The Balkans are not unfamiliar with turbulences and international crises, with the current developments between Serbia and Kosovo not being an exception. The difficulties between Kosovo and Serbia stem from a deep issue of recognition, independence, territorial integrity and self-determination.
Also, it is no secret that the international attitude toward the Serbia-Kosovo situation has always been based on affiliations to the major superpowers: Russia and China on the one hand, and the United States, with its allies, on the other. Kosovo became a close ally and regional springboard for the diplomacy of the U.S.
Serbia, meanwhile, relied on the Slavic roots and the pan-Slavic strategic maneuvers of the Russian Federation in the Balkans for support. In a way, the crisis between Serbia and Kosovo became a proxy conflict for the dominance of the Western and Eastern blocs.
Serbia’s President Aleksandar Vucic and Kosovo’s Prime Minister Albin Kurti have both relied on national support and populistic rhetoric to build the foundation of support for their efforts in ascertaining dominance and proclaiming a victory in the power struggle along with their international backers. However, this conventional understanding of the region might be on the verge of change with the most recent developments between Serbia and Kosovo.
The understanding up until now, as stated, was a case of U.S. and EU-backed Kosovo vs. Russia-backed Serbia; however, certain key developments and tendencies have started to point toward a newly developing situation putting Kosovo in a disadvantaged situation, which may lead to Kosovo rethinking its position in the conflict. Kurti has pushed for a more assertive role than usual within the last year to strengthen Kosovo’s position at the negotiation table, show attempts for complete territorial and institutional sovereignty and legitimacy meanwhile trying to marginalize the establishment of the so-called association (Zajednica) of Serb municipalities in Kosovo (2013 Brussels Agreement). However, one should not dismiss the fact that to dominate Serbia strategically, Kosovo has to go through the support of NATO and the European Union, in other words, the U.S. and its Western allies.
Since the Russia-Ukraine war started in 2022, Serbia has been hesitant in continuing its long-held pro-Russian attitude, even voting in support of the United Nations resolutions condemning the Russian military action in Ukraine but short of sanctions. This change of heart opened the doors for the U.S. to heal and increase its influence and alliance with Serbia. If the Serbian-U.S. relationship begins to improve, the U.S. will inevitably have a softer approach toward supporting Kosovo and its diplomatic moves, thus, will push Kosovo toward concessions, such as accepting the establishment of “Zajednica.”
If we look at the latest developments, such an occurrence is not just a theoretical perspective but is slowly becoming a bitter reality for Kosovo. Albin Kurti’s actions pushed for criticism from the U.S. and the EU related to his handling of the latest clashes in North Mitrovica, one of the consequences being the exclusion of Kosovo from “Defender 23” military exercises of NATO with more sanctions to follow according to statements from U.S. and EU representatives. The U.S.-Serbian business council, established in Washington D.C. just a few days ago, is another example of the American attempts to reposition Serbia into a pro-U.S. perspective.
The fact that this agreement was made within a period of significantly high tensions between Serbia and Kosovo, including the capture of three Kosovo police members by Serbian forces, should be seen as a clear message from the Western superpower to Premier Kurti that nothing is “set in stone” when it comes to U.S. strategic positions within the Balkans.
If Kurti continues down with the current path, unconsciously, it may result in a positive image for Vucic, changing the perception from an authoritarian leader with a negative history during the dissolution of Yugoslavia to a contemporary democratic negotiator and stabilizing factor in the Balkans, as well as, making Serbia from an aggressor state in the case of Kosovo 97/99 with its atrocities to a harmless and a reasonable mediator. Vucic’s strong legitimacy within domestic politics in Serbia as well as the position of Serbia as a key factor in influencing Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and other neighboring Balkan states, makes Serbia an attractive and now very feasible venture for the Americans.
Kurti must observe these developments, readjust to a softer diplomatic approach toward the international community, and become a vigilant statesman. He should buy time and engage in damage control to avoid isolation on the world stage when their support internationally is already dwindling. Serbia has demonstrated its ability to play both sides between the U.S. and Russia, meanwhile, Kosovo does not enjoy such a luxury as the U.S. remains the main supporter of Kosovo’s statehood, international recognition and security along with its allies.
The current case requires a pragmatic approach instead of an idealistic one; the intervention of state police in North Mitrovica must be structurally relieved and fresh elections should be declared and realized. Kurti must engage in the role of negotiator and peacemaker, which would put the currently seemingly internationally-favored Vucic into the role of an aggressor if he does not back down. He also should address new policies to bring a comeback for him by reintegrating the Serbian community within the Kosovo institutions and extending an olive branch to the Serbian community in Kosovo and mainly Northern Mitrovica.
As an influential regional factor and a middle power in recent international conflicts, of course, the role of Türkiye is also crucial in this regard. I expect Türkiye to act as a mediator again between the two sides, just as it did between Russia and Ukraine, asserting its role as a critical actor and a stabilizing agent in the region and beyond.
*Professor in the Department of Political Sciences and currently a vice-rector of the International Balkan University, Skopje, North Macedonia. Focusing mainly on Balkans and Turkish politics.
