Türkiye is preparing for a paradigmatic shift in its Syria policy after the collapse of the Bashar Assad regime. Before Dec. 8, Türkiye’s approach to Syria centered on the fight against terrorism and the refugee problem. Preserving Syria's territorial integrity through normalization with the Assad regime, weakening the PKK's Syrian wing YPG, facilitating the return of refugees to Syria and a political solution within the framework of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2254 were the main pillars of Ankara’s Syria policy. In addition, while adjusting its Syria policy with Russia and Iran within the framework of the Astana format, it was also seeking to solve the YPG problem with the U.S.
However, after the fall of the Assad regime on Dec. 8, Türkiye revised its policy in Syria and created a new strategic framework in line with the realities of the new era. While President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s administration had a compartmentalized approach to Syria before Assad, it is now building a holistic Syria strategy. The main goal of Ankara’s holistic Syria strategy is to stabilize all of Syria.
Türkiye sees post-Assad Syria as an opportunity for regional stabilization. Caution, balance and a pragmatic approach are the key elements shaping Ankara’s new Syria strategy.
Many opportunities can be seen as Türkiye’s strategic advantages in Syria in the new era. First and foremost, among these is the fall of the Assad regime. Türkiye does not have to continue with a strategy that must take into account Assad and the Baath regime to stabilize Syria. This allows Türkiye to develop a more flexible approach and creates a ground where it can directly contribute to Syria’s political future. On the other hand, Ankara has long been working in coordination with opposition forces on maintaining the de-escalation environment in Syria, preventing the Assad regime's attacks on Idlib, operating local governance mechanisms in Idlib, limiting the movement of refugees and fighting against radical terrorist elements. This allows Ankara to exert a certain influence on Syria in the transitional period.
In the new Syria, Iran’s distancing from the Syrian stage also stands out as one of Ankara’s important advantages. Iran no longer maintains militias in Syria and lacks political and ideological influence over the Damascus government. Therefore, Iran does not have the power it once had at the new Syrian table. A similar situation seems to apply to Russia. Russia’s priority is the ongoing war in Ukraine, which forces Moscow to shift its attention from Syria to Ukraine.
The current strategic landscape is also one of Türkiye’s strategic advantages. Between 2016 and 2020, Türkiye had to develop its policy in a highly competitive security environment due to Syria and was engaged in fierce competition with its regional rivals. After 2020, Ankara, which had been at odds with Arab countries holding direct and indirect interests in Syria, eased its foreign policy tensions by dismantling the anti-Türkiye bloc through a strategy of regional normalization.
Türkiye’s critical role in post-Assad Syria unfolds in a new strategic environment where the Iranian axis is weakening and the Turkish-Arab alliance is strengthening. This gives Türkiye an advantage in stabilizing Syria, where it can count on the support of Arab countries and work in coordination with them.
Trump’s likely Syria policy and strong signals to cut ties with the PKK/YPG are also among Türkiye’s most important advantages. The possibility of a coordinated and planned U.S. withdrawal from Syria in coordination with Ankara and Damascus allows Türkiye to approach the YPG problem from a Damascus-centered perspective. The new relationship model between Türkiye and Europe, based on new dynamics, also provides an opportunity for Ankara to use international diplomacy more flexibly during Syria's transition period.
In reshaping its Syria policy, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's administration has built a proactive policy. One of the most important pillars of the proactive policy is the establishment of centralized authority to ensure security and stability. For this reason, Türkiye is working closely with the new Damascus administration to build an inclusive government, guarantee fundamental rights and freedoms, secure religious and ethnic minorities, fight against all terrorist elements and create a facilitative ground for refugees to return to Syria.
The second pillar of Ankara’s strategic priorities is building a united Syria. To achieve this goal, Ankara argues that a territorially unified Syria, whose borders are protected by a single authority, is the only solution. To this end, Ankara supports the formation of a unified Syrian army, consolidating security and defense under a single command, and establishing a democratic system where political sovereignty resides with a central government. This goal has emerged as a red line for the new Damascus administration and enjoys strong support from Ankara.
