The fate of political Islam

Tunisia was the first country to ignite the spark that has totally devastated societies in the Arab world, first through the Arab Spring, then through the incredibly violent counterattack of the establishment. In this sense, political developments in Tunisia have gained significance that transcends their domestic and regional influence.

Tunisia is also a very secular Arab country, looking very much like the early Turkish Republic. The founding party of Tunisian independence, Habib Bourgiba's Néo-Destour, formed a single-party regime and deposed the monarch, very much like the pre-World War II period of the Republican People's Party (CHP) in Turkey. Still, Tunisia has had a very arduous transition to democratic rule. Bourgiba was overthrown by a coup in 1987, which gave power to longtime President Zine el-Abedine Ben Ali. The latter continued the single party regime rather than opening the way to a pluralistic society.However, the proximity to France and the chance to study in French schools and universities has allowed Tunisia to develop an intelligentsia far better educated and more numerous than those in a number of other Arab countries.

After Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation in December 2010, in Sidi Bouzid, the regime was overthrown in Tunisia, as well as in other Arab countries later. But contrary to other Arab countries, despite heavy turmoil, social turbulence and terrorist attacks, Tunisia saw the resurgence of a vibrant democratic system. Two political forces, Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes have been the major political parties in the country. Transparent and democratic elections have been held, won in 2011 by Ennahda and in 2014 by Nidaa Tounes. The alternation between these two parties has also opened a more democratic perspective for Tunisia.

Recently, Ennahda, whose ideology and economic choices are very similar to those of Turkey's Justice and Development Party (AK Party), held its 10th convention where they decided to abandon Islamic references in politics. This important move toward institutional secularization of political life in Tunisia can be seen from a very positive viewpoint. It can also be seen as a move parallel to European communist parties' attempts in the 1970s to distance themselves from the Soviet Union.

"Eurocommunism," instigated by the Italian Communist Party under the guidance of Enrico Berlinguer, followed by the French Communist Party of Georges Marchais, was essentially trying to make a conventional political force out of a communist party. No more reference to revolutionary upheaval, no more dictatorship of the proletariat, no more direct linkage to the Soviet Union. The need to put distance from the Soviet regime and accept the rules of liberal democracy was one of the first steps that ultimately caused the disappearance of socialist ideology as a regime.

Now Ennahda is taking the same step, basically, to distance itself from the execrable image of Islam as shown through the terrorist movements in Tunisia. They do it also to show their faith in parliamentary system at a time when the entire region is in turmoil and democratic representation in different countries are in very difficult situations.

Tunisia has always had a very strong presidential regime, first with Bourgiba then with Ben Ali, which resulted in the first modern popular revolt in the Arab world. What was missing was not a strong presidential regime nor a liberal economic infrastructure, but basic democratic rights.

Ennahda's step toward reinforcing the secularization of Tunisian politics can be important insofar as it targets a better functioning democracy. What can be said for Turkey is mostly in the same vein. The AK Party came to power in 2003 basically because it was organized as a conventional democratic political party, respectful of the outcome of transparent, pluralistic elections. The opposition to the AK Party did not really have the same image and they have lost every election since 2003. But starting from 2013 and the open conflict between the government and the Gülen Movement, the debate shifted from better implementation of democratic rights to the protection of Erdoğan. It is obvious that Turkish politics have seldom been a model for democratic competition. But the way to correct this malfunctioning has always been the enlargement of the sphere of democratic rights and freedoms. The first 10 years of AK Party rule amply demonstrated this issue. Sooner or later, this perspective will have to prevail. It is not a question of restructuring the regime, but rather giving a truly democratic essence to the prevailing regime by establishing decentralized and participative governance. This can be done in a parliamentary, bicameral governmental system, under a presidential or semi-presidential regime or under a monarchy. We have to know whether we really want a functioning, vibrant democracy accepted by all citizens, by the majority as well as by the minorities. Up until now, no political force has come up with a tangible offer.