Ah, The Economist – that venerable bastion of Western perspective – has once again graced us with its penetrating insights, this time into the complexities of the island of Cyprus. In their recent piece, "The war in Ukraine has rattled both sides of Cyprus," they weave a tale that is, at best, a charming work of fiction.
According to The Economist, the influx of Russians and Ukrainians into Northern Cyprus is the latest twist in the island's saga. They suggest that these new arrivals, fleeing sanctions and seeking refuge, have "complicated matters on the island." One might be tempted to ask: Complicated for whom? For the Turkish Cypriots, who have endured decades of international isolation and embargoes? Or perhaps for the Greek Cypriots, whose unwavering commitment to a federal solution has been the epitome of diplomatic inflexibility?
The article dutifully notes that Cyprus has been "rent in twain" since 1974, following Türkiye's intervention. What a quaint way to describe a coup d'etat orchestrated by Greek nationalists aiming for enosis (Union with Greece), which necessitated Türkiye's intervention under the Treaty of Guarantee to protect Turkish Cypriots from impending catastrophe. But why let historical context muddy the waters of a good narrative?
Instead of focusing on the main topic, The Economist resorts to an all-too-familiar trick: the false equivalence with Crimea. While both involve contested territories, the contexts are vastly different. Cyprus’ division is rooted in a history of inter-communal violence, international treaties and a U.N.-endorsed peace process, whereas Crimea’s annexation is widely viewed as a unilateral act of aggression by Russia. Equating the two not only oversimplifies these complex issues but also misleads readers into drawing parallels where none exist. Drawing a line between the situation in Cyprus and Russia’s annexation of Crimea is not only intellectually lazy, but it’s also a blatant attempt to manipulate the emotionally charged Western reader.
The mention of Crimea, like a magician’s misdirection, diverts attention from the reality on the ground in Cyprus. While it’s unsurprising to see this kind of rhetorical ploy, The Economist takes it a step further by drawing attention to the existence of a Russian Consulate in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The implication is clear – to equate its presence with a repeated looming "Russian threat" to Europe in its southern borders, as the EU recognizes Cyprus as a unified entity as if the mere presence of a consulate were a harbinger of invasion.
This, however, opens up a different narrative of intrigue: The EU’s steadfast recognition of Cyprus as a single entity not only ignores the historical intricacies of the so-called "Republic of Cyprus"' constitutional framework but also blatantly contravenes international law. By admitting Cyprus into the Union in 2004 while its political division remained unresolved, the EU violated foundational legal principles and set a precedent of convenience over compliance. This act, overlooked by the mainstream discourse, highlights a calculated disregard for the Copenhagen criteria and undermines the EU’s credibility in adhering to its own stated values.
The irony, of course, is that this noble stance in the article conveniently ignores the ongoing Western siege imposed on Turkish Cypriots. An entire population is subjected to collective punishment through embargoes, isolated from the global economy, and treated as second-class citizens in the eyes of international diplomacy – all in the name of "principles" that apparently apply only when it’s politically expedient.
Beyond this, it appears that the real intent of the article is to prevent any perception that Russia’s consular presence could directly or indirectly imply a form of de facto recognition of the TRNC under international law. By doing so, the aim is not just to stir fear but to delegitimize TRNC by association with a broader geopolitical rivalry.
This deliberate association exploits the preexisting Western paranoia about Russia, further discrediting TRNC in the process. Interestingly, Russian diplomatic missions in countless other countries are never framed as a threat. But here, it’s a crisis – because it fits the preferred narrative. Why rely on facts and context when you can instead exploit the visceral emotions of an already polarized media audience?
