On May 19, the second round of elections to determine the successor to Iran's eighth president, Ebrahim Raisi, who lost his life in a helicopter crash, concluded on Sunday.
According to official results, Masoud Pezeshkian won 54% of the valid votes, thus becoming Iran's new president. Constitutionally mandated to implement fundamental domestic and foreign policies determined by the supreme leader, the identity of the president, while not always significant in macro politics, can hold importance in micro issues, particularly those affecting daily life.
In the first round of elections held on June 28, participation nationwide remained just under 40%, with rates around 33% in Tehran province and approximately 20% in urban areas, Tehran City.
However, the second round on July 5 saw a significant increase in turnout, reaching 50% nationwide.
Despite this slight increase in participation in the second round, the fact that one out of every two voters boycotted the polls suggests ongoing political discontent among the populace.
Even the candidacy of a figure who could be considered reformist or even ethnically nationalist by Iranian standards failed to generate enthusiasm among the broader population, especially urban voters, indicating limited faith in the electoral process as a means of political intervention.
In the first round, despite record low turnout, reformist candidate Pezeshkian secured 42% of the votes. This was notable since low turnout typically favors conservatives in Iran's electoral system. Similar incidents occurred in the recent parliamentary elections, where hardline MPs won a substantial majority despite extremely low voter turnout.
Several factors contributed to Pezeshkian's 42% vote share in the first round despite low turnout. Firstly, the erosion of the conservative base, reducing their voting capacity from around 30% to 20% nationwide. Secondly, conservative votes were divided between Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, speaker of the Parliament of Iran, and former nuclear negotiator Said Jalili.
Despite indications and rumors supporting the parliament speaker's candidacy from elements associated with the "deep state" and traditional election engineers, conservative and regime-supporting masses perceived Ghalibaf as a corrupt politician due to corruption allegations and some family members' behaviors. Ideological groups preferred to vote for Jalili, known for his populist and modest approach, in a sense treating Ghalibaf as a second Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Jalili as a second Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. While this initially benefited Jalili in the first round, his characterization by opponents as "Iran's Taliban" made it impossible for him to garner average voter support, and in the second round, with new voter turnout, the gap between the two candidates widened to 3 million votes.
Mathematically, if voter turnout had remained the same in the second round and all of Ghalibaf's votes had gone to Jalili, Jalili could have won the election. However, pre-election polls already indicated that a significant portion of Ghalibaf's votes could go to Pezeshkian. Moreover, moderate-reformist groups who did not turn out in the first round saw Pezeshkian's potential to win and turned out in the second round, pushing the turnout to 50% and allowing Pezeshkian to comfortably win the second round. This explains why the sectors involved in election engineering were adamant about pressuring Jalili to withdraw. In the second round, Ghalibaf had a higher likelihood of garnering votes from average voters compared to Jalili, known for his radical views.
It will take time to see how Pezeshkian's government will act. Since the Muhammad Khatami era, his tenure as minister of health kept him distant from the state's main decision-making mechanisms for a long time. During electoral debates, he responded to questions on crucial domestic and foreign policy issues by saying, "We will consult experts," which sparked criticism. It is known that he is supported by reformist-moderate figures, and these groups appear to have lost their multidimensional struggle against the security bureaucracy, especially Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps (RGC), over the past decade. Endorsements from significant figures like former Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, former President Hassan Rouhani and Khatami might bring back past domestic political crises. Pezeshkian's actions on issues like ethnic and sectarian discrimination, which he consistently emphasizes, and relations with neighbors, especially Azerbaijan, will also be crucial.
Another question mark is how he managed to obtain approval for a much more important position, considering that his candidacy for parliament in the recent elections was initially rejected by the Guardian Council and accepted only after an appeal. His statements following the election suggest that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei directly intervened and used his initiative. In a country where personal relationships are as crucial as written rules, similar situations have occurred before; Mahmoud Alavi, who was initially denied a seat in parliament, later assumed a position in the Intelligence Ministry. The sharing of Pezeshkian's photo by certain figures from Tabriz, known for their conservative and hardline views, after the election also underscores that factors like regional solidarity alongside political polarization play significant roles in the country's politics.
Despite Pezeshkian's emphasis during his election campaigns, it is not expected that he will prioritize the demands of the Turkish or Sunni communities. Likely, he will make some statements and complaints about implementing Article 15 of the Constitution, which has been inactive for 45 years and grants ethnic groups the right to education in their own languages, similar to what Mohammad Khatami did. The strong support for Pezeshkian's campaign from Western-leaning Iranian nationalists like Zarif suggests that the country will likely be governed by a reformist-moderate Cabinet, a mix of Khatami and Rouhani.
However, the intense domestic and foreign policy agenda indicates that significant changes in the country's policies should not be expected. In this context, Pezeshkian will likely avoid appointing controversial figures. For example, it is highly unlikely that Javad Zarif, who has had serious conflicts with deep powers like the Revolutionary Guards, will return as foreign minister.
A more balanced and controlled figure like Abbas Araghchi may be deemed suitable for this position. Despite Pezeshkian's emphasis, dialogue with the United States, a new Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or signing the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) are unlikely developments, at least in the near future.
However, the positive atmosphere created by Pezeshkian might bring relative ease to domestic politics. There could be relaxation in hijab enforcement, which has caused significant protests among urban populations, and an increase in internet speed.
Regarding ethnic policies, improvements might be seen in issues such as the long-standing complaints from the provinces of Tabriz and Azerbaijan about receiving a smaller share of the national budget. Environmental concerns raised by these regions could be taken more seriously by the central government, and the presence of Turkic cadres in the bureaucracy might increase. This could slow the centrifugal tendencies that have been spreading among Iranian Turks for some time. Whether Pezeshkian's government will indeed resemble the third administration of Khatami or Rouhani will become clear over time.
One certainty is that Pezeshkian will not take any steps that would directly oppose Khamenei or his close circle.
The first challenge for the Pezeshkian administration will be in foreign relations. Particularly, the strained Israel-Iran relations after Oct. 7 could potentially escalate into a significant conflict through Lebanon. If Pezeshkian is perceived by the security bureaucracy as being lenient toward the U.S.-Israel front, he could face various interventions from hardliner factions, especially the conservative-controlled Parliament. He might even encounter ultimatums from RGC commanders, similar to those faced by Khatami. However, Pezeshkian’s extensive experience, lessons learned from the problems encountered by previous presidents, his background as a war veteran, and long-standing personal friendships with some RGC commanders will likely prevent administrative disagreements from escalating beyond a certain point.
