After two previous failed attempts in 2012 and 2019, Somalia finally became a member of the East African Community (EAC) on Nov. 24, bringing the number of member states to eight. It joins Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, South Sudan, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud called it a "beacon of hope" for Somalia, but it sparked fury and public debate among Somali people.
Despite all the criticism thrown at Africa’s integration efforts, the EAC is widely regarded as a successful regional bloc. EAC launched a Custom Union (A free-trade zone with common tariffs) in 2005. It also achieved the milestone of establishing a Common Market (free movement of resources) in 2010. EAC is making great strides in establishing a monetary union and ultimately a political union.
However, the bloc is not without its challenges. One major challenge facing EAC is the lack of a well-functioning dispute settlement system to address divergent views, whether it be socio-economic or political. And it is one of the contributing factors behind the collapse of the first East African Community (1967-1977).
One big unresolved issue is the disagreement about the EU-EAC Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) by the two largest economies of EAC; Kenya and Tanzania. Tanzania refused to sign the EPA, claiming that it has a considerable negative effect on its agricultural exports, among other things. As a result, the signing of the EU-EAC EPA has been stalled.
On the other hand, Kenya entered into bilateral trade agreements with extra-regional partners, the U.K. and EU on Dec. 8, 2020, and on June 19, respectively, bypassing the provisions of Article 37 of the EAC Common Market Protocol. Article 37 stipulates that “The Partner States shall coordinate their trade relations to promote international trade and trade relations between the Community and third parties.”
Other limitations to acknowledge are funding problems and financial commitments to the Community. As of June 14, there were approximately $72 million outstanding in EAC’s annual membership fees.
It is hardly surprising that EAC members are behind on bills, considering their significant development gaps. According to the United Nations they are classified as the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), except Kenya which is a Lower Middle-Income Country (LMIC). Despite facing similar challenges, Somalia seems to be struggling more than these countries due to its protracted political instability.
So, it begs several questions such as whether will Somalia reap the full benefits of EAC membership. Or will it become a rule-taker and run the risk of marginalization? Will its socio-economic and political dynamics put constraints on the integration roadmap and finally fail to integrate?
Somalia has much to offer in terms of entrepreneurial spirit, location and natural resources. Somalia’s main comparative advantage is its geographical location. It has direct access to the Gulf of Aden (one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world), and the Mandab Strait (a link between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea).
Somalia is also endowed with abundant natural resources. It has the longest coastline in Africa stretching to 3,300 kilometers (2,050 miles), 8.5 million hectares of arable land and vast deposits of untapped oil reserves and minerals. These diverse resources should be a blessing, not a curse!
Ironically, the country has low levels of human development and infrastructure. It is estimated that 70% of the population in Somalia live below the international poverty line (on less than $2.15 a day), low per capita gross domestic product (GDP) ($670), low level of literacy (41%), inadequate road and transport infrastructure (Of the 21,830 kilometers (13,564 miles) of roads in the country, only 2,860 kilometers are estimated to be paved (13%). Somalia’s economy relies heavily on international aid.
Moreover, Somalia lacks the capacity for other key aspects that are essential for regional integration-namely, effective institutions, stable environments, and legal and regulatory framework. So, this brings up the question, can Somalia meet the convergence benchmarks of EAC, considering the wide differences in institutions, infrastructure, income and human capital? The assumption is that it will catch up over time. But the fact is that the country is not advancing due to a combination of factors including poor governance and complex clan politics.
Against this bleak backdrop, there is a cautious optimism to steer the country toward prosperity. The Federal Government of Somalia should undertake policy and institutional reforms that will enhance its ability to deliver political goods to the Somali people and compete effectively. While there has been some progress in some areas, for example, Public Financial Management and National Security Architecture, much more needs to be done. The FGS should accelerate revenue diversification by harmonizing Fiscal Federalism and domestic revenue mobilization reforms.
Although Somalia is a Federal State, it has a centralized fiscal system inherited from the Siyad Barre’s regime. The country’s tax base is relatively small and mainly reliant on customs duties. However, Somalia’s ambitious development aspirations will depend on how best its leaders are able to achieve political stability.
The FGS has limited capacity to control its territory and borders. Vast areas of central and southern Somalia are controlled by the terrorist group Al-Shabaab. The FGS has also no control over the breakaway region of Somaliland. Somaliland is not internationally recognized. And the FGS views it as a renegade province.
