In today’s complex geopolitical landscape, the European Union’s enlargement process has once again taken center stage in discussions among European leaders. However, it’s evident that the EU’s leadership and the Western Balkan states have differing perspectives. While the EU aims to strengthen its positioning in the ongoing geopolitical competition or try to find a new vision for the future, the small Western Balkan states are seeking opportunities. Yet, adding the burden of EU accession talks to an already dysfunctional political and economic system could prove detrimental.

Recent statements from European leaders, including French President Emmanuel Macron and European Council President Charles Michel, have rekindled the debate on EU enlargement and the potential for a multispeed Union by 2030. While a multispeed EU offers flexibility and potential solutions, it also raises concerns about fragmentation and inequality within the union. If pushed into first gear to move forward, the long-anchored Western Balkans may risk breaking their already eroded systems rather than keeping pace with the multispeed union.

Multispeed EU

The actual dilemma lies not in continuing the enlargement process but in the ability of the "Brusselians" – the bureaucrats from Brussels – to maintain and restore trust in the EU as an ambitious project for unity and prosperity.

Macron’s proposal, introduced in August 2023, suggests that the EU should consider adopting a multispeed approach to its future. Under this vision, member states at different stages of integration would progress at their own pace, allowing for greater flexibility in EU decision-making and enlargement efforts. However, questions arise regarding whether this approach might further erode fragile trust.

Had trust been a priority for the "Brusselians," we might argue that Brexit would not have occurred, the Visegrad Group (Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic) might not exist, Euroscepticism may never have risen, and internal fragmentation would not pose a challenge. Furthermore, from today’s vantage point, one might wish for different European geopolitical decisions about Russia since 2008, potentially preventing the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea and the subsequent chain of events that have led to the current war in Ukraine.

Likewise, the EU might not have interrupted negotiations with the Republic of Macedonia (which changed its constitutional name to North Macedonia in 2019) over Bulgaria’s denial of the Macedonian language and nation. The absurdity of challenging the existence of the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria, and consequently their right to study the Macedonian language, has been a notorious, decadelong reality. This situation has been condemned in 17 judgments by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, all of which the Bulgarian state has thus far refused to implement. In such context, instead of disciplining Bulgaria for reckless behavior, the EU has come up with the (in)famous "French proposal" that encourages revisionist nationalist bullying by more powerful neighbors against those outside the EU.

Moreover, as an initial step toward building trust, it could be advantageous if the EU ceases to employ the political term "Western Balkans." This approach would demonstrate respect and obligation for the individual countries, allowing for constructive recognition or criticism of their achievements or shortcomings in the reform process. Extending respect would compel both parties to engage in a more profound understanding of their unique cultures and foster collaborative solutions.

Hence, implementing a multispeed EU could be a complex and contentious process. Determining which countries can advance more rapidly and under what conditions may lead to disagreements and tensions among member states. Moreover, it may not inspire politicians from candidate states to take the political risk of implementing reform processes, as they may merely masterfully engage in empty rhetoric, void of tangible results. The critical dilemma remains whether the EU possesses the capacity to address this significant challenge effectively.

Navigating Western Balkans: Road ahead

The EU enlargement process stands at a pivotal juncture. Consequently, the Western Balkans must shift their priority from relentlessly pursuing EU membership to bolstering their political and economic systems.

In a landscape marked by perplexing double standards, where the EU permits historical and nationalistic issues to infiltrate the negotiation process, rather than focusing on democratic and economic reforms, the Western Balkan states should redirect their focus inward. Their efforts should center on what they can accomplish independently rather than relying solely on the EU or the U.S. for guidance and assistance.

A promising starting point is addressing political instability by eradicating ethnonationalist rhetoric, restructuring the economic system, and forging resilient state institutions free from politicization and corruption. Such measures are essential for instilling trust in governance. A paradigm shift is imperative, moving from top-down directives to bottom-up initiatives. Success in navigating an uncertain future hinges on a new approach grounded in three pivotal principles: pragmatism, respect and meritocracy.

Pragmatism: Strengthening the state’s resiliency

With EU enlargement prospects on the back burner, Western Balkan states must ponder what they can do independently. Expecting external aid, including financial support, necessitates fortifying their internal foundations – sustainable political stability and a competitive economy. Only when they demonstrate internal strength can they be deemed reliable partners. This self-reliance may prompt the EU to reconsider its stance on enlargement.

Neo-liberal ideology champions tolerance. However, experience has shown that tolerance alone fuels instability in multiethnic societies like the Western Balkans. Tolerance implies, "I may not like you, but I’ll tolerate you." In ethnically diverse environments, any scope for ethnic exclusivity breeds separatism and ethnonationalist politics. Tolerance fosters false perceptions, failing to encourage mutual understanding of cultural differences. Instead, it promotes exclusivity. On the other hand, respect transcends ethnic differences, fostering genuine cooperation and collaboration toward a prosperous future.

Meritocracy can dissolve the exclusivity often accorded to particular ethnicities, as responsibilities precede privileges within the state. Meritocracy can act as a catalyst for interculturalism and drive a transformation in political and organizational culture. The reform of political culture is of paramount importance. To become a politician, individuals should possess a statesman’s mindset, education and knowledge rather than harboring aspirations of servitude in the hope of financial gain or a state position. This shift in political culture will enable appointing a qualified workforce to state institutions, fostering equal opportunities and breaking the vicious cycle of partisan control over these institutions that perpetuates corruption. Consequently, interethnic relations will improve, as interculturalism encourages open dialogue about shared responsibilities rather than demanding ethnic exclusivity.

In sum, by embracing meritocracy, pragmatism and respect, they can chart a course toward internal development, resilience and improved interethnic relations. The onus is on the Western Balkans to proactively shape their future in an evolving geopolitical landscape.