The use of mercenaries dates back to 400 B.C., and they were used by ancient Greeks, Alexander the Great and Rome's army. Since then, there have been several debates around their use for centuries, and some intellectuals argued that they are beneficial while others opposed the idea of using mercenaries.
In his famous book "Utopia," Thomas More supported the use of mercenaries, while Niccolo Machiavelli opposed it.
There is no doubt that since the Cold War, the intellectual and military thinking about them has taken another form following on-the-ground cases, observations and the transformation of the new wars in which mercenaries have only become a part of the current concept.
Prigozhin's recent mutiny against Russian President Vladimir Putin and officials has revealed the potentially disastrous results of using non-state actors in active conflict zones as Moscow deployed them across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and the African continent to realize its foreign policy goals.
Being known as Putin's old friend and loyal henchman, Prigozhin first started providing kinetic support to Moscow's military operations as a military element. However, from Syria and Libya to the Central African Republic and Mali, the Wagner group under Prigozhin's leadership has eliminated its sole military identity and transformed into more. In the years, it has also become an influential ideologic tool that has conducted intelligence-supported activities and disinformation campaigns that have set all the classic memorizations of Weberian state-military understanding and Clausewitzian war aside.
This is what Andreas Krieg, in 2016, called "surrogate warfare," which means externalizing the burden of war by all means that paves the way for states to refuse responsibility. Besides that, surrogacy means a patron's outsourcing of warfare's strategic, operational and tactical burdens.
As could be seen when it comes to Prigozhin's case, he is not only about kinetic (military) power but is capable of having all elements of warfare, including the ideologic and political parts. He has been a main tool of Russia's military activity denial policy by enabling Moscow to avoid international pressure. However, we have eventually seen him marching through Moscow against the patron, Putin.
In my Ph.D. dissertation, I labeled the surrogates like Prigozhin as "rapacious surrogates" who can not be controlled by their patrons after a while due to their capability to seek their own political goals thanks to the power they obtain gradually. Rapacious surrogates would even become opponents of their partners, as I argued, and Prigozhin is a unique verification case of it. Following Prigozhin's mutiny against Putin and military officials, Moscow will face further issues.
For an extended period, the Wagner Group, under the leadership of Prigozhin, has played an active role in realizing Moscow's geopolitical agenda in the MENA region and African continent. Following Prigozhin's rebellion, many wonder what will happen and who will replace the mercenaries.
It is not going to be an easy case for Russia since the Wagner mercenaries have become the main elements of warlord Khalifa Haftar's army in Libya, a security guarantee for African states like Mali, Central African Republic and more since they have signed official agreements with the countries mentioned above, financed by the UAE, even established an independent logistic and financial infrastructure across the region. To weaken the Wagner Group's financial support, Putin might need to deal with the UAE first. However, this is the most fundamental issue compared to dozens of others.
For instance, amid Russia's war against Ukraine, it is not a piece of cake for Moscow to replace Wagner mercenaries militarily, considering their decentralized existence and Russia's ongoing wars on several fronts with its own, official soldiers. On the other hand, many African countries that have made security deals with the Wagner Group following Moscow's encouragement are concerned about security-related issues. Although Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, right after Prigozhin's mutiny, announced that there would be no malfunctioning regarding those African states, it will not be easy to convince them. Because, despite the deal brokered by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko between Putin and Prigozhin, the Russian president has not removed either Shoigu or Gerasimov. So, nobody has been convinced yet to set the anxiety aside, and Russia's reputation is losing its credibility across the region.
Despite Lavrov's statement, Moscow has refused the Wagner Group's demand for additional military supply, which shows that even Russia doesn't believe in Wagner mercenaries anymore. So, the previous promise regarding the recruitment of Wagner mercenaries by the Russian Defense Ministry seems to be falling victim to Moscow's hideless distrust.
In addition to the war against Ukraine, Russia's military existence in Syria, Libya and several other countries continues to be bone-shaking. In my humble opinion, Russia, from now on, will focus on proxies, kinetic elements rather than rapacious surrogates like Prigozhin in the short term to have "the order" on a string. Moscow, for now, can only replace Wagner with mercenaries or establish another force.
Since establishing another one is not easy for Putin amid his ongoing military activities across several countries, Moscow might consider deploying the RSB Group or oil giant Gazprom's mercenaries to replace Wagner, the existing ones, which are more loyal to Putin. However, in the middle and long term, Russia wouldn't want to risk its yearslong military "achievements" by falling into the hands of another Prigozhin-like rapacious surrogate due to their potential of prioritizing their own agenda rather than the patron's.
In the short term, Russia may deploy mainly kinetic contracted elements while trying to keep its acquisition alive. In the middle period, it will probably focus on what Machiavelli said.
It should not be forgotten that Russia's main foreign policy aim has been accessing the Mediterranean while seeking to challenge the naval supremacy of NATO and the U.S. throughout the Eastern Mediterranean. The same policy, if followed to its end, could also grant Moscow access to southern Europe and the Middle East and North Africa region. This has profound geopolitical implications for the current world order.
The age of neomedievalism is here, and the multipolar system enables non-state actors to exist. However, after experiencing the Prigozhin case, Russia can potentially convert this dynamic to its advantage if not prevented by trying to nationalize all kinds of military elements it has.
To fill the gap left by Russia’s newly emerged enemy, Prigozhin’s Wagner Group, the regional states and international actors should think about ways of bringing order through state-to-state negotiations and actors while the time is already running out. If Moscow’s short-term replacement plan can be prevented, keeping the influence over MENA and Africa will not be a bird in the hand for Russia in the middle and long term.