After Syria’s reentry into the Arab League, nations like the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia started normalizing relations with Damascus. A possible Ankara-Damascus rapprochement, when compared with the above-mentioned countries, carries the most weight in determining Syria’s future and the influence of the United States and European Union on the region’s future.

From the Turkish perspective, the normalization with Syria might serve Turkish interests in two ways: One is the expectation of cooperating with Damascus in fighting against the PKK terrorist group's Syrian wing, the YPG, and the second is the expectation that the normalization process would lead to the Bashar Assad regime taking tangible steps toward favoring the return of the 3.7 million Syrian refugees who are currently living in Türkiye.

On April 3-4, 2023, representatives from Russia, Türkiye, Syria and Iran met in Moscow to partake in a Kremlin-led bid to restore diplomatic ties between Ankara and Damascus. Before this, a previous summit was held between Turkish and Syrian defense ministers at the end of December. However, these steps taken to support normalization have remained fruitless so far.

Assad’s interview with Sky News Arabia in August is noteworthy with respect to understanding the barriers to the materialization of the long-touted reconciliation. Assad claimed that "terrorism in Syria is made in Türkiye," in reference to Ankara’s support of Syria’s armed opposition.

Assad also dispelled the idea that there would be a meeting with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the current climate, whereas Erdoğan stated that, "The door is open to Assad." According to Erdoğan, the Assad government’s approach is important, but Assad wants Türkiye out of northern Syria. This, in Erdoğan’s words, is out of the question as Türkiye fights against PKK terrorism there.

The issue is that the two parties involved have differing interpretations of who constitutes a terrorist. Put differently, Türkiye’s priorities are the YPG terrorist group in the north, and Assad’s are the Turkish-backed opposition in the northwest. Another barrier to reaching a mutually satisfactory agreement is the accusation that Türkiye is the protectorate over the enclave of Idlib. When examined closely, the main impetus behind Türkiye’s controlling Syria’s northwestern Idlib is about preventing the Syrian masses from flooding into Türkiye, especially on the eve of the municipal elections, which will be held in 2024 amid Turkish sentiments about Syrian refugees growing more negative.

Syrians in Türkiye

Türkiye’s domestic environment plays an influential role in the policy change toward the Assad regime, as the 3.7 million Syrian refugees will likely change the sociology and demography of the nation. Therefore, Ankara has understood it is too late to insist on a change of Syrian leadership and now seeks ways of negotiating with Assad. If the proper conditions are established, Ankara hopes Syrian refugees in Türkiye will return to Syria and be greeted with humane living standards. This would also strengthen Ankara’s hand against the U.S.-backed PKK/YPG terrorists in northern Syria.

Assad insists that until Türkiye withdraws its troops from Syria, no meaningful progress will be made for either side. As a result, the current conjuncture is urging Damascus to reconcile with Ankara. A military balance of power continues to exist in Syria. Russia still controls the skies over much of the northwestern regions. Moscow also continues to try to diplomatically head off Turkish and Syrian bids to up the ante by driving a wedge between Türkiye and the West and dealing a strategic blow to NATO, potentially forcing a U.S. military withdrawal from Syria. Secondly, because Syria is under the Caesar Act, which imposed a challenging round of sanctions on Syria in 2020, the Syrian economy is getting worse and Damascus has no option but to reconcile with Türkiye under Erdoğan, whose aim is stability and peace in Syria as well as in Russia-Ukraine war.

To put it differently, considering Erdoğan is the only leader of a NATO country uniquely positioned with balanced relations between the U.S. and Russia, the Turkish president has the biggest potential to maintain cordial relations with both Washington and Moscow to facilitate stability in the region. Consequently, it is in Assad’s best interest to explore a reconciliation with Erdoğan.

In a nutshell, Syria’s isolation, worsening economic conditions in the country and Russia’s pressure on Assad to agree with Türkiye so that Moscow could achieve diplomatic success and calm front lines in Syria while struggling with Ukraine are all important reasons for Assad to settle the issues with Ankara.

Pressure on Assad

From a retrospective perspective, Assad was suppressed by many. For example, in addition to the U.S. opposition to Syria’s return to the Arab fold, some Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia, also opposed normalization with Damascus without a political solution to the conflict. Some Arab countries blamed Syria for the flow of drugs into oil-rich Persian Gulf nations since the war began. Only with the February quake disaster did Syria receive solid humanitarian support, especially from Saudi Arabia. And with the Saudi endorsement, Syria reclaimed its seat in the Arab League. Assad’s isolation ended when the leader landed in Jeddah to participate in the Arab League summit on May 19. The Iranian-Saudi deal in March had a very positive impact on Saudis’ changing attitude toward the Damascus regime. However, despite the above-mentioned positive atmosphere, worsening economic conditions in Syria led to new demonstrations in Daraa province town of Bosra al-Sham, which was the cradle of the 2011 uprising when Assad ended fuel subsidies in August.

The current humanitarian crisis in Syria is so big even if Assad regains control over much of the country’s inhabited regions, he does not have money to rebuild Syria and ensure stability and peace. According to U.N. records, 13.1 million Syrian people need assistance. The devastating earthquakes in early February have now exacerbated the humanitarian crisis, which will persist if Syria does not find the resources to begin rebuilding. Under these circumstances, it is very obvious that the long-lasting proxy war remained largely frozen. Instead, it shifted the arena of struggle from the military to the economy to a battle over reconstruction and sanctions.

All in all, Assad has no choice but to rush to bury the hatchet with Erdoğan, whose priority is the stability, peace and territorial integrity of Syria. Türkiye is the sole neighboring country that was damaged most by the Syrian civil war since 2011. When compared with the other "allies" of the Assad regime, namely Iran and Russia, Türkiye has the right to control the buffer zone along its border with Syria. It must stop the killings of its citizens and put an end to the PKK/YPG’s military existence along the buffer zone – a significant burden considering the cost to Türkiye at a time when Turkish inflation has skyrocketed. Türkiye has the right to control the buffer zone to settle many Syrian refugees who flooded near its border after Assad’s chemical attacks on civilians in Ghouta while simultaneously sheltering 3.7 million Syrian refugees within Turkish territories.

Last but not least, Türkiye is the only country with the right to have a say over the fate of Syria as both Syria and Türkiye have a common destiny, common interest and common future with historical kinship relations. In a nutshell, Türkiye’s normalization with Syria is not only possible but also urgent for both Syrians in Syria and Syrian migrants living as "guests" in Turkish territories.