An organizational image stands as one of the most vital and existential components of terrorist organizations. Inevitably, these groups engage in image management activities, which involve the ongoing development and safeguarding of the positive organizational image they aim to establish in their target audiences. Nevertheless, various events and circumstantial changes can result in image loss and damage for terrorist organizations, prompting them to employ strategies and activities known as image restoration.
According to the image restoration theory developed by William Benoit in the field of communication studies, each organizational structure tries to repair its image after being shaken as a result of different events. In this context, organizational structures may resort to a series of restoration strategies such as "denial," "attributing the blame or fault to others," justifying the action that shook the image and apologizing. These strategies are frequently used by terrorist organizations, which have the characteristics of an organizational structure, and the PKK terrorist organization provides important findings in this context.
Since the early years of its establishment, the PKK terrorist organization has been in dire need of image management and restoration. This first manifested itself in the late 1980s and early 1990s with terrorist acts against the Kurdish settlements in southeastern Türkiye. While the PKK's actions against the Kurdish people and civilians, whom it purported to represent, provoked a serious contradiction and reaction, the PKK tried to repair its loss of image with the rhetoric of "the necessity of actions for struggle and revolutionary violence." This strategy was also used to compensate for the image losses caused by the suicide bombings carried out by the PKK.
However, the PKK also suffered image loss due to its organizational and operational failures. This terrorist group, which tried to present itself as an "invincible" and "all-powerful" organization, was unable to achieve its tactical and strategic "goals." It had made promises after suffering blows against the Turkish security forces and therefore tried to repair the resulting image loss through different strategies. In this context, the group tried to justify its failures through strategic discourses such as "the difficulty of fighting against Türkiye, the second most powerful country in NATO," "the Kurdish people's insufficient support for the PKK" or "the presence of traitors within the PKK and their damage to the organization."
1999-2000 was the period in which the PKK most intensely felt the need for image restoration. The capture of its leader in 1999, and the so-called "extraordinary congress" in 2000 caused a major destruction in the organization's image. After this defeat, the capture of the organization's leader was described as an "international conspiracy." The change in the ideology of the organization was defined as "keeping up with the new international conditions and age" and as a necessity, just as socialism, the ideas of revolution and the creation of an independent state were described as "outdated." With the help of these strategies, the shaken image of the organization was attempted to be restored.
However, the deep contradiction between the new KCK paradigm and the old paradigm could not create a suitable ground for this. For example, whereas before 2000, any alternative to the goal of independence and statehood (such as autonomy) was defined as "betrayal and surrender to Türkiye," after 2005 the KCK paradigm adopted an understanding based on “democratic autonomy.” Factors such as these led to an incomplete image restoration.
Instead of reaching a democratic solution and ending terrorism and violence, the PKK spent the first five years of the 2010s as a period of preparation for a major uprising. Since the second half of 2015, it has attempted an insurgency in southeastern Türkiye with a strategy it calls "revolutionary people's war." With this attempted insurgency, the PKK aimed to create so-called "liberated areas" in parts of southeastern Türkiye, with a tactic based on the "urban guerrilla" model. In this context, the PKK's repression, threats and attacks against civilians and local populations in the region marked the beginning of the collapse of the organization's image. The deaths of civilians and the destruction of cities deepened the shaking of this. For the PKK, this process was the "beginning of the end" in terms of its organizational image.
Following this process, the Claw Operations, which were launched on May 27, 2019, largely squeezed the PKK into the Iraqi arena. During this period, the PKK shed its image as the "protector, vanguard and representative of all Kurds" and its goal of "democratic autonomy" became a terrorist organization whose sole objective was to protect its organizational existence. Thus, the PKK inevitably turned to a defensive concept, where it sought actors with whom it could forge alliances. In this field, the PKK, struggling to protect its existence against Türkiye, started to develop an alliance with Iran and Iranian-backed militia groups. This alliance manifested itself in the Sinjar region, in different areas in northern Iraq, and in attacks against Türkiye's settlements in Iraq.
In addition to this, the terrorist organization, which openly displayed its hostility toward the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), started to attract serious reaction from the Kurdish people living both in Türkiye and Iraq. This also led to the PKK being perceived as a “subcontractor of Iran,” especially in the Iraqi arena. This situation made the image of the terrorist organization, which collapsed after 2015, even more negative.
While the PKK suffered an image loss in the Iraqi arena, it tried to compensate for this loss through the PKK's Syrian affiliate, the YPG. The YPG was seen as a viable alternative to compensate for the loss of image caused by the PKK's transition to the KCK paradigm and the paradox created by the PKK's abandonment of state-building and socialism. Therefore, the YPG was envisaged by the PKK as an actor that would build the PKK/KCK paradigm, democratic autonomy and an "ecological society” in Syria. In this way, a serious image restoration was aimed to be realized.
However, this goal was soon reversed and failed. Firstly, the YPG started to oppress, attack and even ethnically cleanse the local population in the regions it occupied and controlled. It tried to use the civilian population as human shields against Türkiye's operations in these areas. It victimized the population by using critical infrastructure facilities for organizational logistical capacity rather than for the people. Although it tried to present Türkiye's operations as "attacks against the Kurdish people," this effort was not enough for image restoration and was not functional.
On the other hand, the YPG allied with socialist militants from Türkiye and other parts of the world who came to cooperate with it. It even called this alliance the "internationalist battalion," which belongs to socialist terminology. This contradicted the KCK paradigm, which labeled socialism as "outdated," and destroyed the image restoration that had been attempted in this context. In addition, the YPG, which wanted to gain an advantage with the image of "the actor fighting against Daesh," could not achieve this goal due to the disclosure of its covert cooperation with Daesh and the continued presence of Daesh in Syria.
Finally, the contradictions between the YPG's leadership and the PKK's leadership have accelerated image loss instead of image restoration. While the YPG was in close cooperation with the U.S., the PKK leadership made statements that the PKK was still fighting against U.S. imperialism and NATO. On the one hand, using the rhetoric of fighting against the U.S. and NATO and cooperating with socialist militant groups, and on the other hand, surviving with U.S. support, constituted a serious contradiction. In addition, the tensions between the YPG leadership and the PKK leadership, and the YPG's attempts to present itself as a separate organization, immune from the PKK, were among the most important reasons limiting the restoration of its image. It shows that the PKK has reached a dead end in the name of image restoration.
Having lost its image in Türkiye to a great extent, the PKK is trying to create an image in Iraq that it "maintains its organizational existence and strength" through local and tactical attacks against the Turkish army in the areas of Operation Claw. However, instead of being a supportive and empowering element for the PKK in terms of image restoration, the YPG has become an actor that deepens its image loss. This ultimately shows that each image restoration move and strategy leads to further image loss and contradiction. This shows that neither the strategy of blame-shifting and denial nor the strategy of justification is useful for the PKK anymore and that the PKK's search for an image restoration strategy has reached an impasse.
*Researcher on International Security and Terrorism and Ph.D. holder at the National Defense University of Türkiye