The third pillar of Türkiye’s proactive policy is effective regional diplomacy. Ankara is working in close coordination with all Arab countries to reconstruct the political, economic and security of the new Syria. Developing bilateral and multilateral diplomacy models for this purpose, Ankara acts together for Syria's territorial integrity and stability with Arab countries that have direct and indirect interests in Syria. Ankara has been in intensive diplomatic contact with the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Organization and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to urge them to support the new government in Damascus.
Activating multilateral international diplomacy to refocus the international community on Syria is also an important pillar of Ankara’s Syria policy. Although Security Council Resolution 2254 is one of the main sources of reference, Ankara argues that it should be adapted to the new field conditions. In this sense, 2254 is seen as a document that sheds light on the transition process and the roadmap for Syria’s reconstruction. At the same time, Ankara calls on the international community to engage diplomatically with the new Damascus administration and to lift the U.N. embargo on Syria.
Türkiye recognizes the need to manage geopolitical balances in the emerging Syria by adopting a balanced and pragmatic approach. Fully aware of the risks, Ankara is prioritizing its foreign policy efforts in Syria in the coming months to mitigate the challenges.
Foremost among these risks is the potential for armed conflict stemming from disagreements within and between military factions. Therefore, achieving de-conflict between military factions is among Türkiye’s top priorities. Although Ankara sees the YPG issue as an important security threat, it believes that this issue is the responsibility of the new Damascus administration in the post-Assad period. Indeed, the new Damascus administration calls on all armed groups to lay down their arms and contribute as political actors in the transition period.
The meaning of this is quite clear for the YPG: In the new Syria, the YPG no longer has the tools it had before. It lacks the demographic weight to control northeastern Syria, it lacks sufficient military power, and it is powerless against the Arabs who want to hold the new Syria together. More importantly, the Trump administration realizes that the new Damascus government will continue the fight against Daesh unabated and wants to withdraw from Syria. However, this does not mean that the YPG problem will be solved quickly. For this reason, Ankara is closely monitoring Syria's internal dynamics, the potential stances of regional countries and the positions of international actors regarding the YPG issue.
One of the most critical issues in Syria is Israel’s policy over the Golan Heights. Israel considers it a strategic victory to weaken Iran in Syria. It will shape its strategy in the new period according to the goal of consolidating this strategic success and will try to legitimize its policy by securitizing Iran.
The new Damascus administration, Türkiye and the Arab countries want Israel to withdraw from the Golan Heights occupied after Dec. 8. Therefore, Ankara must work closely with Arab countries by directing regional diplomacy towards the goal of preserving Syria’s territorial integrity. The new Damascus administration’s declaration that Syria will not pose a threat to neighboring countries, that it will protect border security, and that there will be no attacks from Syria against neighboring countries is expected to cause Israel to change its policy.
Nevertheless, if Israel continues with its aggressive security policy, Türkiye and Israel may come face to face in Syria. This poses the risk of a new, unprecedented conflict and increases the likelihood that Syria will once again descend into internal conflict. To prevent the Iran-Türkiye rivalry in Syria from turning into a Türkiye-Israel rivalry, Israel’s adoption of a position that supports rather than destabilizes stability in Syria could positively affect Ankara-Israel relations in the new period.
Ankara recognizes that Iran’s influence in Syria has diminished but views Tehran’s diplomatic support as valuable in shaping a new Syria. However, this approach does not imply that Iran will retain the same level of influence as it did in the past. Meanwhile, Russia continues to be an important actor for Ankara.
The new Syria has emerged as one of Ankara’s most pressing foreign policy priorities. Thirteen years of experience and lessons learned underscore the need for a pragmatic approach. Recent diplomatic efforts have demonstrated that Ankara has embraced this pragmatism.
