'There is a distinct possibility that Iran’s domestic turmoil will hardly impact Tehran’s foreign policy vis-a-vis Yemen'
The death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini while in the custody of Iran’s "morality police" last month quickly triggered a wave of nationwide protests. Authorities in Tehran have not been able to quell this unrest which represents a major challenge to the Islamic Republic’s legitimacy. Although the regime’s current crackdown, which has reportedly killed over 140 people, could probably buy the regime in Tehran some time, violent repression alone will not address the root causes of widespread tensions that have built up for decades in Iranian society.
The full implications of Iran’s domestic turmoil on the country’s foreign policy in the Arab world have yet to be realized. However, it is important to consider how upheaval across Iran stands to impact the country’s agenda in Yemen, where Tehran has spent years sponsoring the Houthi rebels as a pillar of its regional surrogate warfare.
Sixteen days after protests erupted over Amini’s killing, the United Nations-brokered truce in Yemen, which had been in force for six months, expired. Despite Iran having publicly supported the cease-fire, Tehran might be at least somewhat responsible for the U.N.’s failure to convince the Iran-backed rebels to agree to an extension earlier this month. "The Houthis’ decision not to renew the Yemen truce may in part be driven by their main backer, Iran," said Elisabeth Kendall, a Yemen expert at Girton College, Cambridge, in an interview with Daily Sabah.
Although the truce’s expiration has not yet resulted in Yemen spiraling back into full-fledged warfare, the country’s situation is tense and there are legitimate reasons to worry about all-out armed conflict soon resuming. Under such circumstances, Tehran would have several options for addressing tensions between the Houthi rebels and their domestic, regional and international adversaries.
On one hand, Iran’s government is very much preoccupied with domestic unrest and strategies for managing the protests. Tehran might determine that at this juncture the regime needs to channel its resources toward the situation at home and perhaps become less involved in foreign conflicts. This is, at least, what Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states – primarily Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain, hope for. Under such circumstances, Iran might invest less in the Yemeni rebels.
Nonetheless, the country has always maintained a "low-cost, high-impact" agenda in Yemen, especially compared to Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, where Tehran’s foreign policy comes at a significantly higher price. Furthermore, compared to Iran-sponsored groups in the Levant, the Houthis have maintained far greater autonomy from Tehran.
Houthis
"Surrogate operations in Yemen have been delegated to the Houthis. So, obviously there are some components on the ground that deliver Iranian support and training. But these are not necessarily Iranians – they’re using Hezbollah there," Andreas Krieg, an associate professor at the School of Security Studies at King’s College London, told Daily Sabah.
"The Houthis are a self-sufficient entity. They don’t need the Iranians to be on call on the ground all the time to actually support them. In that respect, it’s not like a lot of attention will be diverted away from the Houthi activity or like the Houthis are going to start acting differently. The Houthis are fairly autonomous in their decision-making," added Krieg.
At the same time, Tehran might conclude that ramping up activities in Yemen could not only help divert attention from Iran’s internal crises but also enhance Iran’s leverage in the Middle East and beyond.
"(Tehran’s) growing domestic vulnerability could well lead it to double down on such support, since it views its relations with the Houthis and other similar groups as an essential pillar of its security," explained Thomas Juneau, an associate professor at the University of Ottawa’s Graduate School of Public and International Affairs and a non-resident fellow with the Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, in an interview with Daily Sabah.
"We’ve seen the Iranians, acting out and creating a fire outside of the country as a rallying point to distract from internal problems, kind of an escalation, shooting down a plane or blowing up a tanker," explained Krieg. "So, Yemen could be another one of these theaters that they use to distract from what is the actual issue, which is the protests."
Yemen expert Kendall also told Daily Sabah that "reescalation of the Yemen conflict serves both as a distraction from domestic unrest in Iran and a potential point of leverage for Iran to gain more in the deadlocked talks over renewing the JCPOA nuclear talks and to keep western powers from meddling in its domestic upheaval," using the abbreviation for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, also known as the Iran nuclear deal.
Impact on foreign policy
There is also a distinct possibility that Iran’s domestic turmoil will hardly impact Tehran’s foreign policy vis-a-vis Yemen. "The Islamic Republic faces unprecedented protests, but it is not on the verge of collapse. As long as the Islamic Republic stands, it will continue to support non-state armed groups in the region, such as the Houthis in Yemen," said Juneau.
Mindful of the dim prospects for a JCPOA revival, Iran has sought to improve its relations with neighboring countries, including those in the Gulf. Tehran believes that if U.S. sanctions remain in place in a post-JCPOA period, Iran’s ability to circumvent the negative effects of Washington’s financial warfare would be strengthened through improved ties with countries like the U.A.E., which, over the years, has helped the Iranians bypass sanctions.
Suffice to say, Iran re-escalating its surrogate warfare in Yemen would leave these two GCC members feeling increasingly insecure and less optimistic about what they stand to gain from investing more diplomatic energy toward Tehran. Within this context, Oman could be counted on to continue trying to serve as a diplomatic bridge between its GCC neighbors and Iran irrespective of the JCPOA’s fate and the outcome of nationwide protests in Iran while also supporting the U.N.-led efforts to restore the truce in Yemen.
Regardless of Oman and the U.N.’s attempts to help keep a lid on violence in post-truce Yemen, Iran’s government might act out of desperation if unrest at home leaves Tehran increasingly fearful about its survival. Under such circumstances, Iran may conclude that escalating its surrogate warfare is its best option. After all, turmoil that erupts in one Middle Eastern country rarely has no direct or indirect toxic spillover effects on others.
*CEO of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington-based geopolitical risk consultancy
** Senior Vice President, Lead Analyst at Askari Defense and Intelligence, a Virginia-based program management and consulting company