Türkiye's struggle to broker peace between Somalia and Ethiopia
Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan hosts Somali Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Ahmed Muallim Fiqi at the Turkevi, New York, U.S. Sept. 27., 2024. (DHA Photo)

Türkiye's mediation is crucial for resolving Somali-Ethiopian tensions and ensuring regional stability



Ankara's mediation talks between Somalia and Ethiopia is a shuttle diplomacy to seek amicable possibilities of resolving the Somalia-Ethiopia diplomatic tensions occasioned by the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between the break-away region of Somaliland and Ethiopia in January 2024.

Türkiye has a longstanding diplomatic relationship with both Somalia and Ethiopia and hence its role in mediating the Somali-Ethiopian dispute renders it a trustworthy mediator. Moreover, Türkiye has been the guarantor of stability and peace in the Horn of Africa region by investing heavily in Somalia’s state-building efforts and enhancing Somalia’s military capabilities against al-Shabab militants. Turkish drones and military support to the government of Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed turned the wave against the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) rebels in the most recent Ethiopian conflict. Hence, the Ankara process aims to lower the tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia and maintain regional stability.

In the second round of talks, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan reiterated Türkiye’s objectives in the Ankara process by stating, "As Türkiye, our goal is to address the existing concerns and resolve the issues in a way that will benefit not only Somalia and Ethiopia but the entire region." However, resolving the Somali-Ethiopian sea dispute will be challenging since the feuding sides have entrenched positions and non-negotiable items concerning national security and state existence. Furthermore, the dynamics in the Horn of Africa are changing and becoming more complex since regional countries have geopolitical strategic interests in the region as postulated by the scholar Tunç Demirtaş.

The horn of Africa is prone to violence and political instability, and the Ankara process is a lifeline for the region and all its inhabitants. However, given the raging conflicts in both Somalia and Ethiopia recently and the Pandora's box opened by the Somaliland-Ethiopia MoU, the Ankara process faces a herculean task in resolving the Somali-Ethiopian dispute.

The end of Abiy-mania

When Abiy Ahmed Ali became the Prime Minister of Ethiopia in 2018, he was envisaged as a young, charismatic and democratic leader who would transform Ethiopia and the geopolitics of the Horn of Africa for the better. Indeed, in his first year, he oversaw changes in internal politics and Ethiopia’s foreign policy. Abiy-mania engulfed the whole region. However, this political honeymoon ended swiftly. Ethiopia is a complex state with numerous ethnic groups contesting for power and hegemony: in the words of scholar Saskia Brechenmacher, "a history of repression" defines the dynamics of its internal politics.

Military muscle and violence define who has power in Ethiopia. And as a former soldier and an intelligence officer, Abiy Ahmed understood this clearly. Soon, a bloody conflict erupted in the Tigray region, destabilizing northern Ethiopia. Another war is raging in the Amhara region right now with documented systematic human rights abuse and violations.

Amid all these crises in Ethiopia, Abiy embraced a discourse of making Ethiopia great again and accessing the sea peacefully or violently. Zach Vertin, an observer of the region, cautioned about Abiy. He observes that "critics balk at what’s become known as Abiy-mania, however, variously concerned that the Pentecostal preacher-in-chief is naive, self-aggrandizing or an unconvincing product of the old guard." Ethiopia’s imperialistic ambitions rattled Somalia, Eritrea and Egypt – and the drums of war are beating louder. In the words of Peter Kagwanja, "Abiy sowed the wind, the Horn of Africa is reaping the whirlwind." Can the Ankara process bring down the tension in the region?

Fragmented Somalia

The MoU signed between Hargeisa and Addis Ababa is at the core of the discord between Somalia and Ethiopia. By engaging with Somaliland, a secessionist administration in Northern Somalia, Ethiopia overtly disregarded and undermined Somalia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. This was unwarranted and a blatant disregard of international norms of diplomacy.

Ethiopia wants access to the sea and a military naval base in the strategic Bab-el-Mandeb sphere. In Abiy Ahmed’s raison d’etre, this will make Ethiopia great again and solidify his legitimacy in internal politics. What else would distract a population that is tormented and tired of wars if not revived imperial expansionism? Ideologies do energize the spirit.

Somalia is militarily weak and politically fragmented – this was an opportunity for the government in Addis Ababa, and that is why it signed an MoU with a break-away region boldly without flinching. The MoU poses an existential threat to Somalia’s sovereignty, existence and continuing state-building efforts. The government of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud responded feebly to a matter regarding its sovereignty and ontological existence. The red line has been crossed, and Ethiopia doesn’t seem to retreat from the MoU.

Türkiye’s Balancing Act

To resolve the Gordian Knot in the Somalia and Ethiopia dispute, Türkiye has to adopt a balancing act in the Ankara process. Ethiopia’s approach to getting access to the sea is abrasive and inconsiderate to Somalia’s ontological existence. On the other hand, Somalia is preparing for a violent confrontation if push comes to shove. Any conflict will destabilize both Ethiopia and Somalia; regional countries like Eritrea and Egypt will most likely get involved, and armed liberation movements will erupt in the Somali region of Ethiopia.

According to the United Nations state mediation manual, the guiding principle of any mediation logic should be predicated on international law and normative frameworks. The principle of legality will be an obstacle to the Ankara process. Ethiopia aspires to have a military base in the Gulf of Aden; Somalia has no intentions of offering an army base to Ethiopia – a country already entangled in Somali internal politics.

And here lays the limits of the Ankara process. Ethiopia ought to seek commercial access to the sea, which its neighboring countries are willing to offer, and this will benefit the commerce and infrastructure of the whole region. A naval military base has the connotations of imperial expansionist hubris; this is unacceptable to Somalia. The Abyssinian Christian kingdom and its Portuguese allies failed in their 16th-century attempt; Abiy Ahmed revived this Ethiopian aspiration, and it could destabilize the Horn of Africa with dangerous implications.

Either way, Türkiye aspires to resolve the Somalia-Ethiopia dispute. While the Ankara process faces both geopolitical and legal challenges, Türkiye is willing to maintain thoughtful diplomacy to promote stability in the region.