An extremely significant effort was made to improve relations between the two most crucial actors in the Middle East during the Türkiye-Egypt summit that took place in the Egyptian capital Cairo with the attendance of the ministers of foreign affairs.
The two nations drifted to opposing poles after the Arab Spring. Political history demonstrates unequivocally that there is a pattern to the interactions between these two players and that these interactions also have a significant impact on the entire region.
For a certain time in the Middle Ages, the struggle for dominance between Sunnis and Shiites in the Middle East determined the form of Islam. In addition to the Turkish-Arab conflict, the Sunni-Shiite hostility was also manifested in the competition between the Fatimids in Egypt and the Seljuks in Mesopotamia. The ancient conflicts between Hittite rulers and Egyptian pharaohs can be linked to the pattern of conflict between a power in Egypt and a power in Anatolia-Mesopotamia to rule the Middle East.
As the Ottomans conquered Egypt and other Arab lands in the 16th century, this relationship shifted. Staying as a province of the Ottoman Empire for nearly four centuries, Egypt seemed to be one of the most strategic areas of the empire politically and economically. The annual levies from Egypt were important for the imperial finances and served as the granary for the capital as well.
The groundwork for a new type of relationship between East and West was formed in 1798 when Napoleon Bonaparte, former emperor of the French, and the 12,000-man French army arrived in Alexandria. The East started to recognize that it could develop a new image for itself with the "words" of the West, while the West for the first time comprehended that it could establish an imperial and political dominance mechanism over the East. The fact that this experience began in Egypt was important. The short time that France ruled Egypt had a significant impact on how they would live in the future.
Mehmet Ali Pasha, an ordinary Ottoman soldier who arrived in the area from Albania, ascended to the rank of governor and dominated Egypt during the post-Napoleonic era. Egypt steadily grew apart from the government during this time. In reality, the fact that the Ottomans could only put down this insurrection with foreign assistance when Kavalal Mehmet Ali Pasha unfurled the flag of rebellion openly with French support in 1831 accelerated Egypt's emergence as an independent actor.
During the time of the Khedives, who were descendants of Kavalali, Egypt assumed a different geographical pattern, loosely connected to the central government. The modernization of Egypt became something that even the Sublime Porte could look to as an example during this period, while Cairo assumed the image of a multicultural center that could compete with Istanbul. Ottoman rule in the region came to an end when the British invaded the Khedive of Egypt in 1882, using a rebellion in Alexandria as justification.
Only in 1922 was it possible for Egypt to overthrow British domination. The last two Kavalali dynasty members attempted to combat the burgeoning populist-nationalist movements in Egypt but ultimately failed. The charismatic Gamal Abdel Nasser entered the scene in 1952, and following the Egyptian Revolution, a republic was established and the monarchy was dissolved.
In the same years, Türkiye attempted to contact the Western bloc in response to the Soviet menace and seek safety within NATO's security blanket. In the context of the Cold War, Nasser Egypt, which had a troubled history with Western colonialism and adopted a neutral and occasionally close to the Eastern Bloc discourse, frequently battled with the newly elected Democratic Party government. The Baghdad Pact, which Türkiye initiated and intended to be a regional extension of NATO, significantly contributed to the decline in bilateral ties. Egypt was one of the nations in the region that opposed Türkiye the most when it turned to a regional alliance that included Iran, Iraq and Pakistan under the supervision of the United States and Great Britain.
With the assistance of the U.S. and the USSR, Nasser was able to prevent the British, French and Israeli forces from launching a military effort to take the Suez Canal in 1956, which helped to boost his popularity like never before. In the Middle East, this was also the golden age of pan-Arabism. Türkiye was regarded in the region as a "supporter of Western imperialism," but Nasser progressively came to be seen as the rescuer of the entire Arab world, from Morocco to Iraq. Ultimately, the Baghdad Pact effort was a failure. A "communist" wall suddenly encircled Türkiye as pro-Nasser left-nationalist military organizations in Iraq and Syria adjusted to the coup.
Egypt and Baath Syria united in 1958 to form a federation that eventually included Yemen. A political dream that had been unfulfilled for centuries was finally realized with the creation of the United Arab Republic, but it also signaled a greater-than-ever increase in Soviet power in the Middle East. Under these circumstances, Türkiye would rely more and more on NATO.
All the Middle Eastern balances were disturbed by the Arab-Israeli War in 1967. The Nasserist ideal was in a deadlock from which it was unlikely to ever emerge. The military-based populist authorities that dominated the country after Nasser came closer and closer to the Western bloc against the Communists. Naturally, this process led to an improvement in Türkiye-Egypt ties. Egypt became a strong one-man rule under Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak. Türkiye's status in the Western alliance during this era was unstable due to the tumultuous Cold War environment. Nonetheless, the governments of Türkiye and Egypt have prioritized demonstrating to their people that they remain united, particularly with the issue of Israel.
One of the countries most affected by the Arab Spring was Egypt. Mohammed Morsi, the first president of Egypt to be elected, was installed into office by the Muslim Brotherhood, which was also supported by Türkiye. The Muslim Brotherhood took use of its position as one of the finest organized groups in the country during this process. This meant the establishment of a more general conservative-democratic wave in Egypt, which succeeded in Tunisia and gained momentum in Syria. Consequently, it was only reasonable for Türkiye to be among the countries that condemned it most vehemently when the armed forces led by Egypt's then-Chief of General Staff Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi seized power in 2013.
Yet since 2013, both governments have disregarded the significance of realpolitik. Especially in the last 10 years, although many developments have taken place that affected the Middle East in general, the deprivation of the two most powerful and oldest authorities in the region from the basis for conversation generated a terrible situation. Saudi Arabia-Iran tension, the civil wars in Syria, Yemen and Libya, the instability in Lebanon-Iraq and the Israel-Palestine issue, which has evolved to a new dimension, become more inextricable due to the lack of a communication mechanism and a blind opposition between Türkiye and Egypt.
As history has clearly illustrated, one of the most obvious patterns in Middle Eastern international relations is that the likelihood of regional issues being resolved rises if Türkiye and Egypt reach a mutually beneficial deal. It is also evident that the similar positions of Türkiye and Egypt, particularly the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, limit the impact of outside actors in the region.
In a way, the ability of Cairo and Istanbul to communicate with one another as "traditional power centers" in the Middle East is a regional and international development for both nations. National interests should take precedence over ideals while making foreign policy, and as of right now, improving relations between Türkiye and Egypt to the level of the post-Cold War era is more of a need than a choice.
