On Nov. 11, 2024, newly appointed Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar stated, “Israel should cooperate with the Kurds and other minorities in Syria.” Saar described the Kurds as Israel's “natural ally” and said that his country should also approach the Druze minority in Syria and Lebanon. On Nov. 26, 2024, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned the Syrian regime not to “play with fire” in a statement on the Lebanese cease-fire. These statements signaled that Israel would shift its military focus to the Syrian arena in its fight against Iran and that it wanted to establish a political sphere of influence through Syrian minority groups.
In an environment where Israel was expected to make efforts to limit Iranian influence in Syria, the toppling of the Syrian Bashar Assad regime led to the almost complete disappearance of Iranian influence in Syria in a very short period of time. In such an environment, Israel's “security concerns” were expected to have diminished, but on the contrary, Israel started to adopt a more aggressive stance in Syria. In this process, Israel both increased its military operations in Syria and continued its overtures toward Syrian Kurds and Druze.
Starting from Dec. 8, Israel launched intensive airstrikes against Syria and it was announced that the Israeli Air Force carried out 350 airstrikes in Syria in the first two days. As a result of the strikes, 70%-80% of Syria's strategic weapons were destroyed and Syria's air and naval forces were largely eliminated. The Israeli army also advanced on the ground, extending its occupation of the Golan Heights to Qatana, 25 kilometers from Damascus. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said: “Strengthening the Golan means strengthening Israel. We will continue to hold, develop and settle there.” Following this statement, the Israeli government approved a plan to increase settlements in the Golan.
From the moment the Assad regime was toppled in Syria, the statements of Israeli officials and the steps taken on the ground indicate that Israel has focused on five main objectives in Syria. First of all, Israel wants to eliminate all firepower and military infrastructure in Syria. In this way, Israel is trying to prevent Syria from posing a risk to itself as a country, regardless of who is in power. However, given Israel's military capacity and the fact that Syria's already weak military power has been largely eliminated, it seems that Israel wants to prevent Syria from being a military power in the future, rather than Syria posing a risk to Israel.
Israel's second goal is linked to Lebanon. When we look at Israel's invasion route, we see that it is moving along the Lebanese border. On the one hand, Israel is trying to cut Hezbollah's land connection with Syria and on the other hand, it is trying to clamp/encircle Hezbollah through Syrian territory. This is a sign that Hezbollah, whose position has weakened due to the developments in Syria, may come under greater pressure in the future. Thirdly, by advancing the occupation in southern Syria, Israel aims both to expand its territory in de facto terms and to establish strategic military superiority over Damascus.
Netanyahu's statement that “we will continue to hold it, develop it and settle it” points to the implementation of the settler policy in the newly occupied areas, just like in Palestine and the Golan, and the intention to annex these regions in the long run when conditions arise. The new conditions in Syria seem to have closed the debate on the status of the Golan Heights for Israel. After the fall of the Syrian regime, Netanyahu claimed that “the Golan Heights will forever be an integral part of Israel.”
Another prominent tool of Israel's policy toward the new era in Syria is the minority card. At this point, two social groups come to the fore: Druze and Kurds. In essence, these tools can also be seen as part of Israel's expansion efforts. In Syria, the Druze are concentrated in the southern province of Suveyda. Amid the ongoing Israeli offensives in Syria and the expansion of the occupation, news started to spread on social media that some Druze villages in Suveyda wanted to join the Golan.
In fact, Syrian Druze are known as a community with high nationalist sensitivities and loyalty to Syria. Druze leader Sultan Atrash led Syria's struggle for independence against the French mandate. Still, the Syrian Druze are a social segment that is extremely loyal to their country and is very angry against Israel. However, such demands, which are spread through a few names that do not seem to represent the Druze community, suggest that Israel is trying to create the conditions for its involvement in the Druze issue in Syria. The second social segment that Israel has put forward as a minority card
The second social group that Israel has put forward as a minority card is the Syrian Kurds. Syrian Kurds do not live in a geographically significant region of Israel like the Druze. However, Israel probably reads the Syrian Kurds through the YPG/PKK and the areas controlled by the organization. This is because there is not a great distance between Suveyda and the area controlled by the YPG/PKK, and this area is largely desert with no population. Therefore, it is understood that Israel wants to create a sphere of influence over the Druze geography and the YPG/PKK regions with the occupation. However, the biggest contradiction here is that the YPG/PKK region is largely populated by Arabs.
Israel's final goal seems to be to incite a federal structure in Syria and weaken political unity. At least, regardless of Israel's intentions, it can be said that its actions reinforce this tendency. Although there have been differences/divisions within Syria since the revolution, a roughly dual structure has emerged. On the one hand, the former Syrian opposition and the regions are under the control and administration of the new Syrian administration. The second region is the YPG/PKK territories east of the Euphrates River under U.S. protection. While the Damascus administration advocates political unity in the country, the YPG/PKK puts forward federal demands. Therefore, Israel's intensive airstrikes in Syria undermine the efforts of the Damascus government, which advocates political unity, and weaken its ability to extend its sovereignty to the entire Syrian territory. On the other hand, Israel talks about “protecting the Syrian Kurds” and the U.S. continues to provide military support to the YPG/PKK. The logical conclusion of this picture is to strengthen federal tendencies in Syria. Why Israel supports federalism in Syria can be the subject of a separate article.
