Whenever the Armenian question becomes a topical issue, we talk about a three-part framework of demand: recognition, compensation and territory. Certainly, "recognition" implies the acceptance of the genocide as a reality by the Turkish state. "Compensation" means the reimbursement of individual and congregational loss that was experienced as a result of the forced relocation of Armenians. "Territory" signifies the return of soil that covers seven provinces today and which was relatively densely populated by Armenians in eastern Anatolia in 1915. At this point, there are many problems, which of course have not gone unnoticed before today. Therefore, it is possible to argue that the point in question is being maintained as part of a strategy. However, a deeper perspective might suggest that a deliberate ambiguity is created and the complex psychology of the Armenians lies behind it.If we are to respectively address the three topics mentioned above in reverse order, it is difficult to believe that the demand for territory has any hope of being realized. Before anything else, territory does not change hands on the basis of consent in the world of nation states. I think everyone is aware that Armenia is not powerful enough to take territory from Turkey by force. Furthermore, as two member countries of the U.N., Turkey and Armenia must respect each other's territorial integrity. On the other hand, such a demand has a weak historical basis in that the lands inhabited by Armenians in the past did not belong to them (with the exception of those that constituted individual properties), but to the Ottoman Empire. In other words, until the Ottoman Empire collapsed, no soil was regarded as the territory of any ethnic group and it legally implied an area that was brought into use by the Sultanate. Later, "Turks" took possession of those lands, and this required a legal transformation with the downfall of the empire. Even if we argue that that region of Anatolia does not belong to anyone, we have to acknowledge that Turkish nationalism's assertion to be the continuation of the empire is stronger than that of the Armenians, as far as the transitivity between Ottomanism and Turkism is concerned.

Then, what does this demand for territory signify? Perhaps the fact that we Armenians failed to give a satisfactory answer to ourselves about what we experienced in the past causes us to maximize our expectations for the future. Perhaps the future lies like a burden on our shoulders. In other words, we think about what the next generations of Armenians and history will write about us and we are overwhelmed by this responsibility. With our own small will, we cannot endure the burden of the fact that we waive the rights of the "great" Armenian nation.

The issue of compensation complements this stance. It appears that we deliberately want to leave it ambiguous as well. Being content with the revival of Armenian heritage in Anatolia as compensation does not seem satisfactory enough or significant enough for the Armenian diaspora in that it is not very clear to what extent Anatolia is their homeland. On the other hand, it would be rather unethical to demand money in return for what was experienced. Who can measure those sorrows and estimate a price for them? Thus, the world of "compensation" is being kept on the agenda. However, it will always remain futile.

As a result, a weird equation emerges: From the Armenians' perspective, the triplet of recognition, compensation and territory constitutes a holy integration. Recognition is the most important one and the necessary first steps, without which, the next steps are impossible. In contrast, from Turkey's point of view, recognition is not possible before demands for compensation and territory become "realistic," since the outcome of recognition is not known. Therefore, no progress has been made on this topic for many years, and this deadlock might continue for centuries, if this is what is wanted.