After two years of delays, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) finally held parliamentary elections on Oct. 20. In the competitive elections, the region's ruling parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), secured 67 seats in the 100-seat Parliament, along with five minority quotas.

No single actor could win a majority to form a government; the remaining 33 seats were divided between opposition parties. The results showed that even in the region's most fragile period, voters prioritize the ruling powers and that the 30-year power balance between the two Kurdish parties will continue.

Status quo of duopoly

The KRI Parliament’s tenure ended and the legitimacy of the government was weakened as a result of the elections, which were originally scheduled for 2022 but were repeatedly postponed. While the PUK grew its number of seats from 21 to 23, the KDP only managed 39 seats, falling short of the 45 seats in 2018. The balance between the two parties was mainly preserved, while the total number of seats in Parliament was reduced from 111 to 100 this year.

The election did not produce results that would break the 30-year dual structure in the KRI, where the Barzani family-led KDP controls Irbil and Duhok defined as the "yellow zone" and the Talabani family-led PUK dominates Sulaymaniyah and Halabja known as "green zone" since the 1990s. The KDP and PUK have their own Peshmerga, intelligence and security forces, as well as control of the local economy.

The ruling parties’ relations, which have deteriorated considerably since the 2017 independence referendum, continue to be at very opposite poles on the issues of Kirkuk, the budget, relations with Baghdad and the PKK. The PUK’s extremely harsh targeting of the KDP during the election campaign also indicated the tension in relations. This tension was also displayed in a lawsuit filed by the PUK in the Iraqi Federal Court over the minority quotas being in the KDP’s favor. While previously 11 quotas were allocated to Turkmens and Christians, it was decreased to five quotas by decisions of the court. However, the PUK utilized the very same move in this election. By using the loophole in the quota system, the five seats were divided between three allies of the KDP and two partners of the PUK.

Opposition’s electoral inability

Despite the ruling parties’ squabbles, the opposition’s electoral failure and its reluctance to be part of the established order of ruling parties, which is known for its corruption, eliminate alternatives to the Kurdish duopoly. The biggest defeat of the elections was suffered by the Gorran Movement of Change, who failed to maintain the 12 seats in 2018 and gained one seat. Gorran, which previously rode the opposition wave and surpassed the PUK in 2013, lost support from the anti-system masses after joining the government as a partner.

The New Generation Movement (NGM), which raised to 15 from the prior eight seats and occupied a significant role in the opposition left empty by Gorran, is well-known for its vehement opposition to the 2017 independence referendum and the KDP and PUK's duopoly. Despite its populist and ill-disciplined party structure, the NGM’s success also emphasizes the quest for a realistic opposition in the region.

Instead, Islamic parties like the Islamic Union and Justice Group could not gain momentum as expected in the elections due to the already conservative feature of the KDP and that the people generally tend to vote ideologically rather than religiously. Also, the Sulaymaniyah-based Popular Front, founded by Lahur Sheikh Jangi, the former co-chair of the PUK expelled by his cousin Bafel Talabani, failed to become an alternative with only one seat.

The KDP and the PUK manage to maintain their power through the clientelistic network in the region. The fact that membership in the ruling parties opens the way for citizens to obtain jobs and positions gives the ruling parties an advantage over the opposition. The KDP and PUK do not want to lose their party-state-like characteristic that feeds their order. The opposition’s desperate situation consolidates the power of the ruling parties in the eyes of the voters.

Dilemmas with Tehran and Baghdad

To form a government in the KRI, a simple majority of 50+1 is required. After the election results are approved, the party that receives the most votes will have 90 days to form a government. Therefore, it is expected that the parties will start negotiations during the government formation process after the final results are approved. In the current picture, a coalition government of the KDP and PUK is the most likely option.

While the NGM and the Islamic Union have recently announced that they will not take part in the government, the KDP, which has the most seats with 39, needs 12 seats to form a government. The coalition government established in 2018 included the KDP, the PUK, Gorran, Turkmen and Christians. The New Generation, the Islamic Union and the Justice Group, which were on the opposition front, did not join the government. For this reason, the KDP is likely to knock on the PUK’s door first in government talks.

The ruling parties need each other because they cannot form a government on their own. The KDP may try to form a government with smaller parties, but this scenario makes the government’s chances of being effective in the green zone even weaker. The absence of the PUK from the government also weakens the legitimacy of the government. Furthermore, this option would extremely provoke the PUK, which has already caused unrest in the region due to its Baghdad-centric policies. During the government formation process, the Baghdad government, which is under Iranian influence, has an opportunity to easily pressure the KDP on issues such as the budget, salaries and oil exports, and force it to step back in negotiations with the PUK.

A government formula that does not include either of the ruling parties may hinder the government operation in the yellow or green zones, the dual structure may become even more fragile, and the PUK – drawing strength from Baghdad and Tehran-centric policies – may outspeak its demand for autonomy from Irbil.

In the past, the KDP was able to form a government on its own with the help of quotas, which strengthened the party’s hand against others. However, the current electoral results have strengthened the PUK’s hand. The priority for the KDP right now is to quickly establish a government that has been dysfunctional for two years. Government formation negotiations between the two parties took 10 months in 2018 and it lasted nine months in 2013 as well. New negotiations could be postponed since Iraqi parliamentary elections are expected to be held next year because the post of Iraqi president could also be part of these negotiations between the KDP and PUK. While a delay means further weakening of the legitimacy of the current government in limbo, previous experiences have shown that the Kurdish duopoly will test any formula to maximize their interests.