First, let's start with three news stories about President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, a figure who has influenced Türkiye over the past three decades.
The first story dates back to 2008 with the headline "Erdoğan: Give birth to at least three children," reported during an International Women's Day panel in Uşak. Erdoğan addressed the public, saying, "I am speaking not as a prime minister but as your concerned brother. We must protect our young population as it is. The main thing in an economy is population. They want to exterminate the Turkish nation. This is exactly what they are doing. Have at least three children so that our young population does not decrease."
The next news article is from 2013, headlined "Why did Erdoğan announce that he wanted three children?" The newspaper emphasized that then-Prime Minister Erdoğan, speaking at the International Family and Social Policies Summit, reiterated his call for three children per family.
"One child means bankruptcy, two children means bankruptcy, and three children means stagnation. Our fertility rate should reach three to surpass the level of two. We need to achieve this. The West is currently in trouble, but we do not want Türkiye to face the same issues. I call upon all mothers in our country: 'Do not underestimate my words, our sensitivity; we need to spread this campaign far and wide,'" he said.
In recent weeks, President Erdoğan said during a Cabinet meeting that, "The slowdown in the population growth rate is no longer tolerable for Türkiye."
He continued, stating: "We are below the 2.1 level, which is the population renewal threshold. This is frankly an existential threat for our nation, a disaster. The current situation is no longer tolerable for our country. As you know, we have always recommended three children for all families. Unfortunately, time has proven us right in our predictions. We must recognize that population is our greatest strength as a nation, and we must protect it. We will be more determined on this issue in the coming period."
Unfortunately, Erdoğan's longstanding concerns have now materialized.
Statistics indicate that Türkiye is in a demographic crisis, with its annual population growth sharply declining over the past decade and accelerating in recent years. According to data from the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat), the population grew by 7.1 per thousand in 2022 but only by 1.1 per thousand in 2023, marking a historic low. Previously, the lowest growth rate was recorded in 2020 at 5.5 per thousand during the severe pandemic.
The issue lies in the declining fertility rate among Turkish women. They are increasingly marrying later, having children later and opting for smaller families. The fertility rate in Türkiye was 2.1 in 2017, declining to 2.01 in 2018, 1.97 in 2019 and further dropping to 1.51 in 2023. By comparison, the fertility rate was 2.38 in 2002 when the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) came to power.
A population growth rate below 2.1, known as the "golden ratio" or replacement level, signifies a country heading toward an aging crisis. With Türkiye's fertility rate plummeting to 1.51, the proportion of elderly people in the population has surpassed 10%, indicating serious demographic challenges ahead.
Erdoğan's advocacy for "at least three children" was a response to this looming threat. In my previous commentary for Daily Sabah in 2015, I emphasized that Erdoğan's pronatalist policies were not rooted in Islamism or nationalism, contrary to common Western and political analyses. Türkiye's pro-life efforts over the past two decades aimed to avert the future challenges of an aging society.
However, recent data indicates that these policies have largely faltered in achieving their goals. Urgent new strategies are now necessary to stimulate a baby boom in Türkiye. Societal changes within Turkish society have contributed significantly to this policy setback. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent economic downturn have dampened family aspirations for having children. The increasing number of people living independently, which reached 5.2 million in 2023, as analyzed in my previous commentaries, reflects the rapid erosion of the traditional Turkish family structure due to accelerated urbanization and modernization. Factors such as enhanced access to education and employment for women, effective disease control and widespread adoption of contraception have also played pivotal roles.
From another perspective, this demographic shift is a natural phase experienced by many developing nations. However, unpreparedness could pose challenges to the sustainability of welfare states and economic development models as societies age. An aging population translates to fewer workers, reduced tax revenues and heightened strain on public budgets. Türkiye is already grappling with the costs associated with an aging demographic, impacting health care, pension systems and intergenerational dynamics. Aging itself is not inherently calamitous, but failure to prepare adequately poses a genuine threat. Türkiye's imperative now lies in implementing comprehensive policies geared towards readiness rather than attempting to reverse this transformation.
Türkiye needs to take a few measures quickly to ensure a baby boom. It should be underlined that there is no point in repeating similar policies that have been implemented so far, as it is obvious that these policies have not been successful in increasing fertility.
The first thing to do is to ensure economic stability. Data shows that families whose purchasing power has been shaken choose not to have children or postpone having children. Solving the housing crisis in metropolitan cities is an important part of this.
The second most important topic is strengthening family policies. Studies are required to be conducted to understand salient features of the sociological transformation that Türkiye is going through and policies to meet society's expectations regarding family rather than imposing the family template we have in mind onto society. The policies should be aligned with the changing social realities of the Turkish society.
The third heading is the regulation of migration to Türkiye. By urgently establishing a Ministry of Migration, Türkiye needs to become a country that benefits from reverse brain drain and receives planned migration. Considering that the fertility rate of Syrians in our country is 5.3, it seems that migration management is also a solution to the demographic crisis. Instead of thinking that immigration, which is an inevitable phenomenon in the age of immigration, can be prevented by police state measures, we should switch to a planned, selective and qualified immigration system like the United States. In fact, migration plays a significant role in shaping Türkiye's demographic landscape. Internal migration from rural to urban areas, as well as international migration flows, contribute to the diversity of Türkiye's population. Understanding migration patterns and integrating diverse communities is crucial for fostering social cohesion and inclusive growth in the country.
Türkiye faces a critical juncture where investment in its youth is as crucial as stimulating a baby boom. The country's reliance on subsidy-based domestic production and low-value exports falls short of fostering economic efficiency and prosperity. Thus, redirecting investments towards productive sectors and achieving sustainable development hinges on bolstering the nation's human capital.
To transcend the middle-income trap, Türkiye must safeguard its young population while making substantial investments in vital infrastructure such as education, housing, employment, and, notably, research and development (R&D). Establishing a robust human capital framework is key to ensuring enduring and sustainable growth. Türkiye's ability to extend its demographic window of opportunity lies in dual investments: nurturing healthy birth rates and enhancing job prospects, education and health care services for younger generations.
Moreover, integrating demographic studies into academia and allocating resources for scientific research is imperative for formulating effective population policies. Merely rehashing existing policies without addressing the underlying scientific factors contributing to current challenges will yield limited results.
Recent government proposals like extending maternity leave to four months, enabling mothers to work remotely for up to three years and developing remote work models until children are 6, though positive steps are insufficient. Similar policies have been previously attempted without achieving the desired baby boom, underscoring the need for innovative approaches and avoiding the expectation of different outcomes from repeating the same strategies.
While initiatives such as extended maternity leave and enhanced severance pay for mothers contribute positively to increasing women's employment participation – currently at a low 35% – Türkiye must adopt more holistic and multifaceted policy frameworks. Detailed research and comprehensive programs, especially attuned to understanding Generation Z's attitudes toward family and childbearing, are essential for crafting effective solutions.
Europe and the U.S., emerging from World War II with declining populations, witnessed a "baby boomer" generation from 1946 to 1964, characterized by a surge in fertility rates, as the name suggests. Türkiye urgently requires such a demographic resurgence to extend its window of opportunity before confronting an impending aging crisis. Without swift implementation of reform policies, entering an unprepared aging crisis would be devastating for Türkiye.
In essence, Türkiye, renowned for its rich history and diverse culture, is currently undergoing significant demographic changes that influence various facets of society and the economy. These shifts profoundly impact the workforce, economy, consumer market and social dynamics. To foster a baby boom and invest in its youth, Türkiye must safeguard its sizable young population for several more decades, fostering opportunities for innovation, entrepreneurship and economic expansion.
