For those who are familiar with Turkey's political and ideological structures, the most surprising aspect of the Kurdish reconciliation process is probably the determined stance of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government. Perhaps the AK Party was not able to push reforms through as fast as the Kurds would have liked, but nevertheless, it continued to pursue its aim of achieving a resolution. It did so despite encountering all the obstacles that would normally bring the process to a halt, and it declared that it was willing to pay any price to achieve its goal. This situation must have relieved Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the PKK. Naturally, it would increase your confidence to know that an actor with whom you chose to partner would act in accordance with your wishes. However, the Kurdish political movement does not solely consist of Öcalan and the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP). There is a large-scale entity that occupies the civilian domain, namely the Kurdish Communities Union (KCK), and also Mount Qandil, where the headquarters of the movement is located. Qandil desires both the rapid progress of the reconciliation process and wishes to become the ruling power in the region. While Qandil was pushing for the introduction of the resolution as soon as possible, at the same time, it presumed that the AK Party was not actually ready to act, and imagined that the deficiencies of the government would increase their own bargaining power. But this did not happen. The government acted quickly and favoured the suspension of political demands in future phases of the process. As explicitly stated, the AK Party aims at granting all the cultural rights of Kurds within the process, but favours the resolution of political demands as part of a democratic mechanism. In other words, as long as the PKK persuades the public to side with certain regulations and succeeds in the election, some of their political demands could be enacted within a general political framework, and by considering the integrity of Turkey. This offer does not satisfy Qandil, since it does not guarantee their right to administrate in the region. Conversely, it turns the PKK into an ordinary political party. And the fact that Qandil could not adapt to this returning condition should be taken into consideration. For instance, they have not really worked hard enough to negotiate what kind of hierarchy or mechanism would be formed with the local HDP politicians. Taking this point into consideration, we can understand the causes of the Kobani protests (which very easily could have brought the reconciliation process to a full stop), as well as recognize the causes of the current Cizre protest strategy. The aim is to stir up a reaction from those who are against a resolution with the AK Party, and to deal a blow to the government. In fact, the number of those who are now dubious about the reconciliation process increased within the party due to the psychological effects of the protests. But the senior figures of the party and the government remained determined. In this case, how is it possible for those who are acknowledged as the "actual" representatives of the reconciliation process and of the Kurds to prevent and block the very same process? The answer lies in the HDP's decision to join the election as a party. The election threshold in Turkey has, admittedly, been placed at an unacceptable level. The AK Party can be criticized for not considering lowering the threshold to 7 percent. However, it is known that the decision of the HDP is a strategy totally developed by Qandil. It is not very likely, but if the HDP does gain support above the threshold, it could raise its voice in the Parliament more strongly. And if it remains below the threshold, which is much more likely, Turkish democracy would be declared illegitimate, which would create a path for Qandil to become a direct addressee and have a higher bargaining power.Interestingly, Qandil needs to receive at least 8 or 9 percent of the votes to win with this strategy - their candidate received approximately 10 percent in the presidential election. But what if they remain at 6 percent? The first possibility would be the government's nightmare, while the second one would be Qandil's. As the election approaches, Öcalan will have the last word, but we can predict that it will be difficult for them to lower the standards. Might they still consider joining the election as a party in the west, with independent candidates in the east of the country? Can negotiations with the government result in a reconciliation? We will wait and see.