Door to Eurasia, lock of Türkiye: Çanakkale Strait
"Although Western historians attribute the defeat in the naval battle to the oldness of the ships in the Allied navy and try to present the Turkish victory as coincidental and stemming from negligence, the Bosporus fortifications and cannons of the period were as old if not older." (Shutterstock Photo)

The Çanakkale Strait, or the Dardanelles, is Türkiye's crucial maritime chokepoint, linking Europe and Asia and controlling access to the Black Sea, pivotal for Türkiye's geopolitical influence



Just as books have prefaces, historical events also have prefaces. When the history of the Republic of Türkiye is written, the introduction will likely focus on the War of Independence, which took place between 1919 and 1922; however, the preface will be Çanakkale, which may seem like one of the numerous fronts of World War I but is actually the one that saw perhaps the most strategic move.

Military historian Geoffrey Parker evaluates the opening of this front in his work "The Cambridge History of Warfare" as follows: "The attack on the Dardanelles represented the one strategic masterstroke of the war. It was Churchill's brain-child: the First Lord argued that a successful attack there would force Turkey from the war, open up crucial supply lines to Russia, bring Romania and Bulgaria into the war on the Allied side, provide direct support to Serbia, and create a third front against Austria-Hungary."

Yet, as I’ve also previously underlined, every historical event has a preface. The preface to the opening of this front lies in the 500 years of Crusader history and in the famed political treatise "The Prince," which was written by Niccolo Machiavelli – one of the most important figures of the Renaissance period.

Let's examine why.

First of all, if we examine the Crusader aspect, as the work titled "One Hundred Projects on the Partition of the Turkish Empire (1281-1913)" by Trandafir G. Djuvara examines one by one, dozens of projects were developed by the Christian states about the partition of the Ottoman Empire, and many of these projects were focusing on the strait, which was seen as key.

The strait has strategic importance in many aspects, especially political, military and financial, as it has been one of the two main transition points between Asia and Europe throughout history. There have been countless struggles for dominance over this place, starting from the legendary Trojan War. However, its importance in terms of Turkish history begins with the conquest of Çimpe Castle on the Gallipoli peninsula by the Ottoman troops in 1352 and subsequent domination over the entire peninsula.

Gallipoli conquest: Ottoman dominance, strategic control

The conquest of the Gallipoli peninsula made the Ottomans the sole and absolute ruler of both sides of the strait. It provided control over sea and land trade routes between the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea, the maritime transportation of expensive commercial goods – especially silk and fur, which were going from Asia to Europe, and also facilitated the passage of troops in the conquest movements that would continue toward the Balkans.

Of course, this situation did not escape the attention of European Christian states. During this period, Muslim-Crusader clashes took place in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea. The Ottoman domination over the strait gave rise to a new front, and the first attack was made on Lapseki in the autumn of 1359 by Pierre Thomas, bishop of Koroni and papal representative, with a force consisting of 20 ships and several thousand soldiers, with the support he received from Eastern Rome. In this attack, called the "Lapseki Crusade," the Crusaders were defeated by the Ottoman forces.

After this first attack to take the Dardanelles from Ottoman rule, the second attack was made a few years later, in August 1366, by Amadeus VI, the Count of Savoy, who was also called the Green Count. In this attack, which was called the "Savoyard Crusade" and was carried out with 15 ships and 1,500 soldiers, the Crusaders were successful and first, the city of Gallipoli, and then the entire peninsula were captured and left by the Green Count to the control of his paternal cousin, Eastern Roman Emperor John V. Palaiologos.

Eastern Roman control over the Gallipoli peninsula was short-lived, and within a few years, the Ottomans recaptured the region. After that, there was no attack on the strait for a long time. However, as a security measure against possible attacks, Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror had two castles built, first in 1452, Kilitbahir (Lock of the Sea), and then in 1462, right across from this castle, called Kale-i Sultaniye (Sultan's Castle, modern-day "Çimenlik"). These two fortresses fulfilled their duties for many years, including the naval battle that took place on March 18, 1915.

The importance of the construction of these two castles was seen during the 1463-79 Ottoman-Venetian War. The attack, which was the third attack on the strait in the winter of 1463-64 and was carried out by the Venetian Navy, was repelled by the successful defense of the two castles and the navy in question.

There was no attack on the strait for the next 200 years until one was launched by the Venetians. During the Ottoman-Venetian War of 1645-69, which started after the Ottomans attacked Crete, the Venetians blockaded the strait and continued to attack the Ottomans on May 16, 1654, June 21, 1655, June 26-27, 1656, and July 17-19, 1657, the fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh attacks, respectively.

In the first attack, the Ottoman forces repelled the Venetians, but with the victory of the Venetians in the second and third attacks, both the security of the capital Istanbul and the supply of the troops in the ongoing Cretan campaign were in danger. However, apparently, the security of the strait was restored after the Ottoman forces defeated the Venetians in the last attack, which was aimed at Istanbul across the strait.

There were no clashes in the strait in the following 150 years, but the eighth attack, which took place on Feb. 19, 1807, left a black mark on Ottoman history.

Napoleon's influence

The rapprochement between the Ottoman Empire and France under Napoleon led to a rift between the states forming the Anti-Napoleon Coalition in Europe and the Ottoman Empire. As a matter of fact, wars started first between Russia in 1806 and then between the United Kingdom and the Ottomans in 1807.

During the Ottoman-British War of 1807-09, the British Navy, under the command of Adm. Sir John Thomas Duckworth, attacked the strait on Feb. 19, 1807, and passed without difficulty, emerging into the Marmara Sea, threatening the capital Istanbul. The fact that the British did not have troops to maintain control of the land and that they aimed to distance the Ottomans from the alliance with France prevented a direct attack on Istanbul.

