The recent normalization of Türkiye-Egypt relations has led to noteworthy improvements between the two countries. It is highly likely that bilateral relations and all regional issues will be thoroughly discussed during Sisi’s current visit to Türkiye. Within this context, potential cooperation on regional matters, including the tensions in the Horn of Africa, will likely be addressed. In this regard, Somalia emerges as the most prominent country.

Türkiye has maintained close ties with Somalia in the Horn of Africa for many years, which have not only enhanced Türkiye’s influence in the area but also significantly contributed to Somalia’s stability and development processes. For Türkiye, Somalia is a gateway, first to East Africa and then to sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, Türkiye has solidified its presence in Somalia through long-standing development and humanitarian aid projects, which has also increased the country's influence in the region. Additionally, Türkiye’s military training base and other strategic investments in Somalia have further strengthened bilateral relations.

Recently, the evolving dynamics of Türkiye-Egypt relations have highlighted partnership with Libya and East Africa. Following President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s meeting with Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi in Cairo on Feb.14, the subsequent visit of Egypt’s deputy foreign minister responsible for African affairs to Türkiye indicates a swift commencement of collaboration between the two countries concerning developments and crises in Africa. Over the past few months, Türkiye and Egypt have been taking steps towards cooperation in regional policies in East Africa.

AUSSOM replaces ATMIS

Significant changes are expected in Somalia in the near future, as the African Union Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) will end on Dec. 31, 2024, to be replaced by the African Union Support Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). Discussions are ongoing regarding the potential inclusion of Egyptian troops under AUSSOM in the new phase. However, despite various disinformation on social media, there is no official statement that Egypt has deployed troops to Somalia under this mission or in any other capacity. More importantly, it must be emphasized that both Egypt and Somalia, as independent states, can cooperate within international and bilateral agreement frameworks.

In this context, the signal for the Egypt-Somalia Defense Agreement, signed on Aug. 14, 2024, was given by el-Sissi toward the end of January 2024. Following el-Sissi’s meeting in Cairo with Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, el-Sissi’s statement, "Egypt will not allow any threat against Somalia and Somalia’s security," can be considered a commitment that laid the foundation for the recently signed agreement. Moreover, the issue of Egypt’s involvement in AUSSOM after ATMIS has become a significant agenda item between Egypt and Somalia. Egypt currently has 990 military personnel under the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and also deploys police forces and experts under the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) and the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), the disputed area of Abyei between Sudan and South Sudan.

Therefore, Egypt’s experience in peacekeeping missions and its potential contribution to peace and stability in Somalia represent a significant development. Following the agreement, military aid materials sent from Egypt to Somalia on Aug. 27, 2024, via two C-130 aircraft are part of the defense agreement signed between Egypt and Somalia. Additionally, while it is not currently being considered amidst the ongoing tensions in the Horn of Africa, it would not be surprising if Egypt makes a symbolic contribution to ATMIS in the future.

Türkiye's ties with Somalia and Egypt

Türkiye has long supported Somalia’s stability, development and peace and has moral-based and positive attitudes toward any country that supports the security, economy and societal structure of the Somali people and state. In this context, the support provided by any country that shares this objective is welcomed by Türkiye. However, the country’s contributions to Somalia are unparalleled compared to other actors. Moreover, it seems unlikely that any actor would replace Türkiye’s current position in Somalia in the near future. Ankara’s approach to peace efforts in Somalia is grounded in respecting Somalia’s sovereignty, non-interference in its internal affairs, favoring international collaborations and enhancing Somalia’s capacity to make its own decisions. Türkiye consistently emphasizes the importance of all regional and global actors working harmoniously to ensure peace and stability in Somalia. Therefore, there is no situation warranting concern for Ankara.

Somalia is a country with which Türkiye has deep strategic bonds in East Africa. Meanwhile, Egypt is one of Türkiye’s most important economic partners on the continent and a significant regional actor with a presence in various parts of Africa. In this context, cooperation on multiple issues is possible. The two nations are known to share similar views regarding Somalia’s territorial integrity and stability.

However, regional actors sometimes express reservations about resolving contentious issues related to the Nile water-sharing and dam disputes between Ethiopia and Egypt through Somalia. In this context, following Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s announcement regarding the filling of the next phase of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), his letter to the United Nations Security Council indicated that negotiations between the two countries had collapsed entirely. This situation indirectly signifies the escalating tension between the two countries and raises the risk of proxy conflicts.

In this regard, Egypt’s presence in Somalia will likely impact Ethiopia’s security and political calculations. As a country sharing a 1,650-kilometer (1,025-mile) border with Somalia, Ethiopia closely monitors developments in Somalia. Egypt’s increasing partnership with Somalia is highly likely perceived as a threat by Ethiopia, as it may weaken Ethiopia’s strategic interests in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The growing tension over GERD and Egypt’s potential strategy against Ethiopia through Somalia heightens the risk of instability in East Africa. Consequently, Ethiopia may take steps to counterbalance Egypt’s presence in Somalia.

Conversely, viewed from the opposite perspective, the situation also poses various threats to Egypt. The Red Sea, and consequently the Suez Canal and Bab el-Mandeb Strait, hold vital significance for Egypt. Additionally, the Nile River is of other critical importance to Egypt’s economic security. Thus, Ethiopia’s increasing geopolitical influence in the Red Sea is perceived as a threat by Egypt.

Therefore, careful and multifaceted diplomacy is required to prevent the tension between Egypt and Ethiopia from escalating into a broader conflict through Somalia. It is essential to question whether such a crisis would concern Türkiye and many global and regional actors. The potential for conflict due to rising tensions in East Africa could present opportunities for al-Shabab to expand its influence.

Moving beyond this bilateral contention, if Egypt’s deployment of peacekeeping forces in Somalia genuinely supports Somalia’s stability, it can be stated that it would not be a source of concern for Türkiye. However, if Egypt uses Somalia as leverage against Ethiopia and operates solely based on its geopolitical interests, particularly through a strategy against Ethiopia, this would present a different scenario. Additionally, any instability in Somalia resulting from the struggle between Egypt and Ethiopia is a scenario Türkiye would not prefer. Therefore, Türkiye must pursue policies that mitigate rising tensions in the area and maintain balanced relations with all parties to safeguard regional stability and Türkiye’s strategic objectives in the Horn of Africa. Ultimately, rather than being apprehensive, it is anticipated that Türkiye, with its deep-rooted state tradition, will continue to conduct a conscious and proactive diplomacy that supports stability in this process.