Over the past years, Syrian-Turkish relations have experienced significant fluctuations, ranging from tension and hostility to recent attempts at normalization. Some signs suggest a mutual desire to enhance relations, evident in meetings at various levels, notably involving intelligence agency directors and foreign ministers.
In Moscow in 2023, recent developments hint that normalization between Syria and Türkiye may be achievable. This includes the resumption of diplomatic contacts and positive exchanges between Syrian leader Bashar Assad and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
However, numerous obstacles still hinder the full normalization of relations. The most prominent obstacles include the Turkish military presence in certain areas of northern Syria, the refugee issue and Turkish support for the Syrian opposition. It is important to consider Tehran's concerns about the potential strengthening of Turkish influence in the region following the reconciliation between Baghdad and Ankara, as well as the upcoming challenging presidential elections in the United States, which will impact the region depending on the election outcome.
Moreover, the United States backs the PKK terrorist group's Syrian wing YPG. Türkiye has persistently rejected the PKK/YPG's control over northeastern areas of Syria, stressing that it poses a threat to both Syrian unity and Turkish national security. It is noteworthy that Gen. Raymond Thomas, the commander of special operations in the U.S. Army, disclosed in 2017 during a discussion at the "ESPEN" security conference in Colorado that the name "Syrian Democratic Forces" used by the PKK/YPG was at the request of the United States for cover.
The PKK is designated as a terrorist organization in Türkiye, the United States, NATO and various regional nations.
The self-proclaimed "SDF" currently governs cities and towns beyond the authority of the Syrian government, where Arabs form the majority, such as Deir el-Zour, Tal Rifaat and Manbij, as well as others where Arabs make up almost the entire population, like Raqqa and Hassakeh. These areas also have minorities from Chechnya, Circassia, Assyria and Turkmen, along with Kurds, and ancient Arab clans and tribes.
It is evident that achieving reconciliation among all conflicting factions in Syria is the desired outcome for Russia, which is entangled in conflicts with the West and the crisis in Ukraine. Moscow has taken numerous measures to facilitate normalization between Syria and Arab nations, as well as between Damascus and Ankara, ever since Russia's direct military involvement in Syria began.
Syria, and today Moscow, has been making relentless efforts to bring Assad and Erdoğan together. Iraq has also recently joined the mediation efforts, playing a supportive role in facilitating normalization between Syria and Türkiye. This aims to bridge differences and create a conducive environment for direct dialogue between the two countries. Iraq's goal is to secure its borders with Syria and Türkiye, with normalization helping to reduce regional tensions, combat terrorism and enhance security cooperation.
Months ago, Ankara signed an agreement with Baghdad allowing Türkiye to conduct counterterrorism operations deep into Iraqi territory near its borders. Completing the normalization process with Syria could potentially lead to cutting off communication between the two branches of the PKK in Syria and Iraq, thereby restoring stability and sovereignty to the Syrian-Turkish-Iraqi border triangle.
Normalization presents an opportunity to boost economic cooperation among the three nations and explore new avenues for trade and investment. Collaboration on water resources is also a key area of mutual interest, with Syrian-Turkish reconciliation paving the way for fair agreements that address the needs of all three countries.
The dynamics of international and regional priorities in Syria have shifted with the rise of terrorist groups, prompting many countries to reassess their political agendas and move toward reconciliation. This shift benefits all parties involved and helps in gradually resolving the remaining crises.
What has been evident in the Turkish approach for years is the necessity of working and coordinating with Russia and Syria, as long as Washington continues to support Ankara’s adversary, the PKK/YPG, under various names. The U.S. policies do not align with the historical alliance between the United States and Türkiye, or within the framework of the partnership in the NATO coalition "as per the Turkish expression." In continuation of this trend, Türkiye is moving toward normalization with Damascus, encouraged by the restoration of Syrian relations with most Arab countries.
It is worth mentioning that the location of the meeting between Assad and Erdoğan is not crucial. It is a technical matter, given the urgent common interest that is driving Damascus and Ankara closer. The anticipated summit of the two presidents will be a significant step in the normalization process to rebuild trust and subsequently align positions to address the shared dangers and threats that exist in both capitals and the entire region. This is particularly important if the conflict in Gaza spreads to other nations like Lebanon and Syria, along with the potential influx of new waves of refugees posing a threat to the security of both Syria and Türkiye, especially after discussions about Greek Cyprus opening its bases and airports to Israel.
