In various ways, Italy has found itself vulnerably exposed to the consequences of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. As a close U.S. ally and original NATO and EU member, which also maintains deep ties to Russia in energy and other sectors, Italy faces difficult dilemmas as increasing East-West bifurcation pressures Rome to carefully navigate Europe’s gravest post-1945 security crisis.
Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi, as a former European Central Bank governor and a prominent behind-the-scenes figure of Cold War-era Italian politics, is a devoted believer in the trans-Atlantic alliance and Western institutions such as the European Union, NATO and the G-7. Formed in February 2021, Draghi’s technocratic government started realigning Italy more closely with the United States while further solidifying bonds with fellow EU countries – namely France and Germany – prior to Feb. 24. Draghi has spoken of Moscow differently than his predecessors, illustrated by his criticism of Russia’s human rights records. He refers to Russia as a country that Rome must engage, rather than a partner.
After Russia invaded Ukraine, Italy joined other Western capitals in imposing sanctions on Russia, providing Kyiv with arms, and giving humanitarian support to refugees. Given his personal expertise, Draghi was the key mind behind crippling financial sanctions. In Draghi’s words, Rome chose to respond to the Ukrainian government’s appeal for Italian military support because "it’s not possible to respond only with encouragement" after an authoritarian country invades its democratic neighbor.
Rome’s "divorce" from Moscow followed two decades of Italy deepening its relationship with Russia, which sources more than 40% of the country’s gas imports. During much of that period, Italy’s leadership sought greater autonomy from the U.S. and NATO, especially amid Donald Trump’s presidency.
Given Italy’s energy relations with Russia, Rome can’t easily burn bridges with Moscow despite supporting Ukraine. Although Russia only accounts for 1.6% of Italy's exports, wealthy Russians have a significant presence in Italy in the domains of investment, tourism and luxury goods. Within this context, when Draghi visited Washington last month, he was keen to relay to U.S. President Joe Biden the Italian government’s concerns about how the war in Ukraine’s continuation stands to harm his country.
Dicey domestic politics
Officials in Rome must contend with a complex political arena and the extent to which much of the Italian public is critical of U.S. foreign policy. In general, Italy sees itself as a country that promotes stability in Europe and the Mediterranean Sea, going to pains to avoid war when possible. Memories of the 2003 Iraq fiasco, which Silvio Berlusconi’s government brought Italy into, leave many Italians skeptical of the perceived benefits of aligning with Washington in any war. Most importantly, although a strong majority of Italians view Russia as the aggressor in this conflict, there is much debate among the public about the costs of an anti-Russia foreign policy.
Pro-Russia and Eurosceptic elements on the far-right and left of Italy’s political spectrum fuel division and heated discourse. Politicians from Forza Italia, the Five Star Movement and the League have all championed Italy and Russia’s "special relationship" that was formed at the beginning of the century. Along with Berlusconi in his capacity as Italy’s former prime minister, the regional government in Veneto recognized Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea as a legitimate "reunification."
Matteo Salvini, who was Italy’s deputy prime minister and minister of the interior in 2018/19, opposed EU sanctions on Russia in relation to Crimea and threatened to veto them. In 2015, he traveled to Moscow where he posed for a photo in front of the Kremlin while wearing a shirt that had a logo of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s face as he gave the thumbs-up sign. His pro-Bashar Assad rhetoric about the Syrian conflict further underscored his synergies with Putin.
Salvini and his party were linked to Russian money in recordings that allegedly demonstrate attempted bribery. This year Copasir (a parliamentary committee) has been investigating Salvini’s alleged unauthorized meetings with Russian officials following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine.
Like their ideological brethren elsewhere in Europe, neo-fascist groups in Italy such as CasaPound oppose the modern-day liberal order and see Putin as a statesperson who represents order in a chaotic world. Among more left-leaning Italians, particularly of an older generation, there is a romantic view of Russia as a bulwark against U.S. foreign policy, which is a legacy of the Soviet era. The history of CIA meddling in Italian affairs many decades ago when Italy’s Communist Party was Europe’s largest one outside of the USSR and its targeting of student-led movements continue driving much anti-Americanism in the old left.
