New period with Kurds
Syria has completely transformed Turkey's Kurdish question and attributed another definition to it. Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu announced in Mardin that viewing the 10-article package through the old definition can be deceptive. Before Syria, the Kurdish question was basically the result of the unacceptable, unjust and primitive approach of the Turkish state to its Kurdish citizens. Although the PKK was explicitly engaged in terrorist activities, it was admitted that the raison d'etre for the organization was the state, even in the face of the most brutal and violent assaults. The relation between the state and the PKK was also not innocent. During the 1970s, the state oppressed the lively intellectual and political atmosphere created by Kurds by helping the PKK flourish and obliging Kurds to be represented by a single agent. Consequently, even the most fanatic Turkish nationalists were blaming the state for the emergence of the organization while cursing the PKK at the same time.
The positive projection created by this evaluation on social terrain positioned civilian politics in the face of the obligation of finding a solution. Within time, the military also came to realize that the war would not lead anywhere and a political resolution was required. After the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) came to power, such hesitant pursuits all of a sudden turned into a state strategy. Some facts made things easier, including that the AK Party originated from the periphery, approached Kurds as part of its integrative perspective of Islamic identity and perceived the world of heterogeneous identities as the natural order of things. On the other hand, the resolution of the Kurdish question was also necessary to enable the maintenance of the party's ruling power and eradication of military tutelage.The nationalist Turkish perception, which was moderated by a sense of guilt and responsibility, and civilian conservatism, which was supported by social change and future dreams, were unified on the grounds of an appropriate political cycle. The AK Party acted as the carrier of this new synthesis. It was obvious that the issue could be resolved only by negotiating with the PKK and reconciling in some way since it was confronted with a political movement that formed some intricate relations with society along with receiving votes from half of the Kurdish population. Even Kurds who voted for the AK Party and did not favor the PKK believed that the presence of the organization had a positive function. Today, almost everyone agrees that the state would not have sought a resolution if the PKK had not existed.
So the AK Party worked for a solution and did as much as it could. It could not, however, effectively evaluate the influence of Syria on the matter. The dream and possibility of forming a state in Rojava was far more alluring than the most alluring alternative Turkey could offer to the PKK. It was not realistic for the PKK to turn away such a historic opportunity, and eventually it turned out as such.
However, taking this step had a cost for the PKK. The PKK turned from a domestic organization into a foreign force. As a result, the sense of guilt and responsibility attached to the state began to diminish. Particularly, the PKK offset Democratic Union Party's (PYD) cooperation with Syrian leader Bashar Assad, and Russia caused a contrast that marginalized the PKK to a great extent. This situation rendered Kurds helpless. It also led them to keep both the state and the organization at bay in their inner worlds.
Currently both actors are about to give historic accounts of themselves. The attitude of Kurdish society reflects that the feeling of distrust from both sides is profound. For now, the PKK does not have anything to do about it. Its only hope is a mistake or an inefficient attitude from the government. The government, on the other hand, will try to rebuild trust by implementing what can be done and introducing the 10-article rehabilitation package.
The government can be successful if it is cognizant of the insufficiency of this package. But if it regards the package as a sufficient step, it will be hard to make more progress.
The positive projection created by this evaluation on social terrain positioned civilian politics in the face of the obligation of finding a solution. Within time, the military also came to realize that the war would not lead anywhere and a political resolution was required. After the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) came to power, such hesitant pursuits all of a sudden turned into a state strategy. Some facts made things easier, including that the AK Party originated from the periphery, approached Kurds as part of its integrative perspective of Islamic identity and perceived the world of heterogeneous identities as the natural order of things. On the other hand, the resolution of the Kurdish question was also necessary to enable the maintenance of the party's ruling power and eradication of military tutelage.The nationalist Turkish perception, which was moderated by a sense of guilt and responsibility, and civilian conservatism, which was supported by social change and future dreams, were unified on the grounds of an appropriate political cycle. The AK Party acted as the carrier of this new synthesis. It was obvious that the issue could be resolved only by negotiating with the PKK and reconciling in some way since it was confronted with a political movement that formed some intricate relations with society along with receiving votes from half of the Kurdish population. Even Kurds who voted for the AK Party and did not favor the PKK believed that the presence of the organization had a positive function. Today, almost everyone agrees that the state would not have sought a resolution if the PKK had not existed.
So the AK Party worked for a solution and did as much as it could. It could not, however, effectively evaluate the influence of Syria on the matter. The dream and possibility of forming a state in Rojava was far more alluring than the most alluring alternative Turkey could offer to the PKK. It was not realistic for the PKK to turn away such a historic opportunity, and eventually it turned out as such.
However, taking this step had a cost for the PKK. The PKK turned from a domestic organization into a foreign force. As a result, the sense of guilt and responsibility attached to the state began to diminish. Particularly, the PKK offset Democratic Union Party's (PYD) cooperation with Syrian leader Bashar Assad, and Russia caused a contrast that marginalized the PKK to a great extent. This situation rendered Kurds helpless. It also led them to keep both the state and the organization at bay in their inner worlds.
Currently both actors are about to give historic accounts of themselves. The attitude of Kurdish society reflects that the feeling of distrust from both sides is profound. For now, the PKK does not have anything to do about it. Its only hope is a mistake or an inefficient attitude from the government. The government, on the other hand, will try to rebuild trust by implementing what can be done and introducing the 10-article rehabilitation package.
The government can be successful if it is cognizant of the insufficiency of this package. But if it regards the package as a sufficient step, it will be hard to make more progress.