In general, the Kurds were very satisfied with the results of the June 7 elections. The Peoples' Democratic Party's (HDP) ability to exceed the election threshold without any difficulty was interpreted as an indication that the role of civil politics would stand out more in the reconciliation process. But the exact opposite of this came true.

Due to the outlawed PKK's decision to restart the conflict following the decision, the HDP has almost completely lost its political function now. This depressing result has two causes: Firstly, the PKK defined and manipulated the peaceful atmosphere and reconciliation process as part of their armed fight. As a matter of fact, the laying of mines in the region, which are taking dozens of lives, dates back to two years ago. While the state was investing in the region and engaging in infrastructure construction there, the PKK was busy planting remote-controlled explosives under the asphalt roads. The transformation of many villages and arable fields into armory within that period is also the outcome of this mindset. In other words, the PKK seems to have spent the peace process preparing for a greater war.

On the other hand, the initiation of the war at this moment has some logic. As the people affiliated with the organization affirm, this logic has three phases. The first phase is recreating the possibility of sovereignty in northern Syria, where land was obtained but then lost to a certain extent, and uniting the cantons under the rule of the PKK.

The second is turning the "autonomous" public order in eastern and southeastern Turkey, which was formed with PKK pressure, into a structural state. Or better phrased, submitting services such as racketeering, forestalling, forming courts, and maintaining order to the supervision of the militia.

The third point is, presenting the successful ascension into Parliament as a success for the PKK. Preventing the HDP from becoming too autonomous therefore seems to be a critical target.

However, the success of this strategy was dependent on two conditions, both of which were not realized. The first one was the evolution of the U.S.'s indirect sympathy toward the PKK into direct protection, while the second one assumed that people living in Turkey's Kurdish areas would involve themselves in active resistance like they had in the Kobani incidents. The PKK was mistaken on both points. By siding with Turkey's legitimate right to self-defense, the U.S. underlined once again that the PKK is a terrorist organization, and people in the region joined in neither meetings nor protests despite all the invitations, warnings and threats. On top of that, they explicitly stood out against the activities of PKK militants at various places.

This situation is creating a psychological atmosphere that makes it easier for the government to clamp down on the PKK. Also, it seems nearly impossible to cease the operations before public order in the region is completely normalized and the PKK removes all its weapons from the country.

An opinion leader we interviewed in the southeastern province of Şanlıurfa said that it created a "shortness of breath" for the PKK. The PKK's strategy went wrong in every respect, and the organization is not sure about how to stand now and feels the need to escalate the terrorist assaults in an act of overcompensation.

The PKK hopes that its imprisoned leader Abdullah Öcalan will breathe new life into the organization. However, this entirely depends on Öcalan's agreement with the government on a common discourse. In addition, the route Öcalan charts must also be accepted by Qandil, the headquarters of the PKK. What will the PKK do if there is a slender chance? The only tactic they could pursue is hindering the elections and putting the blame on the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan once again. Considering that this is not a very realistic expectation, it would not be a surprise if some intercessors from the West intervene in the following days.