Turkey is currently in a crisis. The crisis is not cyclical but structural. The structural problems with the Gezi protests, an issue that should have been the concern of the city population directly, came to be the concern and jurisdiction of the government. Again, many headlines such as "judicial independence" or "the Gülen movement" can be discussed in the chain events that began with the Dec. 17 operation. However, this sheds no light on why a religious movement emerging from an esoteric belief would try to overthrow or take control of a government.
There is no doubt that the government can be blamed for slowing down reforms and introducing regulations that create an impression of authority, but it does not explain the motivation or the structural reasons behind it.
If the discussion revolves around the government, the government's organizational choices and their reasons from a constitutional perspective, then they also need to be discussed. Turkey has been in a strict centralized structure since the end of the Ottoman Empire, with the exception of the time period between 1920 and 1923. The fear of collapse and division led to these preferences.
But this does not explain why these preferences continued to be upheld. A substantial part of the past 90 years consisted of single-party dictatorships and coups.
Local administrations have authority over non-political issues, such as garbage collection, roads and sewage systems. Construction authorities, which enable annuities, are controlled by the center due to strict hierarchical and disciplined political parties. Accession possibilities gained through local administrations do not provide pluralism and they have no political equivalent. All decisions that can be reflected politically are determined by the center.
The country appears to have a parliamentary system. In Turkey - a country with a heterogenic population - the preference of a high election threshold to ensure a stable government, prevents involvement. The party system is changing the majority of the parliament into a department of legislations, in which the central legislative power weakens the possibility of mediation.
Opposition is becoming passive and irrational. Certainly, this can lead to permanent structural problems, much like it would ease structural reforms.Assembling all spheres such as economy, security, education and culture at a center, would make it attractive to gain economic control as well as providing an opportunity to legitimize and secure it with all the means it offers. It also enables the modeling of society according to preferred political projects. Since the court has been designed as an ideological apparatus by the founding, political elite, it was shut down for democratic participation. Although this possibility was partially regained in 2010, it was not enough to ensure democratic constitution and majority of the court.
With the Gülen movement seizing control of the court, segments of the judicial system worked as a part of the political operations.
It is possible to sum up the foundation of the debate along these lines.In a system where the one who controls the center is able to control everything, it is apparent that obtaining full control of the center would be a motivational factor. This motivation discomforts those who claim the government.
It is not for nothing that the political opposition, which today also includes the Gulen movement, is not open to finding a political solution to the Kurdish issue.
For Turkey's problem is structural.
A new beginning is only possible with a structural change, and therefore only with a new constitutional adjustment. If succeeded, this will be the last crisis of the old-Turkey.
About the author
Osman Can is a Law Professor and Reporting Judge at the Turkish Constitutional Court. He holds a PhD from the University of Cologne, Germany.
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