On Friday, Al Sharq Forum and Istituto Affari Internazionali co-hosted an important event about "Turkey, Kurds and a new region" in Rome. The conference, which attracted a number of leading experts in the field, concentrated on the various aspects of Turkey's evolving relationship with the Kurdish people and other regional powers including Saudi Arabia and Iran. Ahead of the 2015 general election, which is scheduled to take place on June 7, a specific part of the conversation relating to the question of agency within the context of the Kurdish reconciliation process was particularly interesting. The question of agency relates to negotiating parties' need for strong leadership and determination to end violent conflict. For years, PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan served as a representative for Kurdish radicals and played an influential role in every aspect of his organization's violent campaign.

Meanwhile, the Turkish government changed hands a few times: Between 1989 and 1993, President Turgut Özal adopted a reformist stance toward the Kurdish question to address the Kurdish community's grievances, yet died in office under controversial circumstances. Following Özal's death, coalition governments delegated the issue to the Armed Forces. It was not until the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) in the early 2000s that the executive branch started to take charge. Finally, the government initiated direct and public talks with the PKK leadership to negotiate a permanent cease-fire and disarmament despite objections from a number of opposition movements including the Republican People's Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). Today, the reconciliation process remains Turkey's best hope for a brighter future and a more stable neighborhood. "The main reason that the reconciliation process did not start until 2013," a participant suggested, "was the lack of strong leadership on the Turkish side between President Özal's death and the emergence of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as an agent of change."

The effort to peacefully resolve the Kurdish question, surely enough, has been a permanent feature in President Erdoğan's tenure as prime minister: In 2005, he publicly acknowledged the chronic issue and pledged to address the Kurdish community's grievances. Over the next couple of years, the AK Party government implemented a number of democratic reforms amid strong objections from opposition parties and the Armed Forces. Meanwhile, informal talks between the Turkish authorities and the PKK leadership evolved into the Kurdish reconciliation process.

Although the occasional strongly-worded remark raises questions about the prospect of peace, there is no reason to believe that the Turkish government or the PKK leadership intend to change their mind about ending violence. Meanwhile, some experts rush to the conclusion that agency is no longer needed since the political landscape of the Middle East already compels Turkish and Kurdish leaders to join forces. Structural factors alone, however, fail to account for what has already been achieved as a result of the reconciliation process: If anything, the talks produced a lasting cease-fire despite the fact that the Arab Spring revolutions encouraged Kurdish radicals to rise up against national governments in Turkey, Iran, Syria and Iraq. Agents of change, as always, will make history.