On Sept. 27, the targeted assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah by Israeli forces underscored Mossad's extensive reach within Iran. This wave of assassinations, including the earlier killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, has exposed critical vulnerabilities in Iran's intelligence apparatus. The repeated failures of Iran's internal security agencies have led to significant embarrassment for the nation, leaving it increasingly vulnerable to Israel's escalating and aggressive tactics.

Following its failure to defeat Hezbollah in 2006 and withdrawal from Lebanon, Israel underwent a strategic pivot, prioritizing intelligence gathering and infiltration over direct military confrontation. This shift has led to substantial investments in two primary intelligence domains: signals intelligence (SIGINT) and human intelligence (HUMINT).

Mossad has leveraged advancements in SIGINT to track the movements and activities of Hezbollah and Iranian officials with remarkable precision. Their sophisticated systems process vast data sets, utilizing voice and image recognition technologies to pinpoint enemy locations. Concurrently, HUMINT operations have embedded agents within these groups to gather critical on-the-ground information.

Mossad's ability to locate and eliminate high-ranking Hezbollah figures – who were once part of a highly secretive organization – raises questions about how this became possible. Hezbollah's involvement in the Syrian civil war is central to understanding this shift. Before the war, Hezbollah's internal structure was notoriously difficult to penetrate, making it a formidable enemy. But its active participation in the Syrian conflict changed everything.

As Hezbollah became more publicly visible during the war, its disciplined, closed-off nature deteriorated. Israel, along with other intelligence agencies, seized this opportunity, carefully analyzing open-source information such as media reports and social media posts to reveal maximum information about Hezbollah’s fighters, leadership structures, equipment and tactics. But the most valuable information came from spies deeply infiltrated within the Assad regime. The sum of this intelligence exposed valuable insights into a once-secretive and tightly knit resistance group.

Mossad operations in Iran

The most significant blows to Hezbollah, however, have come not from Lebanon but from Mossad's deep infiltration within Iran itself. The most striking example is the cyberattack carried out via pagers on Sept. 17-18. The fact that Iran provided these devices shows that this process was carried out through spies inside Iran. It is thought that Israel was aware of and intervened before the supply of these devices or during the delivery process. As a result of these attacks, Mossad managed to kill hundreds of Hezbollah members and maim thousands, disrupting Hezbollah's operations.

Ex-Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's claim in an interview with CNN Turk in 2021 that the head of the anti-Israel unit was a Mossad agent, along with 20 other people, shows the extent of such infiltration activities. These infiltrators reportedly provided Israel with sensitive information regarding Iran's nuclear program and facilitated high-profile assassinations.

Mossad's success in conducting targeted assassinations is hardly new. Between 2010 and 2020, several prominent Iranian nuclear scientists were killed, with reports suggesting that Iranian defectors provided the intelligence necessary for these operations. The 2018 theft of Iran's secret nuclear archive by Mossad agents is another telling example of the precision with which Israel conducts its operations. The fact that agents knew which safes to open in a heavily guarded warehouse near Tehran suggests they had inside knowledge – most likely from Iranian collaborators.

The fact that most assassinations targeting the higher echelon of Hezbollah leadership took place during meetings with high-ranked Iranian military officers suggests that deeply embedded Iranian spies within the intelligence headquarters provided this intelligence to the Israelis. As is common practice, state officials are required to inform their superiors of the time and location of all significant meetings. This protocol inadvertently provides crucial insights into the identity and position of spies who had access to such information, particularly regarding meetings that were later targeted by Israeli airstrikes.

The pager attack

Israel’s pagers attack has exposed the infiltration in the supply chain for highly sensitive material in Iran. The operation also reveals the changing style of warfare as it merges three previously distinct elements of war into a single event: infiltrating the supply chain via a front company, launching cyberattacks and executing an overt military strike. The pagers were modified with explosives and additional electronics for remote detonation, effectively blending cyberattack techniques, human intelligence and military capabilities. This operation exploited a compromised supply chain to launch a coordinated and multifaceted attack.

There are antecedants to the infiltration of the supply chain. Crypto AG was a Swiss cryptography company that was secretly owned by the CIA during the Cold War. For decades, the company supplied encryption devices to governments around the world, many of which were compromised. This allowed the U.S. and its allies to intercept and decrypt sensitive communications from over 120 countries, including foes and allies, without their knowledge. This covert operation was known as "Operation Rubicon."

Waning influence

Israel's strategy seeks to end Iranian influence in the region, starting with Lebanon by targeting Hezbollah’s critical infrastructure in Lebanon, including hospitals, energy centers and weapons arsenals, along with assassinations of political and civilian figures. In Syria, Israel plans strikes on Iranian militias, as well as Syrians linked to Iran. The strategy extends to Iraq, targeting the Popular Mobilisation Forces and pro-Iran militias. Meanwhile, U.S. and U.K. jets continue to attack Iran’s proxies in Yemen. The epilogue will probably focus on Iran, bombing Revolutionary Guard-affiliated sites, assassinating senior figures, and considering renewed attacks on the Iranian nuclear program.

Israel's aggressive actions and the weakening of Iranian-backed groups are undermining Iran's long-standing regional strategy, centered on "exporting the revolution" and establishing a "Shiite Crescent" of proxies. These setbacks may compel Iran to reconsider its approach. The country faces several options: intensifying support for its allied groups, complying with the U.S. or Israel's demands or bolstering its deterrence by accelerating its nuclear ambitions. Each choice presents significant implications for Iran's future role in the region.