The rapid regime change in Syria caused great shock in Iran. Both Iranian media and officials, either explicitly or implicitly, held Türkiye responsible for the process and consistently highlighted Türkiye's role in the movement. During the initial phase of clashes, Iranian authorities and media generally characterized the situation as a "movement of takfiri terrorists" and presented it to the public as such. According to this perspective, these "terrorist groups" were carrying out another front of the struggle against Iran and the "resistance" with Israeli and U.S. support. As such, Türkiye was making a "mistake" by falling into the "trap" of supporting these groups.
Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, a prominent conservative figure and speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, stated: "The movements of new terrorist-takfiri groups are part of America's and the illegitimate Zionist regime's plan. Syria's neighbors must stay alert and not fall for their plans. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the resistance axis will continue supporting the Syrian state and people against a new conspiracy, just as in the past, after defeating the Zionist regime." In short, before Damascus's fall, Iranian officials sought to conduct active diplomacy and explore possible support without directly confronting Türkiye through accusations.
This situation changed after Damascus fell and the new administration in Syria was established. Iranian media began publishing headlines and opinion pieces against Türkiye almost daily. Everything from Turkish TV series to Türkiye's economic activities was scrutinized by Iranian media and somehow linked to Syria. The notion emerged that Türkiye's next move would be directed toward the Caucasus, with articles emphasizing the need to pay attention to Türkiye's future steps and maintain a firm stance on the Zangezur corridor.
According to Iran, the distance former Syrian regime leader Bashar Assad had been putting between himself and the Iranians also contributed to the situation in Damascus. Assad had noticeably tried to distance himself from Iran and act independently, particularly since May. Three days before Ibrahim Raisi's death, Syria signed a declaration at the 33rd Arab League Summit in Bahrain supporting the United Arab Emirates' sovereignty claims over three islands in the Persian Gulf (Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa). This step was met with a reaction in Iran, Syria's longtime ally, and was characterized as "backstabbing" in Iranian media. Similarly, unlike other "resistance group" leaders, Assad did not immediately travel to Tehran to offer condolences after Ibrahim Raisi's death, visiting only about 10 days after the incident. This too became a subject of Iranian criticism.
Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, making statements after the assassinations of Ismail Haniyeh, head of Hamas, and Fuad Shukr, Hezbollah's military commander, notably omitted Assad's name when listing resistance leaders, essentially ignoring him. Furthermore, according to reports in open sources, Assad's advisor Luna al-Shibl was allegedly discovered conducting espionage activities against Iran, with meeting minutes reportedly leaked to Israel through France. Al-Shibl was reported to have died in a suspicious traffic accident in July 2024. Her brother, Mulhem al-Shibl, had been detained in Damascus a week earlier.
In short, the tension between Iran and the Damascus administration had become public knowledge. Indeed, after Assad's regime ended, Iranian media frequently wrote that Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had warned Assad six months earlier, that the warnings were ignored, and that these consequences could have been avoided had the warnings been heeded. The Iranians also criticized Assad for his harsh stance toward his people and lack of flexibility. Information from the field confirms that Assad regime soldiers disliked Iranian militias.
The importance of Syria for Iran has been written about extensively over the past 13 years. The close relations that existed since Hafez Assad's time had reached an even higher level with the Arab Spring. In addition to the IRGC's Quds Force, Iran-affiliated militia groups such as Fatemiyoun, Zeynabiyoun and Hezbollah had actively operated in the field to support the Assad regime. As a result, Assad managed to reestablish his power when he was about to lose it. Thus, through both Hezbollah militias and its presence in Syria, Iran had created a land border with Israel. This was one of the factors strengthening Iran's hand in terms of deterrence.
Moreover, the logistics network along the Iran-Iraq-Syria-Lebanon line was vital for Iran. Through these networks, Iran could directly reach Hezbollah. Hezbollah, which had been severely hit by recent attacks, needed logistical support from these lines more than ever. Areas under the PKK Syrian wing YPG's control along these routes also led to the development of close relations between PKK/YPG and Iran. While the PKK/YPG provided Iran with certain facilities through these routes, Iran facilitated PKK militants' border crossings from Türkiye to Iran and into Iraqi territory, particularly in Sulaymaniyah.
With its presence in Lebanon and Syria, Iran was an actor in the Eastern Mediterranean, but this situation has now changed. Additionally, access to the Mediterranean served Iran's efforts to support its allies in the Arab world and reinforce its role as a regional leader. Moreover, reaching the Mediterranean was part of Iran's completion of its "Shiite Crescent" strategy.
After the Oct. 7 attacks, Iran and the so-called resistance axis groups' failure to provide promised support to Gaza against Israel, Hezbollah's desire to avoid direct conflict despite suffering several strategic blows including Nasrallah's death and finally Syria's rapid fall to opposition control, the concept Iran tried to conceptualize as the "Axis of Resistance" was opened to debate in Iran. Years of economic aid to Syria became a particular focus of criticism.
Discussions spread to every platform from newspapers to social media, from television to Parliament. Criticisms that were previously limited to the opposition began to rise from all segments of society. One of the main reasons for these criticisms is that while the country is in such poverty and difficulty and conversely has such an important geographical location and enormous energy resources, it cannot even provide electricity to homes. However, after recent developments, criticisms on this issue began to come even from the conservative segment supporting the regime. This situation shows how deep the crisis of confidence in the Iranian administration has become.
The administration's response was harsh. Khamenei, at every opportunity, called out the criticisms spreading fear and hopelessness among the people by saying that the resistance would not end, that it was a spirit and thought, and called on authorities to initiate legal proceedings against critics. In summary, with all these events, Iran's narrative of "regional leadership" and "resistance" has been damaged. This narrative, one of the sources of regime legitimacy, has weakened.
As a result, with the regime change in Syria, Iran has suffered four major strategic losses: loss of access to the Mediterranean, loss of logistics routes, change in the equation of relations with the PKK and severe damage to the concept it conceptualized as the "Axis of Resistance," largely losing its psychological advantage.
In the first days after Nasrallah's assassination, Iran tried to emphasize that "Hezbollah cannot be destroyed despite taking blows" by highlighting the slogan "Hezbollah Lives." After the Syria issue, Khamenei said that Iran was not a proxy force and that resistance was an idea. In fact, Khamenei constantly separates the concepts of proxy force and resistance, thus presenting resistance as an ideology and idea, distancing it from its organic ties with Iran. This way, the defeats experienced do not become Iran's (and its proxies') defeats. Since resistance is already an idea, it doesn't die according to the Iranians. However, it's a fact that there is serious demoralization.
Khamenei also pointed to Syrian youth in two different speeches, saying they would change today's situation. These words are the clearest sign that Iran has not given up on the Syrian field and its objectives. Indeed, after the opposition's victory was confirmed, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said they would talk with "legitimate opponents." When these and other Iranian officials' statements are put together, it's seen that Iran wants to keep dialogue channels open with the new Syria. It is probable that in the future, it will seek ways to work with the new government and perhaps try to gain ground by attempting to take an active role in Syria's reconstruction process. Thus, in the medium and long term, Iran will seek a Syria through which it can somehow reach Lebanon, rather than a hostile Syria with which it has no contact.