And then there’s the selective moral high ground, a familiar tactic in shaping narratives with a veneer of ethical superiority. We’re told that "as a country that has suffered an illegal invasion, Cyprus – and its banks – had no other choice but to comply with sanctions against Russia." The Economist highlights the "cozy arrangement" between wealthy Russians and the Greek Cypriot south, lamenting how the war in Ukraine has disrupted this financial camaraderie. Yet, they conveniently overlook one of the most glaring scandals in recent EU history – the Greek Cypriot "Golden Passports" affair, which allowed wealthy individuals, including Russian oligarchs and other "high-risk figures,“ to purchase EU citizenship for exorbitant fees. This scandal, which ultimately forced the Greek Cypriot administration to terminate the program amid EU scrutiny, highlighted deep flaws in the region's regulatory oversight and raised significant concerns about corruption and security. For years, the EU criticized and tried to prevent this lucrative scheme, which allowed wealthy investors, including controversial Russian figures, to buy EU citizenship for a hefty price. This monumental scandal shook the credibility of the Greek Cypriot administration, yet The Economist seems to have misplaced its magnifying glass this time.
Furthermore, there is a conspicuous silence regarding the Greek Cypriot administration's militarization efforts and its deepening alliances with Western powers, such as its recent arms agreements with France and the United States, actions that have escalated tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. More alarmingly, the Greek Cypriots even entertained the idea of temporarily opening its military bases to Israel, enabling it to continue its Gaza massacres and territorial expansions in the Middle East with greater flexibility. Such moves threaten to destabilize the region further and could even spark a conflict of global proportions, potentially serving as a precursor to World War III – but who seems to care about such dire consequences?
Equally baffling is the article’s failure to acknowledge the growing influence of Zionist actors on the island, a topic that has been explicitly highlighted by numerous media outlets, including Israel’s own Haaretz, as recently as August last year. This omission is particularly striking given the broader geopolitical implications and the increasing scrutiny this phenomenon has drawn. As I detailed in one of my articles named "Zionism’s Grip on Northern Cyprus Grows Stronger Each Day,“ which was published in Daily Sabah, this influence represents a complex challenge to the island's sovereignty and stability. Ironically, these developments represent a far greater danger to Cyprus's future than any of the issues highlighted by The Economist. But again, why let such inconvenient truths interfere with a neatly packaged story?
In a masterstroke of selective reporting, the article mentions the TRNC only in passing, referring to it as a "self-styled" entity recognized solely by Türkiye. No mention of the decadeslong embargoes that have stifled its economy, the international community's refusal to acknowledge the Turkish Cypriots' democratic will, or the Greek Cypriot administration's consistent rejection of any solution that doesn't serve its unilateral interests. Nor does it address why the TRNC had to be established in the first place. The Turkish Cypriots, who initially had no intention of creating a separate state, were forced into this position as a direct consequence of systemic exclusion and persecution. This critical historical context remains conspicuously absent, leaving the reader with an incomplete and misleading understanding of the TRNC's origins. After all, acknowledging these realities might challenge the black-and-white portrayal of Cyprus, which is so comforting to Western audiences.
But perhaps the pièce de resistance is the portrayal of the recent informal talks between the two sides. The Economist describes them with a sense of weary inevitability, noting that "hope of progress is faint." This, without acknowledging that the Greek Cypriot side's intransigence and refusal to accept a two-state solution, have rendered such talks an exercise in futility. The article also overlooks why TRNC President Ersin Tatar insists on a two-state solution in the first place. There is no mention of the harrowing events of "Bloody Christmas" in 1963, when Turkish Cypriots faced violent persecution, leading to their forced removal from the island's constitutional government. These events have profoundly shaped the Turkish Cypriot perspective and for Tatar, a two-state solution is not a whim but a response to historical trauma and a justified demand for security and self-determination. By ignoring this context, The Economist renders Tatar's position incomprehensible to the reader, furthering a one-sided portrayal. But why delve into the messy intricacies of diplomacy when a resigned shrug will suffice?
In conclusion, The Economist has once again demonstrated its ability to present a narrative that is both superficially informative and profoundly misleading. By omitting inconvenient truths and glossing over the complexities of the Cyprus issue, it offers its readers the comfort of a familiar story untroubled by the demands of critical thought or genuine understanding. Bravo.
