Germany’s Thuringia and Saxony early September state elections resulted in a strong showing for the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) as well as the newly created far-left Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW). As the distribution of votes and seats has already been duly and widely commented about, this opinion piece aims something else: how do these extreme political movements define their stance vis-a-vis Germany’s consensus on transatlanticism? What is more, was it always a consensus? And if so, when and how did it start, and how do today’s parties Social Democratic Party (SPD), Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU), and the Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU) view the issue? Cutting all ties with Moscow, support Washington no matter what?
Hence, and to better understand key positions of today’s German government (featuring the Green Party and the Liberals besides, of course, Olaf Scholz’s SPD at the helm, including the Chancellorship) vis-a-vis the United States – more often than not supporting Washington in any scenario – and as once again a Social Democrat politician manages the country’s affairs a trip down the historical and political memory lane, respectively, makes good commentator’s sense.
Let us start in the 1970s: the Federal Republic of West Germany was solidly in the hands of the Social Democrat Party SPD. After Chancellor Willy Brandt, it was Helmut Schmidt who took over at the helm of the country. Granted, there was a sizable influence of and by the Free Democrats (FDP), ironically yet ultimately leading to the downfall of Schmidt’s tenure – some say leading to the betrayal of Schmidt; besides, and what is of high relevance for this opinion page analysis is that although the SPD won easily at the ballot box, it never managed to achieve above 50%, actually well below. Hence, a coalition partner was the order of the day. During the 70s, the FDP favored the SPD, and with the Greens not yet in the political arena, a stable government was guaranteed. How can you make your future coalition partner politically happy, so to speak? Allocate them to the position of foreign minister, first Walter Scheel, then Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who became synonymous with an aspiring, modern West Germany.
One could argue that during that period in German history, we detect a clear-cut division of tasks – foreign policies should be left to the foreign office and minister, respectively, and all other domestic policymaking areas to the Chancellor and his other "non-foreign policy" Cabinet members.
Here, we must study the "Atlantic Bridge" (Atlantik-Brücke). In their own words and duly acknowledged and here in this paragraph translated by the author of this contribution, Atlantik-Brücke was founded in 1952. The Federal Republic of Germany was young and there was a lack of civil society forces to strengthen ties with the West sustainably and long-term. They wanted to lay the foundations for a good transatlantic relationship. At the same time, the American Council on Germany (ACG) was founded in the U.S. as an American sister organization, which began to promote understanding and exchange with Germany. Atlantik-Brücke made a special effort to inform the American public about Germany and thus arouse interest in the country and its people. Cooperation with the American armed forces in Germany had always been a major concern.
Curious? How would such a strong transatlantic liaison impact socialist and social democrat voices in postwar Germany? Historian Meik Woyke wrote a fantastic insight paper on Oct. 24, 2020, about the transatlantic partnership instead of America First, "Helmut Schmidt and the United States of America." Even as a young member of the German federal Parliament Bundestag in the 1950s, Helmut Schmidt visited the U.S. several times, partly to sharpen his expertise and profile in defense and security policy. Quote, my own translation: "In 1957, Schmidt met Henry Kissinger for the first time, who was teaching at Harvard on the U.S. East Coast (...) Schmidt was extremely taken with his dialogue partner. The two became friends and remained political allies to the end. Kissinger's terms in office as national security adviser (1969-1973) and as secretary of state (1973-1977) under U.S. Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford partly coincided with Schmidt’s work as federal minister and the subsequent years as chancellor. Their dialogue was particularly intensive during this period."
At the helm of the Defense Ministry since October 1969, Schmidt closely linked his first federal ministerial office with his security policy concept of a strategy of balance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, which he had formulated more than a decade earlier. He did emphasize the growing responsibility of the European NATO states as Schmidt was extremely critical of NATO’s strategy of nuclear retaliation against the former USSR, as it would have turned both parts of Germany into a nuclear battlefield in an emergency. With his friend, French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing, Schmidt, therefore, caricatured the U.S. president as an unreliable "peanut farmer" who lacked the security policy experience required for his powerful office.
Against this background, it is also remarkable that Helmut Schmidt, the representative of Germany, which had been defeated in World War II, succeeded in bringing about the NATO Dual-Track Decision of Dec. 12, 1979.
Many international observers are surprised to realize that today’s Social Democrat Chancellor Olaf Scholz unwaveringly supports Washington. The human catastrophe unfolding in Palestine is a shocking and sad case in point; the war in Ukraine is a close second. Engaging in NATO’s eastward expansion most definitely comes in third.
Enter uncharted political territories: first, the rise of far-right voices in Germany; second, the demise of the formerly powerful SPD in many states (Lander); and lastly, the emergence of a new far-left spectrum. The Liberals and Greens are in freefall, at least in some parts of the country.
The BSW, under their charismatic leader Sahra Wagenknecht, argues they want to continue to operate in the sense of friendly East-West coexistence as designed first by Willy Brandt and later by Michail Gorbachev. No surprise as BSW is a spin-off, or shall we say break-off, from the Left, which was the successor of the former GDR, Socialist Unity Party (SED) and Wagenknecht was at the helm of Die Linke as well. In 2017, some in her former party argued that a continental European security and defense block, including Russia, would make sense.
And then the AfD: many argue that this party is somewhat anti-American yet politically speaking not anti-American at the same time. German news station N-TV recently said that anti-Americanism would unite AfD and BSW.
In summary: Are SPD and CDU/CSU going to continue on a strong pro-transatlantic policymaking course, perhaps even more so to let the electorate know that straying away from that long-established path favors far-right and far-left movements? Are AfD and BSW actually willing and able to formulate a coherent set of foreign policies? Or could the old split amongst the SPD as described in this opinion piece resurface, think Gerhard Schröder and others? Or is transatlanticism as the only foreign policymaking set no longer mainstream?
Or could Germany one day realize that instead of either leaning East or West, looking over Türkiye’s shoulders makes much better sense hence to follow in the footsteps of a successful 360-degree foreign policy? There will never be a world without either Russia or the U.S. But there are almost 200 other countries in the global mix. Türkiye is promoting exactly that positive and proactive attitude. Maybe that would steal a lot of thunder about far-right, far-left movements currently making headlines in Germany. A return to political common sense?
