Terror undermines the opposition

The PKK aims to undermine the prestige of the AK Party, which receives great support from Kurds in the region due to the initiation of the reconciliation process to end the decades-long Kurdish question



Last weekend, an armed clash occurred in the eastern Turkish province of Ağrı, an area densely populated by Kurds. The parties involved in the clash were security forces and militants from the outlawed PKK, which has been conducting terror attacks against the Turkish state for over 30 years. The incident took place roughly as follows: The PKK's legal wing, the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP), organized an event in the countryside of Ağrı. During this legitimate event, gendarmerie forces that were serving in the region opened fire with long barreled weapons. During the clash, which lasted for more than 15 hours, four soldiers were injured and five PKK militants were killed.

This event is now at the top of Turkey's agenda. However, the opposition and the media outlets that discuss it are striving to remove the core from their discussions, and are doing so in a strange fashion. There are some questions that need clear answers. For example, what are militants with the potential to fight against army troops for 15 hours doing as part of the election organization of a legitimate political party? Can someone criticize a state, which has institutionalized democracy, because it doesn't share its monopoly to use force with illegal groups? Another point that makes the incident interesting is the fact that the clash took place at a time when negotiations between the PKK and the government have been ongoing for two years. Because no such incidents have occurred for a long time, and the fact that the military did not intervene in the PKK units who left Turkey, the incident sparked criticism from the nationalist opposition.

It seems that the upcoming parliamentary election is the main reason why the PKK has become active once again, because the HDP, which wants to enter Parliament by passing the election threshold of 10 percent, needs popular support. Well, will the intensification of clashes in the Kurdish region increase the vote of the HDP that mainly garners votes from Turkey's Kurds? This is a paradox, which research reveals, where the greatest support to the two-year-old reconciliation process is given by Kurds. In this case, why does the PKK resort to such tactics to strengthen its legal wing, the HDP?

The PKK aims to undermine the prestige of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party), which receives great support from Kurds in the region due to the initiation of the reconciliation process to end the decades-long Kurdish question. They think that the government will restart the war by succumbing to pressure from the public, who respond to every attack against soldiers with strong nationalistic feelings. The public also thinks that anti-democratic practices, such as a state of emergency being declared, will continue while the economy and stability, which keeps the AK Party in power, will deteriorate. The PKK's scenario continues as follows: By turning back to the concept of war, Kurdish citizens who support the AK Party for the reconciliation process will withdraw their support for the government. Thus, the PKK will regain its previous support that it can then mobilize.

The PKK believes that conflict is imperative in consolidating its base, since it is aware that during peace time it has lost opportunities to incite Kurdish youngsters to join the PKK's mountain staff. The organization had previously practiced this strategy despite the PKK's jailed leader Abdullah Öcalan's supportive attitude toward the reconciliation process. Additionally, Öcalan's harsh messages to the organization, due to some of its acts during the reconciliation process, had repercussions in the media. At this point, there is a major role that the group's legal parliamentary representative, the HDP, which governs around a hundred municipalities, must assume. However, HDP leaders fail to voice even the slightest criticism of the PKK's armed commanders. Additionally, they justify the PKK's armed actions. As is well known, this attitude does not only go against the laws of the Turkish state, but also against universal norms such as the Venice Criteria, which deems "the systematic praise of violence" as a justification for closure.

However, neither the government nor Turkey's democrats have discussed the alternative of closing the party. Turkey has internalized the idea that the antidote to terror is that demands, which are expressed via weapons, should be defended by means of political mechanisms. Moreover, the AK Party, which has made regulations to obstruct party closures, presents a new and civil constitution, which will lift all political bans as its election campaign promise.

A really tough test lies ahead for the AK Party government before the elections. On the one hand, it needs to uninterruptedly maintain its target to institutionalize democracy, which is an objective that has been keeping it in power for 13 years. On the other hand, it should not offend nationalist segments that desire harsher measures against escalating acts of terror.

As for the opposition, it is happy when lying in the comfort of the chaos. However, they forget that if the flames of terror grow, it might also threaten them. Their state is nothing less than a power-hungry character of the Game of Thrones, since "they are ready to burn the country to become the prince of ashes."