYD, and the Gülenist Terror Group (FETÖ), which Ankara accuses of masterminding the 2016 coup attempt. Second, Türkiye expects the Swedish state to stand firmly against Islamophobia and not allow the burning of the Holy Quran.
Türkiye’s two demands to cooperate with Sweden in fighting against the terrorists and to put an end to Islamophobia have not been met by Stockholm so far. During the Ukrainian recovery conference which was held simultaneously with the Astana meeting on June 21, Ankara repeated once more that Sweden shouldn’t expect a green light from Ankara at the summit unless it prevents anti-Türkiye protests of the PKK terrorists and the burning of the Quran in Stockholm.
The negotiations which were held before the Vilnius NATO summit, showed openly that the prospects of Sweden joining the alliance before the annual NATO summit in Vilnius are dim. This is mainly because the U.S. Congress wants Türkiye to ratify Sweden’s NATO membership before approving the sales of F-16 jets, which Türkiye regards as unacceptable. This shows Sweden’s NATO membership is more relevant with mutual mistrust in the relations between Türkiye and the U.S. rather than Türkiye and Sweden. Put differently, Sweden’s prospects for NATO membership after the Ukrainian war are relevant to the continuation of the status quo in the international system that is composed of the U.N. and NATO under U.S. leadership.
When given the fact that French President Emmanuel Macron had drawn attention to the "brain death" of NATO before the Ukrainian War, the Ukraine war served the interests of the U.S. most as it led to, in Macron’s words, “revival of NATO by electric shock of Russia-Ukraine War.” Second, the war in Ukraine led to the weakening of President Vladimir Putin as it became evident with the mercenary Wagner’s revolt against the Russian army and Putin.
Third, because the Ukrainian war demonized and isolated Putin a lot, it served most to the strengthening of the Democrat’s hand on the eve of the elections in the U.S., which badly needed an enemy in order to mobilize the American masses. Due to the fact that Finland’s membership in NATO led to the Alliance’s border with Russia being doubled, Russia under Putin was more alarmed and increased its attacks on Ukraine, including civilians.
By bringing Sweden into the fold together with Finland, it is also expected to strengthen NATO’s deterrence in the Arctic, a region where Russia has invested heavily in commercial and military infrastructure. Moreover, with the membership of Sweden, all Arctic states, except Russia will be brought into NATO, allowing the alliance to pursue a more assertive strategy in the region. This, no doubt, will increase the probability of making Gotland a NATO base, a watchtower in the north to keep an eye on Putin and to contain Russia. Thus, Sweden and Finland will play the role of America’s gendarme against Russia, which Türkiye, once upon a time, did during the Cold War period.
Currently, Türkiye is obliged by the U.S. to make a choice between its NATO identity and its alliance with Russia. In other words, NATO officials and the U.S. are in a race against time to avoid the embarrassment of seeing the alliance miss its own stated aim of admitting Sweden to the alliance by July 11. Türkiye has been squeezed by Washington and the NATO allies to prove its loyalty to the Western bloc by approving Sweden’s NATO membership even if Washington threw Ankara out of the F-35 program, which Türkiye paid $1.4 billion, and continued to provide weapons and military training to the PKK affiliated YPG terrorists in Syria.
Under these circumstances, it looks quite difficult for Türkiye under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to approve Sweden’s NATO membership as Türkiye’s demands from Sweden and the U.S. fall on deaf ears. Currently, Türkiye is the only NATO country whose dialogue with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Putin is still open. It is also the only NATO country where the officials of both Ukraine and Russia come and negotiate with each other to finalize the war and to provide a flow of grain to the world. Furthermore, it is the only NATO country whose air space is open to Russia, and that does not apply sanctions on Russia so as to avoid the demonization of Putin and isolation of Russia, which Ankara believes would further exacerbate the war and lead to the further destabilization of the region.
Looking from a different angle, the Vilnius NATO summit is more than a regular/ordinary NATO meeting, on the contrary, it is about the prestige of the Western/Euro-centric international system whose patron is the U.S. – it is about understanding to what extent the Western/Euro-centric international system is sustainable by disregarding the rightfulness of Ankara’s claims. It is about the future of Europe where Islamophobic feelings and ultranationalism increase with the influx of more and more refugees.
Last but not least, the Vilnius NATO summit is about understanding how Ankara’s bridging role and its "liminality," highlighting Türkiye’s perceived geographical exceptionalism is a big asset for the Transatlantic alliance in order to keep stability and the status quo in the international system.
