Why a coalition could not be formed?
The fact that there will be snap elections because a coalition partnership could not be formed is now on the parties' agendas as their propaganda campaigns rev into gear. After the June 7 election, the common impression was that whoever abstains from forming a coalition, would lose support in the ensuing elections as a result. Eventually, the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the Republican People's Party (CHP) could not form a coalition partnership. Although they negotiated for quite a long time, now some commenters point the finger of blame at one of these parties for the failure to create a coalition. But on the field, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) was the "brave" protagonist before the elections. Although the party has constantly emphasized that whoever does not support the efforts to form a new government would lose eventually, the MHP declared that it will neither be involved in any coalition nor support any form of minority or caretaker government just after the elections. Then Devlet Bahçeli did not put anything on the table except encouraging the AK Party and CHP to partner and telling them what they should do. Because of this there was only one possibility for a coalition and Bahçeli thought he could blame both parties if a coalition couldn't be formed.
In fact, there is a simple story behind these 45 days. The MHP became a crucial actor after the election and the party did everything to block the coalition talks. The party's purpose was obvious; to represent Turkey's national identity and address the state's concerns on its own against other parties in an atmosphere of instability where the reconciliation process couldn't flourish. Therefore, the MHP thought that the crises prevailing were to its favor and acted like they actually were. Surveys conducted lately showed that this strategy is not so unrealistic. Had the cease-fire been sustained, the MHP would probably have lost support because preventing a coalition from being formed would have been more important. Hence, when the cease-fire was violated, the MHP's attitude that nurtures administration crises became conjectural. In other words, the PKK's strategy is what makes the MHP stronger and ensures the party attracts support from both the AK Party and the CHP's base. And the MHP's growing support almost eliminates the HDP's possibility of being a part of the government. Briefly, it can be said that the PKK's repugnant tactics critically weakened the HDP's chance to be successful. Thus, nobody from the HDP talks about becoming Turkey's party anymore.
On the other hand, this does not show why the AK Party and CHP could not form a coalition partnership. These two parties could have made a viable consensus. But, although the CHP's hand was weaker in the coalition talks, the party acted otherwise. When the surveys conducted in the field showed that the AK Party's support is several points higher than its support in the election, it was obvious that the AK Party would prefer a snap election rather than a coalition partnership. If the CHP had not pursued its "restoration" rhetoric, which basically means to "correct" the AK Party's policies, the AK Party would not have had the option of saying "no." A coalition partnership could have been formed, if the CHP had accepted the prime minister's proposal of a one-year reform government in principal and bargained to extend it up to two years. But the CHP sat on the table by proposing a straight four-year partnership with a party that received 16 percent support more than itself and projects to have a couple of points more in a possible snap election.
Hence, strategically the MHP and tactically the CHP are responsible for the fact that Turkey is heading toward snap elections. Of course, the AK Party can be criticized for this. It can be said that Turkey should have preferred a coalition especially in these grave circumstances. But as Turkey's clear-cut first party in support, the AK Party's choice not to enter a coalition is natural. A coalition requires political vision and foresight hence while the MHP tried to cloud the field, the CHP proved incompetent.
In fact, there is a simple story behind these 45 days. The MHP became a crucial actor after the election and the party did everything to block the coalition talks. The party's purpose was obvious; to represent Turkey's national identity and address the state's concerns on its own against other parties in an atmosphere of instability where the reconciliation process couldn't flourish. Therefore, the MHP thought that the crises prevailing were to its favor and acted like they actually were. Surveys conducted lately showed that this strategy is not so unrealistic. Had the cease-fire been sustained, the MHP would probably have lost support because preventing a coalition from being formed would have been more important. Hence, when the cease-fire was violated, the MHP's attitude that nurtures administration crises became conjectural. In other words, the PKK's strategy is what makes the MHP stronger and ensures the party attracts support from both the AK Party and the CHP's base. And the MHP's growing support almost eliminates the HDP's possibility of being a part of the government. Briefly, it can be said that the PKK's repugnant tactics critically weakened the HDP's chance to be successful. Thus, nobody from the HDP talks about becoming Turkey's party anymore.
On the other hand, this does not show why the AK Party and CHP could not form a coalition partnership. These two parties could have made a viable consensus. But, although the CHP's hand was weaker in the coalition talks, the party acted otherwise. When the surveys conducted in the field showed that the AK Party's support is several points higher than its support in the election, it was obvious that the AK Party would prefer a snap election rather than a coalition partnership. If the CHP had not pursued its "restoration" rhetoric, which basically means to "correct" the AK Party's policies, the AK Party would not have had the option of saying "no." A coalition partnership could have been formed, if the CHP had accepted the prime minister's proposal of a one-year reform government in principal and bargained to extend it up to two years. But the CHP sat on the table by proposing a straight four-year partnership with a party that received 16 percent support more than itself and projects to have a couple of points more in a possible snap election.
Hence, strategically the MHP and tactically the CHP are responsible for the fact that Turkey is heading toward snap elections. Of course, the AK Party can be criticized for this. It can be said that Turkey should have preferred a coalition especially in these grave circumstances. But as Turkey's clear-cut first party in support, the AK Party's choice not to enter a coalition is natural. A coalition requires political vision and foresight hence while the MHP tried to cloud the field, the CHP proved incompetent.