Misinformation warfare
Widespread Russian propaganda in Italian media has exploited these anti-American and/or pro-Russian sentiments in the country since the Russian-Ukrainian war erupted earlier this year. Despite the Italian government silencing Russia’s state-run media post-Feb. 24, pro-Putin Russian voices such as Nadana Fridrikhson continue to appear on Italian media outlets as guests.
Last month, Copasir launched an investigation into Russia’s spread of disinformation in Italy’s media landscape against the backdrop of suspicions that some Russian pundits have been on the Kremlin’s payroll. Significant outrage resulted from Rete 4’s May 1 interview with Russia’s chief diplomat Sergei Lavrov, in which he received little pushback from the anchor while making extremely controversial comments about Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s Jewish identity.
In Italy, there is currently a delicate debate over how to address Russian misinformation in the media without trampling on the right to freedom of expression. Meanwhile, there has been dismay among many Italians as to how influential Kremlin propaganda has become in their media discourse and academic circles, which many Italians only came to fully realize after Feb. 24.
Difficult dilemmas
The Draghi administration’s strong support for Western unity against Russia’s aggression in Ukraine forces Italy to make difficult decisions. The country is in no position to end its dependency on Russian energy this year. While Rome works to secure alternative sources of gas and oil from Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Qatar, the Republic of Congo and other countries, Italy needs time to adjust its energy infrastructure. Building the necessary gas terminals and pipelines will require 24 to 30 months, according to the Italian government. Ultimately, Rome is vulnerable to Russia’s ability to weaponize energy against Europe. As of now, if Moscow shut off the oil and gas flows, Italy would face an economic crisis.
There is the issue of one of Italy’s largest oil refineries, ISAB. Owned by Russia’s Lukoil, this refinery in Sicily processes roughly 20% of Italy’s imported oil. Ironically, the percentage of the crude that ISAB processes went from 15% Russian to 100%, which was a consequence of banks not wanting to risk extending credit to the plant to purchase non-Russian oil due to previous sanctions.
ISAB has done much to explain why Italy has been the only EU member to increase its imports of Russian oil post-Feb. 24. To put this into perspective, Italy's imports of Russian oil quadrupled since the war in Ukraine erupted, with the country receiving approximately 400,000 barrels of oil a day from Russia last month – more than half of that went through ISAB.
Therefore, with Draghi’s government committing Italy to join its fellow EU members in cutting Russian crude by next year, the 3,500 people employed by the plant await an uncertain future. With ISAB and its related activities amounting to half the Province of Syracuse’s gross domestic product, much is at stake in southern Sicily. There has been talk about nationalizing ISAB, but that has yet to occur.
The African dimensions
Insecurity in North Africa and the Sahel is also relevant. A concern among Italians pertains to how Russia can use its position in Libya to undermine Italy’s national security. Although it is debatable how easily the Wagner Group could unleash migrant flows from Libya and other African countries into Italy, this occurring would inevitably cause political problems for Rome, particularly mindful of how xenophobic Italians would blame their government for such a crisis.
Looking ahead, Draghi’s government is to remain in power until Italy’s 2023 elections. There is every reason to expect the current leadership in Rome to remain closely aligned with fellow EU countries and the U.S. vis-a-vis Ukraine. Yet the extent to which the war exposes Italy’s vulnerabilities may lead to greater differences between Rome's and Washington’s perspectives. With a vested interest in this conflict ending as quickly as possible, Italy will be more sympathetic to French President Emmanuel Macron’s stance that the West should not pursue the goal of humiliating Russia but instead be more open to compromises with Russia – compromises that virtually no official in Washington is willing to consider at this juncture.