Amid the looming danger of war between Iran and Israel in the wake of military attacks and counter-attacks between the two, the sudden death of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi on May 19, 2024, in a helicopter crash changed the whole political discourse within and outside Iran.
The crash took place on a mountain near the Iran-Azerbaijan border when Raisi came back after inaugurating a joint Iran-Azerbaijan dam project. In the crash, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian, along with a six-person entourage, also lost their lives. The crashed helicopter was a Vietnam War-era American Bell helicopter. Many, including former Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, blamed the United States for Raisi’s death because it was U.S. sanctions that caused the helicopter to operate without due renovation or maintenance.
Raisi was bid farewell by 12 million grieving Iranians at his funeral rites in the towns of Tabriz, Tehran and Mashhad, which spanned for three days. The occasion was also attended by dignitaries from 68 countries.
Soon after Raisi’s death was confirmed officially, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in a tweet, said that there would be no disruption in the governance and administration of the state, and he also appealed for calm and peace in this hour of grief. The exercise of temporary succession to President Raisi did not witness any sign of political rift and the regime’s resilience and control of the supreme leader over the national political sphere was on full display. First Vice President Mohammad Mukhber, an insider, and supremo of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) economic empire, was appointed as acting president. Moreover, fresh elections to choose a new president will be held on June 28.
It is not the first time that a sudden power vacuum has taken place in Iran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. A similar situation emerged in 1981 when serving President Abolhassan Banisadr was replaced by Muhammad Ali Rajai, who himself was assassinated and current spiritual leader Khamenei was elected as president who served until he was anointed as the supreme leader in 1989.
At home, President Raisi was known to be a true cleric-loyalist of the supreme leader and a traditional conservative. He worked as a unifier among different factions of conservativism and national politics under him was dominated by more conservative elements. He was largely seen as a successor to Ali Khamenei as he was, unlike his predecessors, Khamenei’s ideal and obedient protege.
His pursuit in regional foreign policy was quite steady and he succeeded in restoring diplomatic ties with arch-rival Saudi Arabia, deepening his relationship with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Türkiye, and making a new beginning with Egypt apart from bolstering excellent bonds with China and Russia. He worked hard to improve ties with Qatar, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, India and Pakistan. Only recently, Iran had revived the Chabahar project with India and Raisi had visited Pakistan a few days before his death. Under his presidency, Iran focussed on the Horn of Africa and his past visit to the region (Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe) was the first by any Iranian president in more than a decade, which was largely seen as a "new beginning."
Iran joined BRICS – which includes Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia and the UAE – and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) under his tenure and worked hard to revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). But on the economic front, Raisi failed to affect much change and according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) report, national unemployment reached 8.9 % during the current fiscal year of 2024, which is not much different from the past year's record of 9% and the growth rate fell from 4.7% to 3.8% between 2023 and 2024.
The death of Raisi came at a time when the region was embroiled in a new vortex of conflict in the wake of the Israel-Gaza conflict. The probability of more conflict is very high, given Israel’s explicit objective to entangle other countries in the region and one cannot deny the possibility of escalation between Iran and Israel.
Further, the period before June 28 is likely to see a new phase of political squabbling and it would be a challenge for the supreme authority to prevent any public display of political confrontation among different political streams. The entry of former President Ahmadi Nijad and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, a prominent conservative, into the fray has fuelled the possibility of such a happening. Fairness and transparency have always been questioned in all past elections in Iran, and if these new elections would change, anything needs to be seen.
Raisi was elected president only after the large-scale cancellation of nominations by moderate candidates. Even the nomination of one of the well-known conservative and long-time stalwarts of Iranian politics, Ali Larijani, was canceled in 2021 against Raisi because he failed to get the support of Ali Khamenei despite being close to him.
Though the temporary political transition was apparently smooth, the Iranian political spectrum is marred by a deep divide between ultra-conservatives, traditional conservatives and pragmatic conservatives. The newly elected parliament (Majlis) is dominated by the conservatives and in the last elections, many moderate aspirants for parliament were disqualified. A hardliner, Mohamad Bagher Qalibaf, was reelected as the speaker of the Majlis. Another big challenge would be to keep the national economy on track, which is constantly declining because of the sanctions and rampant corruption. There are further possibilities of more sanctions if former U.S. President Donald Trump re-enters the White House.
Before becoming president, Raisi, apart from the late Qassem Soleimani, was seen as an ideal successor to Ali Khamenei, but his sudden death is likely to trigger new competition for the sake of the top post. Ali Khamenei, too like Raisi, was president of the country, a dynamic figure, loyalist and ideologue when he ascended the throne of spiritual leader. Before his death, Raisi was elected to the Assembly of Experts in March 2024 and was most likely to become the chair of the three-member committee in June only, vested with the power of naming the spiritual leader.
Now his death is likely to embolden and help the son of Ali Khamenei, Mojtaba Khamenei (55), an obscure figure in national politics, to be the front-runner for the top most. Though Mojtaba Khamenei is not so visible in national politics, he has nurtured friendly relationships among the IRGC and enjoys a good affinity with the security apparatus run by the office of the spiritual leader. However, many are opposed to his succession as it would bring back the bitter memory of Shaha’s days when his son was the natural claimant for his father’s throne. Even during the anti-hijab protest, there was resentment against Mojtaba and slogans like "Mojtaba, you may die before you become our leader" were heard on the streets of Tehran.
There could be some possibility of unrest within the Iranian political clique in the absence of clarity about the succession, and prevailing uncertainty could offer an opportunity for the seniors of the IRGC to enhance their control of national politics further. In such circumstances, it would be the biggest challenge for Ali Khamenei to choose an acceptable and idle successor for himself who could sustain the revolutionary enterprise and could not be cowed down by domestic or global pressure.
On the foreign policy front, there is less possibility of any major change because, in principle, foreign policy in Iran is directly controlled by the office of the supreme leader and the high echelon of the IRGC. In the spheres of external politics, the president and foreign minister merely have advisory and implementing roles. All the past ties recrafted with regional and extra-regional countries in Latin America and Africa are likely to continue. The creation and utilization of militias have been a major component of the foreign policy pursuit of Iran, which acts as a frontal protection unit for the country, and this is likely to remain unaffected.
Iran has successfully strengthened its axis, which has helped defeat the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, it prevented the fall of the Syrian regime, helped Houthis against Saudi Arabia in Yemen and strengthened Hamas against Israel.
The successor of Raisi is likely to preserve what has been achieved under the president. As far as Gaza is concerned, the same operational and diplomatic policy would continue and might be more assertive if Israel shows its strategic or military muscle and harbors any objectives of expanding the war. What would be interesting to see is how Iran handles its nuclear file after the U.S. presidential elections in November. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has suspended all nuclear talks following the death of Raisi and IAEA’s Chief Rafael Grossi has also expressed his concerns over the growing capability of Iran’s nuclear weapons. One also needs to see how Iran reacts to the growing possibility of Israel-Saudi Arabia diplomatic ties and the U.S.-Saudi security pact, which has almost entered the final phase.
To sum up, there would not be much change in Iran’s regional policy and there would be a smooth transfer of power after the June 28 election. However, managing the conflict among different streams of conservatism would be an uphill task for the president of the day as future contestation will likely remain confined to the camp of conservatives alone. There could be some political tremors and some unrest could also be seen for the top post of spiritual leader. The race for the post is likely to begin soon given the bad health of Ali Khamenei. Regarding the nuclear issue, nothing is likely to happen before 2025 when a new president in the U.S. is announced, and it could be either Trump or Biden.
