The current war in Lebanon is now the main front for Israel. For months, the repeated offers conveyed by Western interlocutors of a cease-fire and Hezbollah’s withdrawal north of the Litani river, roughly 10 kilometers from the Lebanese-Israeli border, were refused as the official Lebanese position echoed Hezbollah’s: any cease-fire in Lebanon is tied to a cease-fire in Gaza. The war of attrition under the rules of engagement since 2006 was going in Hezbollah’s favor – until Sept. 17 when an opening scene of exploding pagers targeted thousands of Hezbollah operatives heralded the beginning of a relentless aerial campaign against Hezbollah’s strongholds all over Lebanon. Targeted assassinations culminated in the killing of Hasan Nasrallah, Hezbollah's leader, as well as many others. The offer of a cease-fire quickly gave way to a wider objective, degrading Hezbollah’s abilities and establishing a buffer zone in Lebanon. Now, a long-anticipated land operation by the Israeli Defense Forces is underway in south Lebanon.
Prior to the pager attack in September, Hezbollah seemed confident that Israel would abide by the previous rules of engagement of measured responses. A full-scale war was unlikely given Washington’s insistence to avoid escalation and the large still unused arsenal of precision-guided rockets and drones, which would prove too costly for Israel. The dire warnings of Israeli escalation by French and U.S. diplomats were ignored as intimidation. It seemed unrealistic that Iranian restraint and American pressure could keep the warring parties under control.
With the war in full swing, the Lebanese government modified its stance, essentially disengaging from Gaza by accepting an immediate cease-fire and offering the full implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701 – which intended to resolve the Lebanon War in 2006 – implicitly acquiescing to the Israeli demand for Hezbollah’s withdrawal to the north of the Litani River.
For Israel, this has come too little too late. Its goals have become more ambitious. The demilitarized zone in southern Lebanon would be neither inhabited nor inhabitable for Hezbollah’s supporters. Hezbollah would soon be greatly weakened by eliminating its upper echelons, severely degrading its military capabilities and Tel Aviv's punishing the Shiite community with extensive destruction and massive displacement throughout Lebanon. True, Hezbollah remains a formidable force, but Israel has been considerably successful in achieving these goals.
Ever since Oct. 8, 2023, Israel has had to contend with a persistent barrage of direct guided munitions that are hard to detect and intercept resulting in the evacuation of northern towns within the range of these weapons. Effectively, for the first time in its history, Israel had to evacuate towns in the north. The buffer zone was on Israeli soil.
For months Israel tried with limited success to suppress this direct fire though, in principle, via a 10-kilometer buffer zone that would still leave Hezbollah with a formidable long-range arsenal. The buffer zone Israel aims to create in south Lebanon is virtually uninhabitable with widespread destruction of property, agricultural land and basic infrastructure. The Litani River itself provides a valuable tactical barrier. Hundreds of villages were asked to evacuate way beyond the 10-kilometer zone under the pretext of avoiding civilian casualties but in reality, aimed at displacing hundreds of thousands. Additionally, Israel showed little concern for collateral damage in targeting Hezbollah to further scare the population.
The initial demand of a limited Hezbollah withdrawal was superseded in September by a brutal campaign to decapitate its leadership and degrade its long-range capabilities. Israel would no longer rely on Hezbollah’s restraint not to attack but rather deny it the ability to do so. Furthermore, the assassination of Hasan Nasrallah and others as well as intensive bombardment of Beirut and any other area where Hezbollah is present clearly shows that Israel also aims at diminishing Hezbollah as a major player in Lebanon. Hezbollah’s military setbacks would surely reflect on its political sway.
It is no accident that the Shiite community thus far has bore the brunt of Israel’s aggression. Unlike in 2006, Israel has not targeted Lebanon’s infrastructure such as the airport, port, transportation or utilities. Instead, it has almost exclusively targeted the Shiite community with vengeance by inflicting extensive destruction of property and considerable loss of innocent civilian lives. Most of the more than a million internally displaced civilians are Shiite Muslims from the south. On the bright side, they were warmly received in Sunni, Druze and Christian areas, which were meticulously spared Israeli carnage. By targeting Hezbollah throughout Lebanon Israel has selectively punished the Shiite community.
What started as a war of attrition in support of Gaza has now degenerated into an all-out war by Israel on Hezbollah and the Shiite community, which finds itself rather isolated in confronting Israel. Syria has distanced itself from the fight, and Iran has little influence to endorse a cease-fire. Iran’s reconciliatory gestures toward the U.S. during the United Nations General Assembly last September left many Shiite Muslims dismayed since the narrative was of an Israeli-American war. Iranian diplomatic activity has yet to be translated into tangible support for Lebanon and the Shiite community. For many Muslims, this war has become existential in which the Shiite ascendency in Lebanon since Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005 after the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri is at stake.
The consequences for Lebanon of a protracted conflict with a weak central authority and no president for two years are paramount. The prospects of a cease-fire and implementing UNSC Resolution 1701 seem remote. With Hezbollah weakened and the south decimated, Israel may have a free hand to strike Lebanon with impunity as it has done in Syria since 2013. All parties concerned in Lebanon, especially Hezbollah, should acknowledge the new reality by facilitating the election of a president who will oversee the implementation of Resolution 1701. Time is of the essence, and there is much more to lose than a buffer zone south of the Litani River.