One of the drivers of fragility and a persistent problem that is proving more difficult to solve is the dysfunctional federalism in Somalia. There is a deep-rooted mistrust between the Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal Member States which undermines state-building efforts.
The FGS has no controlling power over the most Federal Member States. Moreover, Somalia has not yet agreed to a constitution. The draft constitution has incoherent and conflicting provisions, resulting in persistent disagreements between the FGS and the FMS.
The country is experiencing a constitutional crisis, marked by deep polarization between the political elite. One major concern is the political violence. According to ACLED, ‘From June 24 to July 21, there were 200 political violence events and nearly 480 reported fatalities in Somalia.’ A wicked problem is the recurring election crisis at both the federal and state level which claims lives and displaces people.
A controversial agreement that will reshape the political system adds to the complexity. In May 2023, the National Consultative Council, comprising the federal leaders, regional leaders, and the mayor of Mogadishu, agreed on a new electoral model that will shift from an indirect election system to a direct universal one-person, one-vote system.
The president of Puntland regional state, Saed Deni did not attend the meeting and he refused to endorse the agreement. Adding to that, the agreement has met with resistance from former prime ministers, some lawmakers and the public, raising concerns that it will only worsen the political instability of the country.
Moreover, the absence of a constitutional court and a well-functioning dispute resolution mechanism creates a bottleneck in political development. According to, Bertelsmann Transformation Index, 2022, Somalia ranked 136 and 129 among 137 countries on political transformation and governance respectively.
What is lacking is a political settlement that is driven by strong political will. Somali’s challenges call for pragmatism and cohesive leadership.
In light of the problems Somalia is having, the EAC membership could have widespread implications for Somalia's best interests. Somalia’s sovereignty has already been eroded due to its inability to take care of its security by itself and its heavy reliance on foreign aid.
Undoubtedly, giving away some more of its sovereign powers voluntarily will have serious consequences for the country.
Somalia is currently facing a set of unique challenges that require unique resolutions. Being admitted to EAC means Somalia agreed to forfeit its freedom to set its own rules. Hence, Somalia must adhere to EAC regulations and decisions at the expense of its national policies, identity or interests.
The structural weakness of the FGS constrains the country from taking advantage of the opportunities created by the regional integration. As a result, Somalia will become a dumping ground for products and services from EAC countries. This will inflict irreversible damage on local industries.
As a member of EAC, Somalia is required to pay millions of dollars of front-loaded financial contributions and ongoing financial commitments. All this money could be better spent within Somalia’s borders. The country is already grappling with fiscal challenges. For example, according to the Accountant General’s Consolidation Report for June 2023, the FGS fell short of meeting expenditure commitments by $12 million.
As a result of tariff reductions, Somalia risks a loss of revenue for the EAC countries, bearing in mind that customs duties are the main source of revenue for Somalia. The issue of revenue loss is in addition to a series of potential challenges, including the negative effects of competition for jobs, issues of visas, etc.
But the elephant in the room is Kenya’s involvement in Somalia. Kenya is the core and the economic powerhouse of the regional club. However, Somalia and Kenya have a history of tensions. Since the state of Somalia collapsed in 1991, Kenya has long played a controversial role in Somalia, notably the Kenyan army's illegal invasion of Somalia in October 2011. This complex relationship has often led to an estrangement between the two neighbors. For example, Kenya severed diplomatic ties with Somalia in 2020 following Somalia's ban on miraa/khat. In addition to that, after a long-simmering maritime dispute between Kenya and Somalia, in October 2021, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled largely in favor of Somalia.
But Kenya rejected the ruling. Hence, as a result of the geopolitical divergence, Kenya’s actions may not always be in the best interests of Somalia.
Despite the illegal invasion, Kenyan forces joined the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), previously known as the AU Mission on Feb. 22, 2012. Among the ATMIS forces are two other EAC countries-Burundi and Uganda. Kenya has a geopolitical motivation for its presence in the resource-rich Jubaland State of Somalia.
So, the lingering questions are Will Kenyan forces leave Somalia when the ATMIS mandate ends in December 2024? And will the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF) be deployed in Somalia shortly, hence creating more dependency syndrome? Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) became a full member of EAC on July 11, 2022, and EACRF was also deployed in DRC in November 2022 to help restore peace and stability.
Considering the current state of Somalia, it has a lot more to lose than to gain in EAC. Therefore, the accession of Somalia to EAC seems an elite-driven agenda that can further exacerbate the existing political polarization in Somalia.
