Tsipras, the EU and legitimacy

European integration has always been an "elite" project, with a unique functioning and with institutions that do not look like any other. It has never really taken its legitimacy from wide popular support, but it has "delivered" throughout its existence. Jürgen Habermas recently wrote in Social Europe that "The Union has legitimized itself in the eyes of the citizens primarily through its outcomes, and not so much by the fact that it fulfilled the citizens' political will."

This is perfectly true – there was never a large consensus among voters for "more Europe" – the European Union stayed consistently "not beloved," but on the other hand, nobody seriously considered leaving the EU, because it has brought political stability since 1952, enlarged and widened areas of freedom, fostered a sense of privilege and, most importantly, brought wealth.

Jacques Delors, the iconic president of the European Commission, who served between 1985 and 1995, once declared that "one cannot fall in love with the Single Market." Clearly, the intricate functioning of the EU institutions and the absence of any real democratic controlling mechanisms over these institutions, has created an image of "Brussels Eurocrats deciding behind closed doors." But over time, what the EU has been delivering, as well as its functioning and the so-called system of solidarity, has turned it into the single most viable social model in Europe (and elsewhere).

The EU has been growing steadily and becoming more and more integrated over the years, culminating in the penultimate stage of integration: The Monetary Union. It was called the Economic and Monetary Union, because a common currency, which is by necessity a federal instrument, would need at least a basic harmonization and convergence of economic policies. The trouble was that a federal instrument was managed by an intergovernmental body, which is the Council of Ministers of the EU. Therefore, there was no real convergence, nor harmonization of economic policies, let alone employment policies. These domains remain the most lightly-written parts of the Founding Treaties, mostly because of the fact that in order to get elected, governments needed to have economic and employment policies that they could qualify as their "own."

Flexible and less flexible regulatory frameworks have been put in place, especially with the Pact on Stability and Growth, but the system, using a federal instrument and deciding in an intergovernmental way, was inherently dysfunctional. These dysfunctions became visible very quickly – in particular, the restriction of the budget deficit below 3 percent of the GDP, which has been a real pain in the neck for all eurozone countries, not least for Germany and France. But these malfunctioning components of the monetary union were dealt with by the EU member states, in the best tradition of EU dynamics: by long, tedious and detailed negotiations where a consensus was delivered, in the full knowledge of all the participants.

Greece, whose economic performance was inadequate to join the EU, has been the first country not to play the game of transparency. Starting with the Simitis government, public books and accounts have been grossly modified in order to give a much better view of the economy. Greece was able to join the EU on the grounds of a qualified deceit, which lasted for almost eight years, before the extent of the fraud was discovered. The huge budget deficit, hidden for years, has pushed the Greek economy into the abyss and bankruptcy has been avoided only thanks to a huge bail-out program, mainly helping the bankrupt Greek banking system to remain afloat.

The austerity measures that accompanied the Greek bail-out were seemingly implemented to let the economy recover on much sounder grounds, but it was also a means with which to show Greece that making a fool out of the whole EU system would not go unpunished.

Greeks (or a majority of them) have suffered immensely for five years, GDP has plunged almost 25 percent, growth has remained negative almost the entire time, and except for severing the financing means, no real reform has been carried out, especially regarding deregulation of the economic sectors and privatization. Despite regular admonitions, the EU has not really insisted upon the completion of the structural reforms in Greece. On the other hand, expenditure limitations were closely implemented and scrutinized. This has created immense resentment among the Greek population, especially vis-à-vis Germany, who is seen as the culprit.

Syriza's victory is in direct line with this sense of having had enough on the part of the Greeks. Tsipras and Varoufakis know this and they will need to play their game very intelligently, by blowing hot and cold. The problem is that they have no real power to stand up to the almighty institutions of the EU. Varoufakis has been touring most of the EU capitals, and met two days ago the implacable German Christian Democrat Minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, where he received the blunt message: Germany does not want the austerity program to be altered and does not wish to replace the Troika by a more political institution. The European Central Bank has been even blunter; they have practically condemned the Greek Banks to use an emergency fund, which could be cut off any moment, for a maximum of 25 days.

This is a very direct way to tell the Greeks that the siesta is over and it is now time for reality. Is this really a good idea? Making Tsipras and his government look so frail against the omnipotent European Central Bank will seriously undermine the EU's image of a union that "delivers"... Already the French Left Party has organized a manifestation to protest against the measures taken vis–à-vis Greece, in front of the ECB. Greece is very weak, everyone knows that, but making an example of it via discipline to a whole society the way the ECB and Schäuble are tempted to continue to do will create real legitimacy problems within the EU very soon.