However, although a counterattack was launched due to the Ottomans' insistence on the alliance, the well-prepared defensive fortifications caused the British to retreat.

This attack is also proof that the Crusaders' past is the prologue of the Çanakkale front because the first attacks on the strait started on Feb. 19, 1915.

Although the British started to retreat on March 2-3, 1807, and left the Dardanelles within a few days, the Russian navy under the command of Adm. Dmitry Senyavin, who came to the region around the same time, attacked this once – and it was the ninth attack, which took place on May 22, 1807. Although the Russian navy caused casualties, it was not a successful attack; so he understood and retreated. However, although the Ottoman fleet, which attacked the Russian forces that did not lift the blockade on the Bosporus on July 1, 1807, was defeated in the Battle of Lemnos, the Russians did not attack the Bosporus again then.

There was no new attack on the Dardanelles for approximately 100 years. Of course, the main reason for this was the increasing importance of the strait in world trade. In fact, the Ottoman Empire was now financially under the administration of European states due to the Public Debt Administration (Düyûn-u Umûmiye), which was set up due to its internal and external debts in this period.

Naturally, the threat in the Turkish Straits would haunt them, too. However, during the Italo-Turkish War of 1911-12, which ignited over control of Tripoli, the Italians attacked the strait.

This 10th attack, which started as a blockade and took place on April 18, 1912, was repelled due to the fortifications in the straits. In this case, new bastions and castles whose construction was started by the administrations of Mahmud II and Abdülmecid I following the British and Russian attacks in 1807 and finalized during the reign of Abdulhamid II in 1907 had an impact on the repulsion.

Although the Italians were repelled and the war ended with the Treaty of Ushi, the Dardanelles was attacked once again before the end of 1912 with the First Balkan War of 1912-13 that started around the same time. This 11th attack, this time carried out by the Greek navy on Dec. 19, 1912, was repelled within a few hours.

The Crusades, which served as the first part of the preface of the Çanakkale front with the naval wars that started on Feb. 19, 1915, and ended on March 18, 1915, and the land wars that started on April 25, 1915, and lasted until Jan. 9, 1916, consist of these events.

So why do Machiavelli and his famed work "The Prince" serve as the second part of this story’s preface?

The answer to this question lies in Machiavelli and his work. In "The Prince," about "The Turk," he says, "He who considers both of these states will recognize great difficulties in seizing the state of the Turk, but, once it is conquered, great ease in holding it."

But of course, Machiavelli details the reasons behind his claim as follows: "The examples of these two governments in our time are the Turk and the King of France. The entire monarchy of the Turk is governed by one lord, the others are his servants; and, dividing his kingdom into sanjaks, he sends there different administrators, and shifts and changes them as he chooses. But the King of France is placed in the midst of an ancient body of lords, acknowledged by their own subjects, and beloved by them; they have their own prerogatives, nor can the king take these away except at his peril.

"Therefore, he who considers both of these states will recognize great difficulties in seizing the state of the Turk, but, once it is conquered, great ease in holding it. The causes of the difficulties in seizing the kingdom of the Turk are that the usurper cannot be called in by the princes of the kingdom, nor can he hope to be assisted in his designs by the revolt of those whom the lord has around him. This arises from the reasons given above; for his ministers, being all slaves and bondmen, can only be corrupted with great difficulty, and one can expect little advantage from them when they have been corrupted, as they cannot carry the people with them, for the reasons assigned.

"Hence, he who attacks the Turk must bear in mind that he will find him united, and he will have to rely more on his own strength than on the revolt of others; but, if once the Turk has been conquered, and routed in the field in such a way that he cannot replace his armies, there is nothing to fear but the family of the prince, and, this being exterminated, there remains no one to fear, the others having no credit with the people; and as the conqueror did not rely on them before his victory, so he ought not to fear them after it."

In short, Machiavelli says that, while fighting the Turkish state, the people and the army will be completely loyal to the sultan and his dynasty, and strong resistance will be encountered.

However, if the sultan and the dynasty were eliminated either on the battlefield or by entering the capital, either by killing or by being captured, the Turkish state would no longer be a threat, as there would be no new alternative.

Many studies conducted by examining his character and what he did throughout his life show that the late British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was a real Machiavellian. Therefore, it is not surprising that such a man acts on the orders of his master.

However, as it is said in the 30th verse of the Quran's Surah al-Anfal, "They planned, but Allah also planned. And Allah is the best of planners."

Despite all this Crusader past and Machiavellian view, the plan would be buried first in the waters of the Bosporus on March 18, 1915, and then in the lands of Gallipoli from April 25, 1915, to Jan. 9, 1916.

Although Western historians attribute the defeat in the naval battle to the oldness of the ships in the Allied navy and try to present the Turkish victory as coincidental and stemming from negligence, the Bosporus fortifications and cannons of the period were as old if not older. On the contrary, although the Turkish defense system was much more backward in nature, the Allied fleet suffered a severe defeat on March 18, 1915, due to Turkish artillery and sea mines.

But of course, as it is said in the 17th verse of the same surah, "It was Allah Who slew them, and you did not smite when you smote (the enemy), but it was Allah Who smote."

May the souls of all our soldiers who fought heroically, especially the front commander Cevat Pasha (Çobanlı), and of course, the souls of our martyrs and veterans, rest in peace on the 109th anniversary of the Çanakkale Naval Victory won on March 18, 1915. And of course, the soul of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the visionary leader and founder of our nation, who would later defeat the enemy decisively during the Gallipoli campaign, with his wise leadership and military prowess.