The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) group of countries represents a significant portion of the global population, especially including India and China, and a growing percentage of the global economy. It has become a group of states that now represents the non-Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) group of countries in the developing world.
In the August 2023 meeting of BRICS in South Africa, it was announced that the BRICS would be expanded to include six more new countries from developing or emerging economies – namely Argentina, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia.
Ankara's approach to BRICS group membership should be taken with slight caution. No NATO country has yet joined BRICS; however, being excluded may become more problematic decades later. Türkiye should seize the opportunity to become a member if given a chance; however, membership should not be sought at all costs. Instead, policymakers should alternatively promote organizations to which Türkiye is already a member, such as the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). It is worth remembering that the BRICS group of states is still a “grouping,” and other than the new Development Bank, formerly referred to as the BRICS Development Bank, it does not have many institutional bodies, which, in contrast, the OTS states do have.
Türkiye’s potential membership in BRICS could be divisive because when the nation eyes such a group, immediately it is accused, usually unfairly and unjustly by European allies, of shifting an axis or having rapprochement with the adversaries or rivals of Western European states and the United States. Specifically, close and special relations between the presidents of Türkiye and Russia have been criticized by many Western powers. For instance, although Türkiye recognizes Ukraine’s territorial unity (and doesn’t recognize the annexation of Crimea), Türkiye is not part of the sanctions against Russia either. By the same token, Türkiye is further balancing its relations with China and Western allies.
In contrast, Türkiye has been very unjustly treated by the European allies, especially in the process of European Union membership. Past experiences have demonstrated how costly it could be to not join an international organization. Türkiye did not join the EU, perhaps when it could have, but then when it officially applied in the 1980s, it has since been granted special status or has been kept at the doorstep. From where it stood, it watched the EU integrating new members from the Eastern bloc, with no apparent prospect of Turkish membership in the near future. In response to the criticism that Türkiye is not "European enough," it should be reiterated that this criticism is very Eurocentric and unfair because if the EU is going to be a club of values, not just of an identity based on religion and culture, then the Turkish membership should have been welcomed more earnestly.
After all, Türkiye is a member of many European institutions and has a customs union with the EU. Türkiye is a founding member of the European Court of Human Rights. It is also observing many of the EU standards when it comes to its trade and other economic regulations and is trying to adapt to the EU Green Deal. However, even when it comes to granting visas and unrestricted travel of Turkish citizens to the EU, we see blunt discrimination and purposeful delays and complications created by the European states for Turkish citizens who would like to travel either for tourism, business or for academic and scientific research purposes. In several decades, if there is a drastic change in the global economy, the standards of living and technology, Türkiye may also miss out on BRICS membership if it had the opportunity. For this reason alone, it is still worthwhile for Türkiye to become part of the BRICS group.
Consequently, it is also worth mentioning that BRICS is just a grouping of states and not yet a formal international organization with solid political, economic and cultural motivation, which were in the origins of the EU and its predecessor organizations. The level of integration as well as solidarity of the EU in a political, economic and social logical aspect, in addition to NATO membership at this moment, has no comparison. NATO membership, especially, is regarded as a solid security alliance that is a shield against potential adversaries and rivals from a political and military perspective. The application of Sweden and Finland for NATO membership has demonstrated how valuable that organization is still for providing security, even for EU states.
Even though Türkiye is not part of the EU and there is an uncertain prospect regarding eventual membership, Türkiye’s trade with the EU is significant and citizens of Turkish descent living in Europe demonstrate how Türkiye is integrated in European politics. Although in recent years, Türkiye has supported policies such as the Asia Anew Initiative and opening toward the Middle East, many of its trade ties, as well as its cooperation in terms of science and industry, tourism and also in many others, are with the EU countries. Therefore, Türkiye and the EU will need to continue enhanced cooperation over the following decades regardless of the eventual outcome of the membership prospect.
Regarding BRICS, the examples of the Russian and Chinese presidents’ absence at the G-20 in India’s capital, New Delhi, demonstrate how internally divided the BRICS group can be. Furthermore, it also demonstrates how differently the BRICS group is viewed by the countries that are members. For instance, Russia and China would promote BRICS and its enlargement specifically as an alternative to the OECD, the EU and NATO-led Western states. While countries such as Brazil, India and South Africa share more democratic values and rules-based societies, they have more in common with Western states and Türkiye. These three countries are also in a much better position to act as a counterweight between West and East. India, for instance, which is trying to adopt a leadership role in the Global South, has good relations with Western countries, especially with the U.S., where Vice President Kamala Harris is of Indian ancestry, as well as with the United Kingdom, where Prime Minister Rishi Sunak is of Indian descent.
Hence, India can act as a counterweight within BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) for the agenda furthered by Russia and China, which tend to be more adversarial toward the Western and European countries. It should also be duly noted that there are ongoing border disputes between India and China and as such, there could potentially be other roadblocks within the BRICS grouping when they make decisions or try to form a formal international organization, unlike the current format of "grouping" states that characterizes the BRICS at present.
Overall, the recommendation made in this article would be to cautiously and carefully eye an opportunity to join BRICS. However, a lot should be considered given the potential divisions within BRICS and its internal divisions, as well as the lack of a clear mandate regarding its values as well as future corporation mechanisms. Türkiye may not have the opportunity to join BRICS and that could clearly be a possibility since it is not a member of the SCO. Furthermore, with six additional countries, Türkiye’s joining BRICS could be more complex, with the possibility of being vetoed by any one of the former five or six new nations.
In conclusion, Türkiye’s priority should be to take advantage of opportunities in a new world political and economic order where trade between the West and the Eastern states of Eurasia would be increasingly evolving in an Indo-Pacific region rather than the Euro-Atlantic region. For this reason, Türkiye tries to promote new Silk Road projects such as the Middle Corridor as well as the “Arab peace road” through Iraq while still being incorporated into China’s Belt and Road Initiative. During the recent G-20 summit, there was a newly proposed trade route trajectory or project which is called the India Middle East Europe Corridor or the IMEC. Curiously, this newly proposed project doesn’t include Türkiye.
Türkiye is a key factor for global trade and supply chains as well as energy transition and, therefore, for any of those projects and corridors. Including Türkiye would provide advantages in terms of the logistics industry as well as any other modern facilities, and that would ease international trade. With past problems that occurred in the Suez Canal, we recognize how vital and crucial the roles that Türkiye could play are in international supply chains. Therefore, Türkiye should seek to enhance and further its position as a center of international trade, logistics and supply chains by not being left out of any of these projects but also furthering its own interests to have solidarity and cooperation in the Eurasian landmass. Logically, the easiest way to do this would be to further an existing organization with emerging institutional bodies of which Türkiye is already a member, namely the OTS.
The OTS can have agreements with other international institutions such as the EU, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSCE), the SCO, the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN), as well as with BRICS. Thus, it is more crucial for Türkiye to leverage non-membership to either the EU or, perhaps in the future, with BRICS by instead further developing an organization to which it is a member, such as the OTS, as it stands at the heart of the Eurasian landmass and at the core of the different trade route corridors envisaged.
